

# Stage 03 Workgroup Report

## Connection and Use of System Code (CUSC)

# CMP201 Removal of BSUoS Charges from Generation Volume 1

What stage is this document at?

01	Initial Written Assessment
02	Workgroup Consultation
03	Workgroup Report
04	Code Administrator Consultation
05	Draft CUSC Modification Report
06	Final CUSC Modification Report

This proposal seeks to modify the CUSC to better align GB market arrangements with other EU member states by removing BSUoS charges from GB Generators and, instead, recover BSUoS from GB Suppliers only.

Published on: 14<sup>th</sup> February 2013



### ***The Workgroup Concludes:***

That the CMP201 Original and both Workgroup Alternative CUSC Modifications better facilitate the Applicable CUSC Objectives, with a preference for WACM 1.



### ***High Impact:***

Generators and Suppliers



### ***Medium Impact:***

Other CUSC Parties



### ***Low Impact:***

None



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Any Questions?

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## About this document

This is the final Workgroup Report which includes the deliberations of the Workgroup, responses from the Workgroup Consultation and the final conclusions of the Workgroup.

## Document Control

<b>Version</b>	<b>Date</b>	<b>Author</b>	<b>Change Reference</b>
2.0	19 July 2012	Code Administrator	Final Workgroup Report
3.0	6 February 2013	Code Administrator	Post Send-Back Final Workgroup Report for WG comment
3.1	14 February 2013	Code Administrator	Final Workgroup Report for submission to CUSC Panel



## 1 Summary

### What is BSUoS?

- 1.1 CMP201 seeks to remove BSUoS charges from GB Generators, thereafter recovering all BSUoS from GB Suppliers. In doing so, it seeks to better facilitate efficient competition between GB generation and generation in other EU markets. Better aligning the GB market arrangements and the charges faced by GB generation with those prevalent in other EU member states, where generation is typically not subject to such charges, allows GB and continental generation to compete on a more equitable basis and removes the potential for BSUoS to distort cross border trade.
- 1.2 The EU “Third Package” aims to deliver all consumers greater choice with more cross-border trade so as to achieve efficiency gains, competitive prices and security of supply. It recognises that different market structures will exist however it also acknowledges the need for fair competition across the European Community so as to provide producers with the appropriate incentives for investing in new generation. Changing the GB arrangements as proposed in CMP201 thus facilitates the aims outlined in the EU Directive 2009/72/EC concerning rule for the internal market in electricity<sup>1</sup>.
- 1.3 CMP201 was proposed by National Grid Electricity Transmission plc (NGET) and submitted to the CUSC Modifications Panel for their consideration on 8<sup>th</sup> December 2011. The Panel determined that the proposal should be considered by a Workgroup and that they should report back to the Panel within four months following a period of 15 business days for the Workgroup Consultation. The four months was subsequently increased by the Panel to allow for more in depth analysis by the Workgroup to be included in this report.
- 1.4 The Workgroup first met on 10<sup>th</sup> January 2012 and the members accepted the Terms of Reference. A copy of the Terms of Reference is provided in [Annex 1](#). The Workgroup considered the issues raised by the CUSC Modification Proposal and worked through the Terms of Reference.
- 1.5 This document outlines the discussions held by the Workgroup, the responses to the Workgroup Consultation and the nature of the CUSC changes that are proposed. Summaries of the responses can be found in Section 8. Copies of all representations received in response to the Workgroup Consultation are contained within Volume 2 of this report.
- 1.6 The Workgroup Report was discussed and accepted by the CUSC Panel at their meeting on 27<sup>th</sup> July 2012. A Code Administrator Consultation then took place and the Final CUSC Modification Report was compiled for the CUSC Panel to hold their vote on 28<sup>th</sup> September 2012. The Code Administrator Consultation Responses can be found in Volume 2 of the Final Report.<sup>2</sup> At that meeting, the Panel voted by majority that the CMP201 Original and both Workgroup Alternative CUSC Modifications better facilitate the Applicable CUSC Objectives. There was a majority preference for the Original Proposal to be implemented. Full details of the original Panel vote are provided in Annex 15. The Final Report was then sent to the Authority on 10<sup>th</sup> October 2013.

National Grid recovers the costs of balancing the system through BSUoS charges. BSUoS charges are paid for by all CUSC Parties, including Lead Parties for flows on Interconnector BM Units. The Statement of the Use of System Charging Methodology includes a detailed methodology for the calculation of daily BSUoS charges and information on the timing of the charges. The Statement of the BSUoS Charging Methodology was recently incorporated in the CUSC can be found at the following [link CUSC Section 14:](#)

<sup>1</sup> <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:211:0055:0093:EN:PDF>

<sup>2</sup> The responses can be found here: <http://www.nationalgrid.com/NR/rdonlyres/B94D6062-097C-465C-B8DF-7139932F8BED/56924/CMP201FinalModReportVolume2Responses.pdf>

- 1.7 The Report was subsequently 'sent back' by the Authority<sup>3</sup> due to deficiencies and it was agreed for the Workgroup to reconvene and re-issue the Workgroup Report for presentation to the CUSC Panel. The Workgroup was reconstituted to address the issues raised by Ofgem.
- 1.8 This CUSC Modifications Report has been prepared in accordance with the terms of the CUSC. An electronic copy can be found on the National Grid website at [www.nationalgrid.com/uk/Electricity/Codes](http://www.nationalgrid.com/uk/Electricity/Codes), along with the CUSC Modification Proposal form
- 1.9 National Grid has initiated BSC amendment proposals<sup>4</sup> to address a possible interaction with the Residual Cashflow Reallocation Cashflow arrangements under the BSC.

## Workgroup Conclusion

- 1.10 The Workgroup voted by majority that CMP201 better meets the Applicable CUSC Objectives, with marginally more votes in favour of WACM 1. Following "send-back", the Workgroup re-confirmed their votes and views had not subsequently changed. A summary of the votes is provided in [Section 7](#). Full details of the Workgroup vote are contained within [Annex 6](#). A record of the pre send-back votes is provided in [Annex 15](#)
- 1.11 The Workgroup were also asked for their views on the numerical accuracy of the analysis model and the significance of the results. The majority of Workgroup members were strongly of the view that:
- the analysis model correctly modelled the likely convergence of markets arising from this proposal;
  - the "value" of the model is in isolating and demonstrating the proposal's effect and underlying market trend;
  - that the model cannot provide precise numerical impact because of numerous external variable that it would need to consider and unpredictability associated with the behaviour of market participants operating in multiple markets;
  - that this and other external factors may offset, or magnify the effects of the proposal.
- 1.12 The Workgroup also considered whether they believed that the long-term impact of the proposal was likely to be beneficial to GB consumers. The majority of Workgroup members were of the view that:
- The proposal helps to provide the correct signals for investment and that GB consumers should benefit from that investment.
  - The proposal does not guarantee investment. Other factors will also influence decisions however, where the investment case is marginal then this signal could make a difference. Note that investments can also include improvements to existing plant, prolonging its economic life.
  - Any short term impact on GB consumers is indeterminate due to the variety of other external factors in multiple markets that may offset or

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<sup>3</sup> <http://www.nationalgrid.com/NR/rdonlyres/B2F90AF1-E255-457C-A5C0-F8123A47E41B/57216/CMP201OfgemSendbackletter.pdf>

<sup>4</sup> P285 and P286 which can be found at <http://www.elexon.co.uk/change/modifications/>

magnify the effect shown by the model which assumes a static, predictable background;

- Whether or not any short term impact materialises, it cannot be determined how long that impact would last due to complexity of market factors and the nature of investment decisions.
- If the proposal does not proceed, there is a greater risk of higher future costs for GB consumers as a consequence of less competition, greater risk exposure for new investment, and potentially reduced Security of Supply, and a potential contraction in GB generation base.

## **National Grid's Opinion**

- 1.13 As Proposer, National Grid supports the implementation of CMP201 in that it helps to create a level playing field between Generators in the EU internal market for electricity which should facilitate further cross-border trading of electricity and benefit GB consumers in terms of the consequence of more competitive electricity prices and also in that it properly reflects its duties in the development of National Grid's business by promoting a single internal market in electricity and facilitating greater cross-border trading of electricity.

## 2 Why Change?

- 2.1 The Transmission Licence allows NGET to recover revenue in respect of the Balancing Services activity through a Balancing Services Use of System (BSUoS) charge, which is recovered equally (50:50) from demand (represented by Suppliers) and generation (represented by Generators). Liable CUSC parties pay BSUoS on a non-locational MWh basis. The BSUoS methodology describes the parties liable for BSUoS charges and the method for setting the BSUoS tariff and is contained within Section 14 of [the CUSC](#).
- 2.2 Being non-locational and applied equally to all liable CUSC parties, BSUoS is generally considered as a 'pass-through' i.e. is wholly factored in to the market prices. Therefore it contains little or no incentive on generation to despatch or demand to balance in an efficient manner. BSUoS tariffs are calculated ex-post and therefore the market price offered by GB Generators to Suppliers, and Suppliers to end consumers, will also contain an element to recover the variability risk associated with the BSUoS liability.
- 2.3 Within Europe, it is commonly the case that the equivalent of BSUoS is charged almost exclusively to demand rather than generation. As a result the wholesale electricity price in those markets will not include this cost. Consequently, GB Generators are disadvantaged when compared to equivalent Generators in other Member States if they trade, or wish to trade, in those markets.
- 2.4 Whilst the EU Third Package arrangements recognise that different types of market organisation will exist within the wider internal market in electricity, it also acknowledges the need to ensure a level playing field to deliver the full benefits of a competitive internal market in electricity. In particular the Third Package seeks to facilitate efficient cross border trading of electricity and coupling of markets. CMP201 will assist in this objective.
- 2.5 This proposal seeks to address this misalignment in cost allocation by aligning the GB Balancing Services charging arrangements with those more prevalent across the EU and so provide for a more competitive EU wholesale electricity market.
- 2.6 The wider debate as to what charging arrangements are appropriate across Europe is not considered within this proposal as the CUSC process only addresses changes to the GB arrangements. Harmonising arrangements across Europe, including GB, would have a similar outcome for both GB producers and consumers as CMP201. However, any Europe-wide initiative would take significantly longer to agree and implement and the competition issues currently faced by GB producers and the consequences for GB consumers would therefore be perpetuated for longer than that offered under CMP201.
- 2.7 Any alignment progressed at a European level will have similar consequences for both GB producers and consumers. Pragmatically, CMP201 if approved will achieve the same objective as any Europe wide initiative on harmonising arrangement

2.8 It should also be noted that a further proposal, CMP202, that specifically looks at the impact of BSUoS charges on Interconnectors and cross-border trades was raised in light of the EU Third Package arrangements. This can be found on the [CUSC modifications website page](#). CMP202 was approved by the Authority on 15<sup>th</sup> August 2012 and implemented on 31<sup>st</sup> August 2012.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> The decision letter can be found here:

<http://www.nationalgrid.com/NR/rdonlyres/6030B915-F3E0-4418-BF08-CA6B1CC5C4BD/55635/CMP202D.pdf>



### 3 Solution

- 3.1 CMP201 seeks to align the GB electricity Balancing Services charging arrangements with those prevalent within other EU Member States. Currently the GB cost of operating the system is recovered equally (50:50) from demand and generation CUSC parties who are liable for BSUoS. The liability criteria are contained in Section 14 of [the CUSC](#).
- 3.2 CMP201 proposes that BSUoS charges, which are currently charged to all liable CUSC Parties on a non-locational MWh basis are removed from GB Generators and recovered 100% from demand; i.e. GB Suppliers. This will effectively align the GB 'generation stack' with those in other EU markets (thus facilitating cross border trading of electricity by GB Generators) by removing the BSUoS element from generation prices offered to the markets. This facilitates efficient competition with generation in other EU markets which are not subject to such charges.
- 3.3 When considering the proposal, the Workgroup looked at implementation timescales. The proposal and its alternatives were chosen such that any approval decision would permit sufficient time for the changes to be adequately reflected in pricing structures and contractual arrangements of both generators and suppliers. The Workgroup considered that implementation options of the 1<sup>st</sup> April, 2 3 and 5 years after an Authority decision were appropriate. Details of the proposed Implementation timescales are provided in [Section 6](#).

## 4 Summary of Workgroup Discussions

### Presentation of Proposal

- 4.1 The Proposer, National Grid, presented the background and reasons for raising CMP201. The [original proposal form](#) is shown in [Annex 2](#) and the supporting [presentation](#) is available on the [CUSC Workgroup website](#). The Proposer's principle reason for seeking to remove BSUoS from GB Generators is to better align the GB electricity market arrangements with those prevalent in continental Europe, thus better facilitating cross border trading of electricity by GB Generators and providing more effective competition in the European electricity market.
- 4.2 There was broad agreement that in a competitive generation market the removal of a flat charge, such as BSUoS, would feed through to the wholesale market price for electricity in future contracts. Despite this the Workgroup did have significant concerns in a number of areas. These mainly centred on:
- i) The potential to create windfall gains and losses associated with existing contracts;
  - ii) Whether Generators are better placed to manage the risk associated with BSUoS and so by transferring this to Suppliers it would increase end consumer cost;
  - iii) Does this proposal provide parity with other market arrangements in mainland Europe?
  - iv) Interaction with revenue flows in BSC cashout arrangements; and
  - v) The impact on credit arrangements for Suppliers;
  - vi) The impact to GB consumers.

### Potential for winners and losers

- 4.3 The implementation of CMP201 needs to consider existing contractual commitments. Removing the 50% BSUoS share from generation will allow generation to offer lower wholesale electricity market prices (net of BSUoS element) which should, in a competitive generation market, largely offset the corresponding transfer of BSUoS charge to Suppliers (from 50% to 100%)
- 4.4 The Workgroup first of all considered the transition risk resulting from this proposal for Suppliers in terms of the temporary winners and losers. This would arise where existing contracts between a Supplier and a Generator had been set based on a wholesale electricity price that included generation BSUoS. In these cases Suppliers would have agreed to pay the generation BSUoS (a forecast) in the forward contract price, however they would be exposed to this share of BSUoS again following implementation of this proposal.
- 4.5 For example, if a Generator has assumed a total BSUoS charge of £2, then currently it would factor into the price they offer the market, a BSUoS 'element' representative of their share (£1); the Supplier would also factor into the price they charge their share of BSUoS (£1). Overall, the Supplier charges for £2 of BSUoS, £1 directly and £1 indirectly in the wholesale price. If CMP201 were approved, and the Supplier was unable to

renegotiate their contract with the Generator, then they would pay £3 (the £1 charged by the Generator in their price to the Supplier plus the 100% (£2) of the BSUoS charge recovered from demand).

- 4.6 The Workgroup broadly agreed this particular issue was related to the period after which the proposal has been agreed by the Authority and the commercial arrangements in the market adjust to take account of the changes.
- 4.7 Given the Supplier / end consumer contracting arrangements, some Suppliers would not necessarily be able to pass through all this cost. They could only pass on this cost to those customers:
- i) whose contracts allowed for it as a specific pass-through element;
  - ii) whose contracts allowed for them to be 're-opened'; or
  - iii) those customers whose contract lapsed and / or were renewed during the CMP201 transition period.
- 4.8 For those customer contracts that did not have a pass through mechanism, a 're-opener', or whose duration extended beyond the CMP201 transition<sup>6</sup> period (such as a 'fixed price' contract), this would result in a one-off windfall gain to the Generator (and a corresponding one-off loss to the Supplier).
- 4.9 It was noted that in certain circumstances the Supplier maybe able to renegotiate their contract with the Generator to remove the BSUoS element, although this was understood not to be the normal arrangement.
- 4.10 In terms of magnitude it was acknowledged that due to commercial sensitivity, there is no information publicly available on Supplier's long-term contracts (both with their customers and with Generators) so it would be difficult to quantify this effect, and in any event highly subjective.
- 4.11 It was suggested that the recent Ofgem Retail Market Review report could provide information on the hedging strategy for the 'Big Six' which would give an indication of the length of time supply businesses are commitment to providing energy at a particular price.<sup>7</sup> From that report, it was subsequently noted that there were a number strategies, typically hedging over 12, 18 and 24 month periods, with 90% of domestic energy hedged / purchased over 18 months and 10% being purchase in the on the day market as a possible scenario for modelling.
- 4.12 Workgroup members noted that this report only covered domestic volume (approximately 2/3rds of supplied energy) and that the arrangements for Industrial and Commercial consumers could be different; i.e. contractually BSUoS may or may not be treated as a pass through. Again, due to the commercial sensitivity and individual nature of these contracts, there is no readily available information. The Workgroup however generally understood that contract negotiations normally occurred in October and April and understood to generally be for one or two years in duration.

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<sup>6</sup> The period between the authority agreeing the change and it becoming 'live'

<sup>7</sup> Link to Ofgem's Electricity and Gas Supply Market Report document – see Appendix 2 for Hedging Strategies


<http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/Markets/RetMkts/ensuppro/Documents1/Electricity%20and%20Gas%20Supply%20Market%20Report%20December%202010.pdf>

- 4.13 The Workgroup also discussed the nature of energy purchase hedges highlighted in the Ofgem report. It was not clear whether those hedges were at a “fixed price” or “Contract for Differences” (CfDs) i.e. to the extent that those hedges were obligations or options. It was noted that where the contracts were based on CfDs around the wholesale electricity price that a shift in Generator revenue (i.e. a reduction from 50% to zero for BSUoS) would be reflected in the wholesale market price for electricity which would flow through to all Suppliers, thus possibly mitigating the potential for winners and losers.
- 4.14 It was also suggested that fully vertically integrated utilities (in this context, those with generation and supply interests) would be equally exposed to both the loss and gain so it would have no net effect at a Group level on those types of companies, and so therefore main risk (from CMP201) was to smaller non fully vertically integrated Suppliers. The Workgroup generally accepted that vertically integrated utilities operate separate Supply and Generation businesses and that such an interpretation could have serious negative consequences on competition, particularly in the supply arena.

#### **Do Suppliers and Generators face the same risk on BSUoS volatility?**


- 4.15 The risk of BSUoS volatility was discussed. Whereas the overall net loss and gain discussed above was mainly perceived as a transition issue, the redistribution of risk (from generation to demand) would be an enduring issue. The Proposer suggested that the overall risk is not being increased as a result of the CMP201, but rather that it was being transferred from Generator to Supplier.
- 4.16 One member raised an issue that the risk from BSUoS variability was asymmetric and Generators were better positioned to manage that risk compared to Suppliers. That member suggested that if BSUoS is increased, it gets recycled to the Generators. Therefore the risk premium for Generators is lower than for Suppliers and so it is not simply a transfer of risk (from Generators to Suppliers) as suggested. However, some Workgroup members disputed this, suggesting that the risk is transferred but overall it remains the same.
- 4.17 A scenario was outlined whereby a Generator may receive constraint revenues, the cost of which feeds into BSUoS and is therefore shared across all parties. So whilst the BSUoS charge has risen for all parties, the Generator in receipt of the constraint revenue has less exposure to BSUoS volatility as a consequence.
- 4.18 Using the £2 total BSUoS example above, a Generator might receive 20p in constraint revenues but be liable to pay the £1 – hence their ‘net’ BSUoS cost is 80p (rather than £1). The Supplier, on the other hand, is less able to access constraint revenues; being limited, for example, to offering demand side response. Counter views were expressed by Workgroup members who noted that:
- i) Constraint costs were only one element within BSUoS.
  - ii) The large majority of Generators could not predict if or when they may receive constraint revenues (indeed depending on their technology and / or location, some Generators may receive little, if any, constraint revenues over their lifetime).
  - iii) Provision of services is on a commercial basis and subject to competitive pressures and so individual Generators could not simply inflate the cost of services.

- 4.19 Some of the Workgroup acknowledged the view that some Generators benefit from payments that make up BSUoS, via constraint revenues etc., and so their risk maybe lower, and so by transferring BSUoS to demand, the overall risk premium may increase slightly.
- 4.20 One Workgroup member suggested that at the wholesale level Generators would be better able to manage the risk, whereas Suppliers would find it more difficult to pass the risk on to end consumers. Again, not all Workgroup members agreed with this.
- 4.21 Another Workgroup member pointed out that the wholesale electricity market was competitive and so Generators cannot price the cost of constraints etc., any more easily than Suppliers. They added that Generators are also bound by the Transmission Constraint Licence Condition.
- 4.22 A Workgroup member suggested that for wind farms, the proposed change would remove a corrective signal of their actions and that this may increase overall BSUoS charges. It was noted that this applied to all liable parties, Generators and Suppliers. It was also noted that nature of the BSUoS charge is unlikely to be a good signal to modify behaviour:
- i) because BSUoS is charged to all parties equally and not those that may have caused the need for the System Operator (SO) action, and
  - ii) given the ex-post determination of BSUoS it was difficult to predict and so react to.
- 4.23 It was agreed by the Workgroup that BSUoS is therefore mainly a cost recovery mechanism rather than a market signal to modify participant behaviour. Suppliers would (with CMP201) be taking on the whole BSUoS risk and that this could have negative consequences for end consumers although without a detailed understanding of individual risk mitigation strategies this could not be demonstrated. It was also suggested that the potential for mismanagement of this risk by parties, and the potential for negative consequences, is arguably inherent and will not increase or decrease as a consequence of changing which party manages the risk. The potential for mismanagement exists regardless of how and in what proportion BSUoS risk is allocated, be it on Generators, Suppliers or any proportion of the two entities. In conclusion, the Workgroup was split over whether there was, or was not a change in the BSUoS risk premium. Again, due to the commercial sensitivity and individual nature of these strategies, there is no readily available information to support either position.
- 4.24 The Workgroup considered what elements are most volatile within BSUoS and examined the graphs shown below (prepared by National Grid). Figure 1 shows the relative volatility of BSUoS internal costs (e.g. control centre costs), and those externally driven cost (payment for Balancing Services) arising from real time System Operator actions. As may be expected, the external costs were the significant cause of volatility.



**Figure 1: BSUoS by External /Internal Cost driver**

4.25 Figure 2 then provides a breakdown of those external cost elements of which Balancing Services Settlement system costs are the most variable, reflecting the nature of balancing the system.



**Figure 2: BSUoS External Cost elements**

**BSCCV:** BS Settlement Costs – Settlement Period Specific

**BSCCA:** BS Settlement Costs – Non Settlement Period Specific

**IncPayExt:** Total forecast external incentive Payment

**ET:** Daily BS adjustment

**OM:** Provision of BS Services to others

*Note that both ET and OM were zero throughout 2010/11.*

### Interaction of BSUoS and RCRC

4.26 The Workgroup considered the relationship with Residual Cashflow Reallocation Cashflow (RCRC) arising from participant's imbalance. Whilst acknowledging that there was some linkage between the two elements due to the SO costs arising from imbalance, it was commented that BSUoS is more than the cost of the Net Imbalance Volume (NIV). It was also highlighted to the Workgroup that RCRC has been both positive (payment to CUSC parties) and negative (charge on CUSC parties) and that all parties were likely to factor this into their contracts in a similar

manner.

- 4.27 Under current market arrangements, RCRC and the energy balancing costs element of BSUoS are assumed to net off to zero, leaving a Party only exposed to Imbalance Charges<sup>8</sup>. This is because RCRC is, by definition<sup>9</sup>, equal and opposite to the sum of energy balancing costs. This would no longer hold if CMP201 was implemented.
- 4.28 For example, as explained in [Annex 12](#) a balanced party, who would face zero energy balancing costs under current market arrangements, would pay (or receive) energy balancing costs under CMP201, theoretically to the value of RCRC, despite being in balance. It was agreed by the Workgroup that it would not be practical to examine the future interaction of BSUoS and RCRC until the possible electricity cash-out Significant Code Review that Ofgem is considering holding is progressed as that will determine if it is a significant issue.
- 4.29 Following the Workgroup consultation the Workgroup considered further how revenues from imbalance payments accrue in RCRC, whereas the net cost associated with rebalancing the system are recovered as part of BSUoS. This is described in more detail in [Annex 12](#). One Workgroup member felt that this issue was not a significant problem, as RCRC is collected from everyone's cash-out and redistributed evenly. It was generally felt that RCRC should be levied to the same parties as BSUoS, although not all members agreed.
- 4.30 Having considered the interaction the majority of the Workgroup understood that this was outside the scope of the CUSC and thus CMP201 Workgroup. The Workgroup discussed this being raised as a 'BSC issue' as it was not something that the CMP201 Workgroup could resolve. The Ofgem representative noted that it would be preferable if an initial view could be reached by a BSC or joint standing/issues group by the time CMP201 is sent to the Authority for a decision.
- 4.31 National Grid indicated that in order to resolve the issue in a timely manner it considered raising BSC modification proposals would be more appropriate and would investigate this approach bilaterally with ELEXON. This would not prevent alternatives being raised under the BSC and similar representation on the interactions made under the BSC process. Under the Transmission licence NGET has responsibility for ensuring consistency between codes. National Grid raised P285 and P286 under the BSC<sup>10</sup> to address this issue. These were progressed independently of any Ofgem decision on a potential 'cashout' Significant Code Review and P285 was approved on 23 January 2013 and due to be implemented on 27 June 2013. P286 is currently with the Authority awaiting a decision.

## **Consider the Impact on End Consumers**

- 4.32 In considering the impact on consumers, the Workgroup considered, not only the impact on GB consumers, but also on the wider EU market and the objectives and duties set out set out in the EU Third Package legislation. The main aim of the Third Package, as set out in Directive 2009/72 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity<sup>11</sup>, is to deliver real choice for all consumers in the Community and more cross-

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<sup>8</sup> This ignores the secondary effect of any incentivisation through the SO incentive scheme.

<sup>9</sup> This assumption, particularly in respect of dual imbalance pricing, will be reviewed by the Workgroup in more depth after the consultation.

<sup>10</sup> P285 and P286 which can be found at <http://www.elexon.co.uk/change/modifications/>

border trade, so as to achieve efficiency gains, competitive prices, higher standards of service and to contribute to security of supply and sustainability. It asserts however, that currently, there are obstacles to the sale of electricity on equal terms, without discrimination or disadvantage in the Community. To address this, the Directive outlines measures that will facilitate its aims namely:

- market prices should give the right incentives for investing in new generation;
- promoting fair competition and fostering new generation capacity in order to allow consumers to take full advantage of the opportunities of a liberalised market;
- fostering integration of their internal markets
- development of a true internal market through cross-border trade;
- Common rules for a true internal market that provides undistorted market prices, providing incentives for cross-border interconnection and new generation investment

4.33 The Directive recognises different market structures will exist and is silent on how BSUoS, or equivalent charges, should be charged. It is left to Member States on how the Directive translates to local arrangements, the measures taken to ensure a level playing field being based on the requirements of general interest.

4.34 As discussed previously (paragraph 4.3) there is the potential for transitional windfall gains and losses by generators and suppliers, and the Workgroup was concerned that this could feed through and have a negative short to medium term impact on end consumers if not properly addressed. Along with this, the enduring redistribution of BSUoS risk to Suppliers (as previously discussed in 4.23) could also impact on end consumers. To mitigate both transitional and potentially enduring effects it was suggested that a number of options could be considered, for example:

- i) a reasonable length of time allowed for transition to allow parties (Generators and Suppliers) to take account of the changes in their commercial agreements with each other and, in the case of Suppliers, with end consumers);
- ii) fixed BSUoS charges for Suppliers; and
- iii) changes to trading products to allow BSUoS liability to be efficiently passed through.

4.35 The Workgroup understood that some Suppliers are trading further out than 18 months, therefore products in the forward market will need to change in order to clearly show whether BSUoS is included or not. It was suggested that implementation of CMP201 should only take place when all forward trading arrangements have been amended to clearly state whether or not BSUoS is included. However, it was noted that there maybe a risk of a perverse behaviour whereby participants enter into very long term forward trading arrangements, such as with a single customer for 10 years, in order to extend the CMP201 transition period and thus frustrate the transition of CMP201. Furthermore, the Workgroup recognised that some Suppliers could be over-hedged and some may be under-hedged (depending on the commercial position they have chosen) and therefore it was not entirely clear what the impacts of implementing CMP201 sooner rather than later would be.

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<sup>11</sup> <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:211:0055:0093:EN:PDF>



- 4.36 Following the closure of the Workgroup Consultation, further analysis was carried out to model the impact on GB and wider EU markets. In doing so, the impact on both generation and consumers was examined. A simple market model consisting of three interconnected nodes to represent the GB, French and Dutch markets was developed. Using historic spot-prices and demand data, a generation price-stack and load duration curve was produced for each of these countries. The model was then run with a number of sample demand levels, with and without an average BSUoS price in the GB prices, to represent the effect the annual effect of this proposal.
- 4.37 It was surmised that end users within Great Britain could initially be adversely impacted by around £177m out of a total GB model cost of approximately £16,000m equating to a 1.1% rise per annum in GB market costs. The results however need to be considered in the context of an idealised and simplified market model, the accuracy of the underlying sample data and the assumption that no other market effects, other than the change in the BSUoS arrangements occur.
- 4.38 Following the Authority's "send back" letter, the Workgroup met on the 15<sup>th</sup> November 2012, where the analysis model was further discussed. Views were expressed that the model only provided indication of what would happen if markets were entirely static and all other factors, other than the reallocation of BSUoS away from GB generation, did not change. In reality, fuel prices, plant availability, new generation build, and underlying demand variations will vary across the entire EU market and not just the simple three interconnected markets modelled. Consequently the results should be considered as providing an insight into the likely effect rather than a precise numerical impact. Views were expressed that, in isolation, the effects of the proposal are demonstrated by the model. However other external factors that cannot be modelled, may offset or magnify the outcome
- 4.39 Within the accuracy of the scenarios modelled, views were expressed that the percentage change in GB market costs was limited and not the key outcome given the model's accuracy and other wider fluctuations and market effects that cannot be modelled. As such it was considered that the trend observed, namely the impact BSUoS has on cross-border flow and competition, was more relevant than the precise numbers.
- 4.40 To that end, the model supported the proposal's original premise that removing BSUoS from GB generation would deliver more effective competition and trade across the EU. To the extent that this then result in increased GB generator surpluses as shown by the model, then GB consumers should benefit in the longer term from new investment arising from a greater incentive to invest in new GB generation.
- 4.41 The Workgroup also considered if further modelling with, for example greater resolution on the modelled price curves or increasing the number of samples used to represent a year would provide any better insight. It was generally accepted that the modelled effect, i.e. convergence of market arrangements leading to greater competition and EU social welfare, being defined as the net benefit across all consumers (including GB), would be the same albeit the precise numbers would inevitably be different. The model and associated analysis is discussed further in [Annex 13](#) to this report.
- 4.42 Noting the views expressed above that it is the trend from the model results that is key, the model supported the economic theory that there would be an consumer benefit to the wider EU market (including GB) albeit very small. Whilst the model showed a cost impact on GB

consumers (1.1%), there was an equivalent and marginally larger reduction for non-GB consumers (1.11%). The model correctly showed a positive, albeit negligible, net benefit across all EU consumers markets consequential to better alignment of the market arrangements.

- 4.43 It should be noted that this proposal (CMP201) also addresses the further competition issues that arise from the CMP202 change that removed BSUoS liabilities from Interconnector Users (making equivalent continental generation appear less expensive for import, and whilst reducing the barrier for export, not completely removing it). In considering the impact on end consumers, CMP201 attempts to address the disparity between the GB market arrangements and those prevalent in the rest of Europe. It should be also noted that however parity is achieved, be it GB adopting the EU norm or all other EU states adopting the GB position, the impact on GB consumers will be the same: The costs and charges reflected in generation prices under similar arrangements will result in competition between plant on equitable terms without distortions arising from incompatible national arrangements. Therefore the effect on end consumers will be the same as changes in consumer costs are related to the changes in interconnector flows e.g. if continental generation increased in cost, GB would export more to continental consumer; with same effect on GB marginal price leading to increased costs for GB consumers and lower costs on the continent.
- 4.44 When considering common market arrangements and appropriate charging structure across the EU, it should be recognised that the CUSC process can only address GB charging issues. Any Europe-wide initiative that facilitates the harmonisation of market arrangements would take significantly longer to agree and implement and the competition issues currently faced by GB producers and the consequences for GB consumers, both in the short and longer term, would be perpetuated for longer than that offered under CMP201.
- 4.45 GB generation could initially benefit by a 3% (£180m) increase in surpluses, although over a wider EU market producer surpluses would fall slightly. This represents a revenue transfer from continental to GB generation resulting from greater GB access to the EU market, convergence of those markets and competitive pressures that result in a reduction in producer surplus in continental markets outweighing the increased surpluses observed in the GB market. In principle, greater GB generation surpluses should attract greater investment in Generation. In doing so, it benefits consumers in the longer term by encouraging the development of a more efficient generation base and thus mitigates, to some extent, further cost increases to GB consumers from aging plant. As inframarginal units come on line in GB this would bring down the marginal cost in GB. Equally, it was observed that inefficient market arrangements are not sustainable as they provide inappropriate investment signals that could result in both a long term risk to security of supply and potentially higher and more volatile prices caused by lower levels of new GB investments and capacity.
- 4.46 Following the “send back” letter, the Workgroup also considered whether it was possible to quantify the timescales over which new investment would occur. An indication of potential new investment has subsequently been published in National Grid’s [2012 Electricity Ten Year Statement](#) (ETYS) which shows a level of new generation either under construction or consented and could potentially be constructed in similar timeframes as this proposal. Conscious that the ETYS is a forecast, albeit with higher confidence in the first 2 to 3 years, and that the analysis model is also only indicative of the effect of new generation entering the GB market,

there appears to be sufficient new generation either in construction or with consents to build, to offset the impact on GB consumers identified above.

- 4.47 Also, whilst the model analysis demonstrated that new investment in GB could reduce consumer costs over time, the Workgroup concluded that due to the multiplicity of factors affecting individual investment decisions, attempts to model investment timescales was highly subjective and easily contestable. The Workgroup was of the view that in an open market, greater surpluses will attract greater investment and that removing market distortions should lead to the correct investment decision. These points are discussed further in [Annex 13](#)
- 4.48 It should be noted that in the model analysis, producer surplus and consumer cost calculations are not directly comparable. The producer surplus is a proxy for profit i.e. the price a commodity is sold at minus cost. The consumer cost is a measure of the total cost of providing electricity. It is not a measure of consumer surplus in the Marshallian sense i.e. the difference between what a consumer is willing to pay for a commodity and what he or she actually pays. Therefore adding together the two calculations does not provide an overall market benefit/cost value.
- 4.49 The model did show that there is an overall net gain to EU consumers and in time one would expect the additional GB surpluses to feedback into lower GB market prices via competitive pressures including encouraging new generation to enter the market. This is discussed further in [Annex 13](#).
- 4.50 The Workgroup noted that this information was not available during the Workgroup consultation. Subsequent consultations have provided opportunities for interested parties to comment and they will be able to provide further comments on the Workgroup's finding following Ofgem's "send-back" via the Code Administrator consultation and also via any potential impact assessment that Ofgem may carry out.
- 4.51 The analysis also indicated that the reduction in the GB wholesale price that should arise from the transfer of BSUoS liabilities may not be fully realised by GB Suppliers. This would be due to GB generation gaining greater access to a wider EU market for their production. The analysis indicated a likely increase in net exports from GB to the other EU member states modelled which would place an upward pressure on GB prices. For example, if the cost of BSUoS was £1/MWh for both (GB) Generators and Suppliers, under CMP201 a Supplier would be exposed to £2/MWh BSUoS and the GB wholesale price in theory would reduce by £1/MWh. However, when the change in BSUoS results in increased export from GB, the GB wholesale price adjusts to reflect both the change in BSUoS (downwards) and increased export (upwards). This is why there is a net cost to GB consumers. The increased import to continental Europe results in a reduction in wholesale prices in Europe. Overall, there is a net benefit for European consumers as a whole which is a natural consequence of increased competition in harmonised markets. [Annex 13](#) contains a brief description of the model used by National Grid to establish this and the results of the analysis performed.
- 4.52 The Workgroup also discussed and noted that the analysis model assumes a "fully coupled" market where electricity would always flow from low to high market prices during each half hour and that in reality; Interconnectors can flow against market price. Whilst it is difficult to quantify, the impact of CMP201 may not be as great as modelled due to this sub-optimal trading.
- 4.53 To provide a broader view National Grid carried out a number of further scenarios. These included changes to the level of BSUoS, analysis based

on 2011/12 data, and looking at the merit order to understand the effect a switch between Coal and Gas might have. As per previous comments, it is the effect and consistency that is considered important rather than absolute magnitude.

- 4.54 The results, available in [Annex 13](#), showed that as BSUoS charges increased from £1.11/MWh (the annual average charge for 2010/11) to a scenario assuming a BSUoS charge of £1.75/MWh then, as expected, the total GB market cost also increased by between 1.1% and 1.7%. If CMP201 was not implemented, the model showed a similar 0.6% increased impact on consumers. GB producer surplus however would be asymmetrically reduced by 1.7% due to the higher BSUoS charge being reflected in the GB wholesale price which then attracts further GB imports. Again this shows the impact of BSUoS on competition and cross-border flows. In the longer term, potential issues may arise as the GB market becomes less attractive to new investment with an increased risk of supply shortfalls. The view was also expressed that this could also lead to a contracting GB generation base, the likely effect of which would be to increase prices to GB consumers.
- 4.55 The analysis based on 2011/12 prices was comparable with that performed for 2010/11 showing a 1.2% increase in GB market costs with a 2.5% increase in GB producer surpluses. Overall, the analysis showed a broadly neutral impact across the wider EU market with a marginal benefit to consumers.
- 4.56 Analysis of coal & gas prices for 2010/11 and 2011/12 showed that, on average, fuel prices favoured running coal plant 5% more in 2011/12 than in 2010/11. As a comparative measure of the potential change in plant merit order, the results from the 2011/12 study, for which the annual average BSUoS charge was £1.53/MWh, were compared with the results from the 2010/11 study that included a similar annual BSUoS charge of £1.50/MWh.
- 4.57 Whilst other effects may have an impact on the comparison, such as underlying demand trends and the level of wind generation, these are likely to be a smaller effect compared to fuel prices (modelled demand variation <1%, additional wind capacity <0.2% increase between 2010 and 2011).
- 4.58 Between the two years, the model showed a GB market cost increase of 1.5% increase for 2010/11 and 1.9% for 2011/12. Given the accuracy of the model data and other underlying assumptions, there appears to be no significantly different outcome from differing generation plant merit orders.

## **Credit risk**

- 4.59 The Workgroup discussed the subject of credit risk. Under the current CUSC arrangements, Generators and Suppliers have to provide credit cover for one months' BSUoS liability as notified by National Grid. Although this can be reviewed at any time, in the past National Grid has reviewed this quarterly, based on the BSUoS price and metered volumes for the last three months compared to the same period in the previous year and the likely metered volumes for the next quarter.
- 4.60 As Suppliers would potentially need to increase their credit holding (if CMP201 were implemented) it was suggested that, in particular for smaller Suppliers, the increased credit risk could have a negative impact on competition. Counter to this it was noted that smaller Generators would have reduced credit risk and therefore this could benefit

competition.

- 4.61 It was also noted that overall credit risk to Suppliers would include a reduction of credit that they post in wholesales trades. This information is not available as it is largely a bilateral arrangement between Suppliers and Generators. This could largely net off the overall change to individual Suppliers requirement with National Grid – subject to an equal and opposite reduction in wholesale prices. The Workgroup noted that the analysis indicated the change was not exactly equal and opposite and would depend on the actual bilateral trading arrangements.
- 4.62 Overall the majority of the Workgroup believe that CMP201 would result in a transfer of credit risk between parties rather than a transfer plus fractional increase on one of the parties.
- 4.63 Following the Workgroup consultation the Workgroup considered the view that there is a lower credit risk on Generators than Suppliers due to the monies they receive via BSUoS. As discussed previously, some members of the Workgroup highlighted that this was not an issue that Generators can manage but it was generally recognised by some Workgroup members that Generators have a marginally lower credit risk than Suppliers.
- 4.64 A lot of prominence has been given to the market modelling however as previously discussed, other factors may offset or magnify the modelled outcome. Some Workgroup members felt that competition would be improved in the European<sup>12</sup> market were CMP201 to be implemented and as shown by the model. Others felt that the local (GB) market would not be affected due to the wider market factors. One Workgroup member suggested that local competition would be improved to a marginal extent due to improved transparency surrounding credit risk (i.e. removed from wholesale price). This view was not shared by all Workgroup members.
- 4.65 National Grid reviewed the current holding of credit cover to quantify the extent of any credit cover changes. The results of this are summarised in [Annex 10](#). This indicated that based on current levels of credit only four parties would be affected; none were a small Supplier. Of those four Suppliers, one may acquire sufficient additional cover through the payment history mechanism in a few months. The four affected parties identified all related to companies of significant size, two of which provide Parent Company Guarantees leaving potentially only one Supplier required to increase their credit cover with National Grid (noting it may reduce in other areas). If CMP201 were implemented then, given the likely implementation timescales, any affected party would have sufficient time to arrange for sufficient credit cover.

### **Consider the Impact on Supply Competition**

- 4.66 This section considers the impact on competition within the GB supply market. As this proposal has been raised to address the issue of facilitating competition between GB and other EU markets, many of the issues relating to the generation competition in differing markets has already been covered above.
- 4.67 The Workgroup all agreed that the Supplier risk would increase. Some Workgroup Members believe that Suppliers generally find it more difficult

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<sup>12</sup> In the context of this report “European” / “EU” markets refer to the non GB markets for electricity; although, in practice, GB is part of the EU.

to predict BSUoS (compared with Generators), and that smaller Suppliers would be even less able to handle the risk. However, some Workgroup Members believe that Generators also face the same risk today and smaller independent Generators currently find it harder to predict risk.

- 4.68 Two Workgroup members provided an information paper to the Workgroup in order to demonstrate the CMP201 competition issues for Suppliers. This is included in [Annex 7](#). The Workgroup discussed the paper (but did not unanimously agree, or disagree, with its contents). It was noted that System Operator balancing costs is only one element of BSUoS, and the majority of System Operator actions will not flow through to RCRC.
- 4.69 In reviewing the example presented in the paper that suggest a net loss (-0.12) it was suggested that this did not represent the whole picture. The premise of the original CMP201 proposal is that if BSUoS is removed from generation this would feed through to the wholesale electricity price, some members of the group indicated this was a premise rather than a fact. In addition, as BSUoS is paid ex-post, and is volatile, the market cannot predict nor accurately reduce power price by BSUoS reduction. Therefore whilst the Supplier would see an increase in BSUoS it should see an equal and opposite decrease in the wholesale electricity price that they pay; although it is noted elsewhere that increased exports from GB, as modelled under a CMP201 scenario, will result in a reduction in wholesale prices not being exactly equal to the increase in BSUoS.

#### **Consider how the equivalent of BSUoS is charged for in other EU member states**

- 4.70 The Proposer advised that steps had been taken to understand if Generators in Europe are compensated equivalently to Generators in GB for the services that they provide to the SO but that it had been difficult to locate this information.
- 4.71 The pan European TSO trade association (ENTSO-E) had produced a paper<sup>13</sup> in May 2011 which provided some information which the Workgroup considered. This seemed to suggest that the majority of the neighbouring electricity markets to which GB was (inter)connected had low (2%) or zero charges on Generators for network operator charges. In terms of the 25 EU member states surveyed (excludes Cyprus and Malta) 16 applied a zero charge on Generators, four charged between zero and 10%, two charged between 11-20% and three (including GB) charged more with the balance, in all cases, falling on demand.
- 4.72 There was some uncertainty as to whether the 'network operator charges' surveyed by ENTSO-E fully equated to the GB BSUoS charge and the Workgroup asked National Grid if it could source additional information. An information request was sent by National Grid to a number of countries and of the responses received it was found that Generators were compensated for all services; i.e. they pay little, if any, of what is believed to be broadly the same (as GB) BSUoS type charges. For one country, primary, secondary and tertiary reserves were recovered 100% from generation and other costs recovered 100% from demand. For the other four countries, the equivalent of BSUoS costs were confirmed as being recovered 100% from demand although precise market arrangements varied.

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<sup>13</sup> Transmission Tariffs in Europe: <https://www.entsoe.eu/market/transmission-tariffs/>

4.73 A summary of these findings were presented to the Workgroup. This is included as [Annex 9](#).

### Examine the Impact of implementation on all relevant parties

#### The effect of BSUoS on inter-market operation.

4.74 BSUoS is the daily charge aimed at recovering the cost of operating the GB National Electricity Transmission System (NETS). It consists of fixed elements covering SO internal costs and Balancing Service contracts plus the variable elements of daily Ancillary Services, balancing and constraint costs.

4.75 As discussed above, in other European Member States, it is understood that it is commonly the case that their equivalent of BSUoS is charged almost exclusively to demand; Interconnector Users being liable solely for their energy imbalances in each market.

4.76 In the GB market, all CUSC parties are liable for BSUoS based on their energy taken from, or supplied to the transmission system. Being an unavoidable cost of generation (similar to fuel) this has the effect of raising the GB market price of electricity by a Generator's share (or forecast share + risk margin) of the BSUoS charge. GB Generators would therefore appear more expensive than their equivalent European counterparts.

#### Trading effects under the current arrangements

4.77 Currently, Interconnector Users are also charged BSUoS in the same manner as other GB BSUoS payers. The price of electricity imports to GB is therefore raised in a similar way as GB generation; the end consumer sees the same costs in the GB electricity market irrespective of its source (Figure 3).





Figure 3 Current EU / GB BSUoS Arrangements – Imports

4.78 Under the current CUSC arrangements however, BSUoS charges create a potential barrier to GB electricity exports. Generation BSUoS charges inherent in the GB electricity market price, plus the demand BSUoS charges levied on the export of electricity from GB, can potentially raise the GB price of exporting electricity above that at which it would naturally flow if both markets were aligned (Figure 4).




**Figure 4 Impact of current BSUoS arrangements on GB exports.**

4.79 This barrier to electricity exports is the economic rational for CMP202.

Trading effects if only CMP202 CUSC modification is implemented


4.80 An Interconnector User, not exposed to BSUoS, would see a greater electricity market price differential artificially caused by the GB Generator's exposure to BSUoS and may therefore trade to import electricity into GB on occasions other than when it would be economic under comparable market arrangements. In effect, the BSUoS charge levied on GB Generators would create a "subsidy" for electricity imported into GB. A secondary effect (approximately 2%) would be that BSUoS charges would also increase for all other GB BSUoS payers (both G & D) to recover the BSUoS revenue "lost" from Interconnector Users (Figure 5).



**Figure 5: Potential distortion from uplift due to generation BSUoS**


4.81 Whilst removing BSUoS charges from Interconnectors Users would reduce the "BSUoS" barrier on electricity exports, it does not totally remove it. The GB wholesale electricity price would still retain the generation element of BSUoS and consequently may be artificially higher than that in EU Member States. As a result, there may still be occasions when apparently economic electricity exports do not take place as a result of BSUoS charges on GB Generators (Figure 6).





**Figure 6: Impact of Generator BSUoS “uplift” on GB exports**

Trading effects if both CMP201 and CMP202 CUSC Modifications are implemented



**Figure 7 Market “equalisation” by removing BSUoS from Interconnectors and GB generation**

4.82 Removing BSUoS charges from both Interconnector Users and GB Generators aligns both electricity markets making them directly comparable (Figure 7). Interconnector flows should therefore occur based on market price differentials without any market distorting effects caused by BSUoS.

4.83 In conclusion, by removing (with CMP201) BSUoS charges from GB Generators (in addition to those on Interconnector Users, with CMP202) would:

- 1) Facilitate further cross-border trading of electricity and greater use of interconnectors as shown by the model. This in turn should increase electricity market competition and security of supply by encouraging new, more efficient investment which then benefits consumers as a consequence of improving GB Generators access to a wider EU market.
- 2) Further align the GB electricity market arrangements with those predominantly operating in other EU member states and, in doing so, further the EU Third Package objectives of a single EU market in electricity as outlined in paragraph 4.32
- 3) Remove an apparent barrier to GB electricity exports due to the different treatment of BSUoS in the other European electricity markets as shown by the market model.

- 4) Avoid a potential “subsidy” to Interconnectors and continental Generators on GB electricity imports as a consequence of a generation BSUoS charges being reflected in the GB market electricity prices were BSUoS charges to be removed only from Interconnectors. Again this was demonstrated by the market model used where higher BSUoS charges resulted in greater import / less GB generation, as discussed in paragraph 4.54.
- 4.84 In terms of generation, the Workgroup discussed that as there would be no BSUoS charge; there would be a lower wholesale electricity price and overall little benefit (for GB consumers). However it was noted that this proposal was raised as a consequence of competition issues that arise from the treatment of Interconnectors under the Third Package. Its aims were therefore to facilitate pan European benefits of a single market in electricity, i.e. greater consumer choice, with fair competition and undistorted markets that provide appropriate investment signals and lead to greater security of supply.
- 4.85 It was noted that, with CMP201, there would be no exposure for GB Generators to the volatility of BSUoS so there would be a benefit in terms of the wider electricity market. It was also agreed that there may be a significant disbenefit if the proposal is implemented too early due to the windfall gain.
- 4.86 With regard to traders, it was noted that there would be more opportunity to trade with the EU electricity market on generation stacks so this would provide a benefit. It was also commented that improving cross border trade would improve the investment case for new interconnector. [Annex 11](#) presents analysis on the possible impact on cross-border trades using a simple model. Overall this suggests that exports from GB increase. This is also shown through the more detailed modelling discussed in [Annex 13](#).

4.87 The Workgroup considered a table of pros and cons for each type of party and how each issue could be quantified:

**Table 1: Pros and Cons of CMP201 for each type of party**

<b>Party</b>	<b>Pro</b>	<b>How to Quantify</b>	<b>Con / Issue</b>	<b>How to Quantify</b>
Interconnector Owner / Trader	Potentially optimises EU cross border trade in electricity – increased revenue with greater transactions			
Supplier			<p>Potential windfall loss if implementation / transition is poorly managed: Require sufficient time for change to be reflected in Supplier / Gen and Supplier / customer contracts.</p> <p>Certainty of implementation date, with sufficient transition time required to avoid windfall loss</p> <p>Potential asymmetrical BSUoS volatility risk: Supplier might be more exposed to BSUoS volatility than Generation</p>	<p>Ofgem Retail market Review: Supplier contract strategy. Also Action 10 of Workgroup meeting 10<sup>th</sup> Jan.</p> <p>BSUoS forecast vs. outturn Can we quantify additional Supplier risk?</p> <p>Paragraph 4.15 et al</p>
Trading Unit			<p>Possible slight increase in embedded benefit which may encourage further future Trading Units. Potential “snowball” effect on embedded benefit.</p>	

Party	Pro	How to Quantify	Con / Issue	How to Quantify
Generator	<p>Compete with other EU generation on equal basis.</p> <p>Greater opportunities to export electricity from GB – creates a level playing field with continental generation</p> <p>Removes potential electricity import (to GB) distortion; e.g. potential for higher cost imports, that only appear to be relatively ‘cheap’ due to the regulatory treatment of BSUoS type costs, to undercut GB generation as EU generation does not pay BSUoS</p>	<p>Market Review: ENSTO-E survey &amp; synthesis report; review of TSO websites</p> <p>Potentially, analysis of historic prices and / or model of market interaction.</p>	<p>Potential windfall gains if implementation / transition is poorly managed: See Suppliers</p>	<p>As per Supplier <a href="#">Annex 9</a></p> <p><a href="#">Annex 13</a> &amp; Paragraph 4.32</p> <p><a href="#">Annex 13</a></p>

Party	Pro	How to Quantify	Con / Issue	How to Quantify
End Consumers	<p>Promotion of efficient EU wide competition in electricity through removal of NTBs. Maximises allocative efficiency across the EU.</p> <p>Potentially no increase in risk if Generators' and Suppliers' BSUoS risk is symmetrical. Risk is only transferred. Under such circumstances, no effect on end consumers from changing the BSUoS charge allocation.</p> <p>Around £11m benefit to wider EU market end consumers.</p>	Potentially from model of market interactions.	<p>Short Term: End consumer electricity prices may increase as Generator / Supplier and Supplier / Customer contracts are adjust to reflect the new arrangements. Potential increase from asymmetric risk if significant. Potential wholesale prices do not decrease in line with decrease in BSUoS costs, possibly mitigated by implementation strategy and competition.</p> <p>Potential Increase in market costs to GB end consumers (around 1% / £178m) due to increase in exports from GB via the interconnector.</p>	<p>Potentially from model of market interactions.</p> <p><a href="#">Annex 13</a> &amp; Paragraph 4.32</p>

## BMU and trading unit considerations

- 4.88 Items 5 (e) and (h) of the Workgroup Terms of Reference (see [Annex 1](#)) cover issues of BMU unit definition and how using this affects how BSUoS is charged. The specific areas the Workgroup were charge to consider were [(e)] “Consider what is meant by Generators in the context of delivering and offtaking Trading Units and BM Units” and [(h)] “Consider the impact on embedded benefits”. With respect to embedded benefits the Proposer advised the Workgroup that any change in BSUoS sharing factors (between Generators and Suppliers) would change both the charge and the overall benefit in equal proportions.
- 4.89 Currently embedded generation benefits from avoiding BSUoS charges; there are also benefits from reduced BSUoS demand charge as a consequence of that embedded generation. Under the CMP201 proposal, there would be no Generator BSUoS to avoid and the benefit arising from reduced demand would double. Overall the net embedded benefit should be the same under CMP201 as it currently is and the Workgroup also

noted that the sharing of embedded benefit between Suppliers and embedded generation is as per their individual contracts.

4.90 The ELEXON observer provided an information paper summarising the (BSC) Balancing Mechanism Units and Trading Units definition issues that could arise with CMP201 in order for the Workgroup to consider the impacts and benefits more clearly. This is included as [Annex 8](#) to this report.

4.91 It was recognised that the definition of generation in the CMP201 proposal could have consequences for embedded benefits. The Proposer confirmed that the original proposal did not intend to adjust or remove any embedded benefits. The Workgroup reviewed the ELEXON paper and broadly agreed with the conclusion that scenario 2 should be used to develop legal drafting.

### Consider the Treatment of Pumped Storage

4.92 The Proposer presented an overview of the potential impact on Pumped Storage from CMP201 which indicated that ignoring plant efficiency the impact on Pumped Storage should be broadly neutral. This is shown diagrammatically in Figure 8 below:




Figure 8 Redistribution impact on Pumped Storage

4.93 The principle impact for Pumped Storage arises from the efficiency of the plant; i.e. it requires approximately 25% more energy from pumping (which is treated as demand) than is provided when generating. Put another way, for every 100 units of electricity that a Pumped Storage power station produces it uses 125 units to pump the water to the top of the reservoir. Currently Pumped Storage pays 50% BSUoS on their demand for electricity (which is 25% greater than their production of electricity) and 50% on their production. Under CMP201 Pumped Storage would therefore pay the additional BSUoS charges (i.e. 100% on their demand) but not have to pay anything on their production. The materiality of this would depend on the BSUoS price differential paid when pumping and saved when generating.

4.94 Table 2 BSUoS Price Ratio for assumed Generation / Pump windows below, based on 2010/11 data attempts to quantify this. For the purposes of this analysis, it has been assumed that pumping will occur some time

between 23:00 and 04:00 i.e. overnight. An average BSUoS price was calculated for each season during these hours. Similarly, average BSUoS prices were derived for various windows during the day when Pumped Storage may wish to generate. The table shows the ratio of these two values. A value greater than 100% indicates that the average BSUoS in that window was greater than the average BSUoS in the corresponding pump window.

- 4.95 In general it shows that, due to generally higher BSUoS in those periods where Pumped Storage could be expected to generate, the avoided generation BSUoS charge is sufficiently high compared with the addition BSUoS cost incurred when pumping.

**Table 2 BSUoS Price Ratio for assumed Generation / Pump windows**

Periods	Hours	Winter	Spring	Summer	Autumn
9 – 12	04:30 to 06:00	74%	78%	96%	100%
13 -21	06:30 to 10: 30	157%	172%	109%	142%
22 – 33	11:00 to 16:30	155%	149%	97%	114%
34 – 41	17:00 to 20:30	177%	175%	111%	145%
42 – 45	21:00 to 22:30	109%	179%	122%	100%
46 – 8	23:00 to 04:00	Assumed Pump Window			

- 4.96 The Workgroup agreed that the impact of CMP201 on Pumped Storage should be broadly neutral.

### **Charging BSUoS to Demand**

- 4.97 The Workgroup was also requested by the Panel to consider if the mechanism for charging BSUoS to remaining parties continues to be beneficial and whether the CUSC Modifications Panel may wish to initiate further work outside the Workgroup on this subject
- 4.98 The Proposer confirmed that the original was drafted to consider the removal of BSUoS from generation rather than amend the manner in which it is paid by demand. The Workgroup acknowledged that this issue was being considered by National Grid separately in response to Customer Engagement through RIIO. National Grid considered this an important issue but outside the scope of CMP201 proposal.

### **Workgroup Alternative CUSC Modifications**

- 4.99 Based on the discussion above in respect of winners and losses the Workgroup considered a number of options regarding transition and implementation for CMP201, which might have been included in either the original proposal or might have been raised as an alternative to the original:
- i) Two year transition;
  - ii) Five year transition;
  - iii) Phased implementation over two years;
  - iv) Phased implementation over five years; and
  - v) Two year delay then a phased implementation.
- 4.100 With options (i) and (ii) there would be a step-change in BSUoS liabilities after an implementation decision. In other words, assuming CMP201 were approved by the Authority during 2012/13, then it would come into

effect from 1<sup>st</sup> April 2015 (option (i)) or 1<sup>st</sup> April 2018 (option (ii)). Thus with option (i) Generators would pay 50% of BSUoS charges in March 2015, as would Suppliers. Then in April 2015 Generators would not pay any BSUoS charge and Suppliers would pay 100% of BSUoS charges. A similar approach would apply with option (ii), but three years later than option (i).

4.101 With option (iii) there would be a phased introduction of the change. Again assuming CMP201 were approved by the Authority during 2012, then from 1<sup>st</sup> April 2013 to 31<sup>st</sup> March 2015 the proportion of the BSUoS charges paid by Generators would decline and, correspondingly, the Supplier share would increase. The logic for the phased approach is that, as noted above, the contracts between Generators and Supplier and Suppliers and end customers do not all start (or end) on the same date. Rather they are spread out over various timeframes. A phased introduction would mitigate the transition impact as contracts expired and renewed under the new arrangements. The Workgroup noted that there were a number of ways that the phasing might happen and a number of variations were discussed.

4.102 Variation (a) would see the 50% Generator share of BSUoS reduce by the same amount over the 24 month phased implementation period (this equates to approximately 2% per month). Thus, in this example, Generators would pay 50% of BSUoS in March 2013 (and Suppliers 50%). Then in April 2013 Generators would pay ~48% (and Suppliers ~52%) which would become, in May 2013, ~46% for Generators (and Suppliers ~54%) and so on until on 1<sup>st</sup> April 2015 Generators would pay no BSUoS charge (and Suppliers would pay 100% of BSUoS).

4.103 As noted above, the Workgroup was aware that the contracting arrangements for industrial and commercial consumers meant that negotiations normally occurred in October and April contracting 'rounds'; i.e. most, if not all, of these types of customer contracts tended to start / end on these months (be they for 6, 12, 18, 24 etc., months duration). Given this another variation (b) would be to phase the implementation of CMP201 linked to these dates. Assuming a similar two year period starting on 1<sup>st</sup> April 2013 then the phasing would be spread over the four subsequent contracting rounds. Thus Generators would pay 50% of BSUoS (and Suppliers 50%) from April 2013 to October 2013, then from October 2013 to April 2014 Generators would pay 37.5% (and Suppliers 62.5%) followed by 25% for Generators (and 75% for Suppliers) for the period April 2014 to October 2014 and then, for the final period from October 2014 to April 2015, Generators would pay 12.5% (and Suppliers 87.5%). Finally, from April 2015 Generators would pay no BSUoS charge (and Suppliers would pay 100% of BSUoS).

4.104 The Workgroup noted that given the contracting arrangements in the domestic sector that variation (a) was perhaps more closely aligned with these types of customers 'churn' rates etc., whilst given the contracting arrangements in the industrial and commercial sector that variation (b) was perhaps more closely aligned with these types of customers. Given this a possible further variation (c) would be to migrate Suppliers non half hourly demand on the basis of variation (a) and Suppliers half hourly demand on the basis of variation (b). Whilst perhaps more complex than applying either variation (a) or (b) it would, in principle, be possible to achieve variation (c) if this was felt to better reflect market conditions.

4.105 Having considered option (iii) the Workgroup noted that it could also be phased in over a longer period than two years, such as five years which was considered as option (iv). In this case (again assuming CMP201 were approved by the Authority during 2012) the phasing would also start



from 1<sup>st</sup> April 2013. Therefore with variation (a) phasing would be spread over 60 months (instead of 24 months with option (iii)). Thus, with variation (a), instead of the rate of change being approximately 2% per month it would be approximately 0.8% per month. In other words starting from 1<sup>st</sup> April 2013 Generators would pay ~49.2% (and Suppliers ~50.8%) and so on, concluding with Generators paying no BSUoS charge (and Suppliers pay 100%) from 1<sup>st</sup> April 2018.

- 4.106 With variation (b) the phasing would be over ten contracting rounds (rather than the four with option (iii)). This would mean that the phasing would be 5% per contracting round (rather than the 12.5% per round in option (iii)). Thus starting with the October 2013 to April 2014 round Generators would pay 45% (and Suppliers 55%) and so on until, from 1<sup>st</sup> April 2018, Generators pay no BSUoS charge (and Suppliers pay 100%).
- 4.107 The final options considered at this stage by the Workgroup (noting that there are many potential options and variations on those options) was option (v) which would move the start of the phasing implementation dates in option (iii) or (iv) from 1<sup>st</sup> April 2013 to 1<sup>st</sup> April 2015. Thus with option (v), if the option (iii) based approach of two year phasing were adopted then Generators would end up paying no BSUoS charge (and Suppliers pay 100%) from 1<sup>st</sup> April 2017. In the case of the option (iv) five year phasing approach then, under option (v), the date when Generators would end up paying no BSUoS charge (and Suppliers pay 100%) would be 1<sup>st</sup> April 2020.
- 4.108 At the post-consultation meeting, the Workgroup considered the responses received in relation to transition and implementation and the majority of the Workgroup agreed that a fixed lead time for implementation would be preferable. The majority of the Workgroup felt that phasing would be too complex, but not insurmountable.
- 4.109 No Workgroup members supported an implementation time of less than 2 years. As suggested by the Proposer in the Workgroup Consultation, it was agreed that based on the information available, the CMP201 Original would contain an implementation arrangement of the 1st April following 2 years after the Authority decision on CMP201. So for example, if a decision was made on or prior to 31<sup>st</sup> March 2013, the implementation date would be 1<sup>st</sup> April 2015: a decision thereafter and before 1<sup>st</sup> April 2014 would result in an implementation date of 1<sup>st</sup> April 2016.
- 4.110 The Workgroup considered a number of Draft alternative CUSC Modifications regarding implementation and came up with the following options:
- a) Original – the 1<sup>st</sup> April following 2 year after a Regulatory decision.
  - b) Draft Alternative (i) – the 1<sup>st</sup> April following 3 year after a Regulatory decision.
  - c) Draft Alternative (ii) - the 1<sup>st</sup> April following 4 year after a Regulatory decision.
  - d) Draft Alternative (iii) – the 1<sup>st</sup> April following 5 year after a Regulatory decision.
- 4.111 The Workgroup Chair asked the group to provide their views on the above options in respect of better facilitating the Applicable Objectives. There was majority Workgroup support for Draft Alternative (i), but not for Draft Alternative (ii). Four members of the Workgroup supported the 5 year option (Draft Alternative (iii)) and although this did not form a majority of the Workgroup, the Chair decided to progress this option using his powers under the CUSC governance rules.

4.112 Therefore, the final conclusion of the Workgroup was that, in addition to the Original Proposal, there should be two Workgroup Alternative CUSC Modifications (WACMs) as follows:

- a) Original – 1<sup>st</sup> April following 2 year after an Authority decision
- b) WACM1 – 1<sup>st</sup> April following 3 year after an Authority decision.
- c) WACM 2 – 1<sup>st</sup> April following 5 year after an Authority decision

4.113 For clarity, and assuming an Authority decision on or prior to 31<sup>st</sup> March 2013, then the above proposals would be implemented in 2015, 2016 and 2018 respectively as shown below:

Authority Decision Date:	Implementation Date		
	Original: 2 years	WACM1: 3 Years	WACM2: 5 Years
On or before 31 <sup>st</sup> March 2014	1 <sup>st</sup> April 2016	1 <sup>st</sup> April 2017	1 <sup>st</sup> April 2019
Between 1 <sup>st</sup> April 2014 and 31 <sup>st</sup> March 2015	1 <sup>st</sup> April 2017	1 <sup>st</sup> April 2018	1 <sup>st</sup> April 2020
Between 1 <sup>st</sup> April 2015 and 31 <sup>st</sup> March 2016	1 <sup>st</sup> April 2018	1 <sup>st</sup> April 2019	1 <sup>st</sup> April 2021
Etc.			

## 5 Impacts

### Impact on the CUSC

5.1 CMP201 requires amendments to the following parts of the CUSC:

- Section 14 – Charging Methodologies, Part 2 – The Statement of the Use of System Charging Methodology,
- Section 2 – the Statement of the Balancing Services Use of System Charging Methodology.

5.2 The text required to give effect to the Proposal is included as Annex 15 to this report.

### Impact on Greenhouse Gas Emissions

5.3 Neither the Proposer nor the Workgroup identified any material impact on greenhouse gas emissions.

### Impact on Core Industry Documents

5.4 The Workgroup considered the interaction with the cashout arrangements in the BSC, and particularly the relationship with the Residual Cashflow Reallocation Cashflow. This has been discussed above in part 4 of this report.

5.5 The Workgroup appreciate that parties generally considered that there was a linkage between BSUoS and the cashout arrangements in the BSC. This manifests itself that when NGET takes an energy balancing action and recovers the net cost through BSUoS. The energy imbalance that led to the NGET action would result in a revenue change in the Residual Cashflow Reallocation Cashflow (RCRC). RCRC is 'cashed out' to the lead parties of BMUs based on their metered volumes. This redistribution was understood to have the effect of reinforcing the incentive for an individual party to balance. It was also noted that BSUoS covered many more costs beyond energy balancing.

5.6 The Workgroup also noted that Ofgem recently consulted on the possibility of it undertaking a Significant Code Review into the (BSC) cashout arrangements and the Workgroup believed that any consequential changes as a result of CMP201 could be covered by that Ofgem review.

5.7 Following consideration by the Workgroup, where a number of members believed there was a strong interaction with RCRC, National Grid raised two amendment proposals under the BSC to ensure this possible interaction is fully considered in the appropriate forum and that any consequential proposals could be developed and brought before the Authority.<sup>14</sup> P285 was approved on 23 January 2013 and P286 is currently awaiting a decision from the Authority.

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<sup>14</sup> P285 and P286 which can be found at <http://www.elexon.co.uk/change/modifications/>

## **Impact on other Industry Documents**

- 5.8 Neither the Proposer nor the Workgroup identified any impacts on other Industry Documents.

## **Impact on IS systems**

- 5.9 National Grid indicated that there will be an impact on central IS systems to adjust revenue recovery to demand parties; however at this stage it is understood that it is likely to be relatively minor (less than £100k) and not a critical path item for implementation (assuming a minimum two years lead time for contractual reasons).
- 5.10 No significant IS issues for Users were identified as part of the Workgroup consultation.

## 6 Proposed Implementation

- 6.1 The CMP201 Original Proposal suggests an implementation date of 24 months should give the industry sufficient time to respond and therefore limit any windfall gain / loss.
- 6.2 The Workgroup noted the Proposer's suggestion and considered a number of possible implementation approaches which they have developed into subsequent Workgroup Alternative CUSC Modifications (as detailed in paragraphs 4.99-4.113 above).
- 6.3 The final conclusion of the Workgroup was that, in addition to the Original Proposal, there should be two Workgroup Alternative CUSC Modifications (WACMs) with the following implementation approach for each:
- a) Original – 1<sup>st</sup> April following 2 year after an Authority decision
  - b) WACM1 – 1<sup>st</sup> April following 3 year after an Authority decision
  - c) WACM 2 – 1<sup>st</sup> April following 5 year after an Authority decision
- 6.4 For clarity, and assuming an Authority decision on or prior to 31<sup>st</sup> March 2014, then the above proposals would be implemented in 2016, 2017 and 2019 respectively as shown below:

Authority Decision Date:	Implementation Date		
	Original: 2 years	WACM1: 3 Years	WACM2: 5 Years
On or before 31 <sup>st</sup> March 2014	1 <sup>st</sup> April 2016	1 <sup>st</sup> April 2017	1 <sup>st</sup> April 2019
Between 1 <sup>st</sup> April 2014 and 31 <sup>st</sup> March 2015	1 <sup>st</sup> April 2017	1 <sup>st</sup> April 2018	1 <sup>st</sup> April 2020
Between 1 <sup>st</sup> April 2015 and 31 <sup>st</sup> March 2016	1 <sup>st</sup> April 2018	1 <sup>st</sup> April 2019	1 <sup>st</sup> April 2021
Etc.			

## 7 Views

### Workgroup Conclusion

- 7.1 The Workgroup believes that the Terms of Reference have been fulfilled and CMP201 has been fully considered.
- 7.2 For reference the Applicable CUSC Objectives for the Use of System Charging Methodology are:
- (a) that compliance with the use of system charging methodology facilitates effective competition in the generation and supply of electricity and (so far as is consistent therewith) facilitates competition in the sale, distribution and purchase of electricity;
- (b) that compliance with the use of system charging methodology results in charges which reflect, as far as is reasonably practicable, the costs (excluding any payments between transmission licensees which are made under and in accordance with the STC) incurred by transmission licensees in their transmission businesses and which are compatible with standard condition C26 (Requirements of a connect and manage connection);
- (c) that, so far as is consistent with sub-paragraphs (a) and (b), the use of system charging methodology, as far as is reasonably practicable, properly takes account of the developments in transmission licensees' transmission businesses.
- 7.3 Following the “send back” letter, the Workgroup confirmed its original votes and views. The Workgroup majority vote was that CMP201 does better facilitate Applicable Objectives (a) and (c) and was Neutral on (b). The majority of the Workgroup expressed a preference for the CMP201 WACM 1. The table below summarises the votes: Full details of the vote can be found in [Annex 6](#).

Vote 1: Whether each Proposal better facilitates the Applicable CUSC Objectives

Name	Original			WACM1			WACM2		
	(a)	(b)	(c)	(a)	(b)	(c)	(a)	(b)	(c)
Cem Suleyman	Yes	Neutral	Yes	Yes	Neutral	Yes	Yes	Neutral	Yes
Iain Pielage	Yes	Neutral	Yes	Yes	Neutral	Yes	No	Neutral	No
James Anderson	Yes	Neutral	Yes	Yes	Neutral	Yes	Yes	Neutral	Yes
Michael Dodd	Yes	Neutral	Yes	Yes	Neutral	Yes	Yes	Neutral	No
Sarah Owen	No	Neutral	No	No	Neutral	No	No	Neutral	No
Helen Inwood	No	Neutral	No	No	Neutral	Neutral	Yes	Neutral	No
Esther	Neutral	Neutral	Yes	Yes	Neutral	Yes	Yes	Neutral	Yes

Sutton									
Paul Mott	Yes	Neutral	Yes	Yes	Neutral	Yes	Yes	Neutral	Yes
Rob Hill	No	Neutral	Yes	No	Neutral	Yes	Yes	Neutral	Yes
Garth Graham	Yes	Neutral	Yes	Yes	Neutral	Yes	No	Neutral	No

Vote 2: Whether each WACM better facilitates the Applicable CUSC Objectives than the Original.

Name	WACM1			WACM2		
	(a)	(b)	(c)	(a)	(b)	(c)
Cem Suleyman	Yes	Neutral	Yes	No	Neutral	No
Iain Pielage	Neutral	Neutral	Neutral	No	Neutral	No
James Anderson	No	Neutral	No	No	Neutral	No
Michael Dodd	No	Neutral	No	No	Neutral	No
Sarah Owen	Neutral	Neutral	Neutral	Neutral	Neutral	Neutral
Helen Inwood	Neutral	Neutral	Neutral	Yes	Neutral	Neutral
Esther Sutton	Yes	Neutral	Yes	Yes	Neutral	Yes
Paul Mott	Yes	Neutral	Yes	No	Neutral	No
Rob Hill	Yes	Neutral	Yes	Yes	Neutral	Yes
Garth Graham	Yes	Neural	Yes	No	Neutral	No

Vote 3: Which option BEST facilitates achievement of the Applicable CUSC Objectives? (inc. the CUSC baseline; i.e. 'status quo')

Name	Best Option
Cem Suleyman	WACM 1
Iain Pielage	Original
James Anderson	Original
Michael Dodd	Original
Sarah Owen	Baseline
Helen Inwood	WACM 2
Esther Sutton	WACM 1
Paul Mott	WACM 1
Rob Hill	WACM 2
Garth Graham	WACM 1

## National Grid Opinion

- 7.4 National Grid considers that CMP201 would better facilitate Applicable Use of System Charging Methodology (CUSC) Objective (a) in that it helps to create a level playing field between Generators in the EU internal market for electricity which in turn should facilitate further cross-border trading of electricity and benefit GB consumers in terms of the consequence of more competitive electricity prices and Applicable Use of System Charging Methodology (CUSC) Objective (c) in that it properly reflects its duties in the development of National Grid's business by promoting a single internal market in electricity and facilitating greater cross-border trading of electricity. National Grid believes that in respect of Objective (b), that the CMP201 proposal is neutral. The BSUoS cost methodology will continue to reflect costs and therefore the charges in the appropriate time periods. Given that under the current regime these are regarded as a pass through, and therefore a revenue recovery issue, the CMP201 proposal will neither improve nor weaken cost reflectivity. The base analysis performed as part of this Modification indicates that overall GB cost and overall EU market cost reduces. The view above is based on the qualitative assessment of the benefits of converging markets and not the additional quantitative impact assessment over which concerns have been raised.



## 8 Workgroup Consultation Response Summary

8.6 13 responses were received to the Workgroup Consultation. These responses are contained within Volume 2 of this document. The following table provides an overview of the representations received.

Company	Initial Views	Views against Applicable CUSC Objectives (ACOs)	Implementation	Other Comments
Centrica	Do not support – Proposal is flawed. End users adversely impacted and risk to suppliers due to volatility. Also, results in disconnect between industry subject to RCRC and BSUoS which should be resolved under CMP201.	Does not better facilitate the ACOs. Detrimental impact on (a) as adverse affect on competition in supply due to uncertain cash-flows.	At least 2 year delay to prevent windfall losses/gains. Phasing would cause complications and risk.	Ofgem could undertake an impact assessment. A change to the volume of credit posted may be required to ensure sufficient credit cover.
Consumer Focus	Status quo should be maintained due to number of risks identified. Should be reconsidered when EU member states are more advanced in liberalising their energy markets. Also, risk to consumers if generators do not pass their savings from BSUoS to suppliers.	Doesn't better facilitate (a) or (b). Negative impact on competition and harder for new entrants due to increase in suppliers credit holding. Neutral on (c).	Do not support – should be postponed until other member states are more advanced in liberalising their energy markets.	Welcome assessment of total annual value of current BSUoS by generators. Generators are better positioned to manage variability risk than suppliers and are naturally hedged.
Drax and Haven	Agree with intentions as will better align GB balancing services charging arrangements. Must be implemented alongside CMP202. Levying BSUoS on demand will result in a transfer of risk rather than increase or decrease, BSUoS is a cost recovery mechanism.	Better facilitates (a) and (c).	Reasonable length of time should be given for transition, ideally 3 years to avoid any perverse outcomes. 5 years would be disproportionate to the potential cost to suppliers.	Small impact on supplier's credit risk costs. Impacts outweighed by benefits of CMP201. Disagree that end consumer costs will rise due to asymmetric risk, don't believe any interaction between RCRC and BSUoS.
EON	Supportive	Better facilitate (a) and (c)	Support a longer timeframe. 3 year transition period may not be enough.	Any negative impact on competition due to credit arrangements will be offset by generators having the opposite effect.

<b>Company</b>	<b>Initial Views</b>	<b>Views against Applicable CUSC Objectives (ACOs)</b>	<b>Implementation</b>	<b>Other Comments</b>
EDF Energy	Supportive.	Better facilitate (a) and (c)	Timescales need to take some account of existing contractual arrangements. At least 18 months is required. Neutral on phasing.	Do not regard RCRC as natural hedge for BSUoS. Could be merit in the RCRC charging base being considered in the future but not proper business for CMP201. On enduring basis, suppliers should not face significant difficulty in increased credit exposure.
Eggborough	Supportive.	Better facilitates the ACOs.	2 years is too long, 1 year is reasonable time for suppliers.	Limited credit risk on suppliers. Solution could be to double number against which credit is raised.
First Utility	Not supportive – forcing suppliers to take the whole risk is disproportionate.	Will not better facilitate the ACOs due to negative impact on competition.	2 years may reduce potential windfall effect but still create barriers to entry for smaller suppliers.	Increased credit costs will disproportionately affect smaller players.
International Power	Supportive. Do not believe that generation or supply is able to hedge BSUoS to any meaningful extent and the collection of BSUoS is simply a revenue recovery exercise.	Yes, will bring the cost base of GB generation in line with Europe.	Supportive as long as adequate notice to the market to ensure no windfall gains or losses. 36 months is adequate.	No party should be required to hold more security than is required currently, or should be justified if so. Potential impact on retail IS systems.
RWE	Concern at lack of clarity around implementation. Consultation does not provide analysis on impact on end consumers. Suppliers have higher risk.	No. Impact on market participants is unclear and link between RCRC and BSUoS has not been addressed.	Support approach as long as impact analysis is undertaken and is outside current hedging timescales	Full impact assessment is required. Detrimental impact on credit cover, particularly for small parties. CMP201 forms part of the SCR on cash out.

<b>Company</b>	<b>Initial Views</b>	<b>Views against Applicable CUSC Objectives (ACOs)</b>	<b>Implementation</b>	<b>Other Comments</b>
Scottish Power	Support, should be implemented with CMP202.	Better facilitates (a) and (c).	Support 2 year approach, minimises windfall losses / gains. Single transition date is preferable.	Any supplier issues over forecasting could be addressed by a subsequent change. Under-securing of BSUoS by suppliers would be short-term. Correlation between RCRC and BSUoS has largely broken down due to use of more economic constraint management.
Smartest Energy	Supportive to extent, if in combination with market coupling.	CMP201 alone does not facilitate ACOs. Constraint costs are best dealt with by transferring costs into day ahead market.	Yes, should be made at time that market coupling effects regional day ahead wholesale pricing.	Credit is issue for smaller parties. Not convinced RCRC / BSUoS interaction is a serious issue. Total costs should be the same due to completion in generation market.
SSE	Support principle but clarity required on some aspects.	Yes, particularly (a) as it facilitates competition.	Agree with approach (2 year). Appreciate desire for phased transition.	Phased transition may reduce credit risk.
Total Gas & Power	Broadly supportive.	Yes.	2 years not enough. Strongly support 5 year transition. Phased implementation would be disruptive.	Credit risk will add to the burden of smaller suppliers and may therefore impact competition, but this impact is small. Potential impact on IS systems if phased or inefficient notice period for implementation.

## Annex 1 - Workgroup Terms of Reference

### Responsibilities

1. The Workgroup is responsible for assisting the CUSC Modifications Panel in the evaluation of CUSC Modification Proposal CMP201 'Removal of BSUoS Charges from Generation' tabled by National Grid at the CUSC Modifications Panel meeting on 16 December 2011.
2. The proposal must be evaluated to consider whether it better facilitates achievement of the Applicable CUSC Objectives. These can be summarised as follows:

### Use of System Charging Methodology

- (a) that compliance with the use of system charging methodology facilitates effective competition in the generation and supply of electricity and (so far as is consistent therewith) facilitates competition in the sale, distribution and purchase of electricity;
  - (b) that compliance with the use of system charging methodology results in charges which reflect, as far as is reasonably practicable, the costs (excluding any payments between transmission licensees which are made under and in accordance with the STC) incurred by transmission licensees in their transmission businesses and which are compatible with standard condition C26 (Requirements of a connect and manage connection);
  - (c) that, so far as is consistent with sub-paragraphs (a) and (b), the use of system charging methodology, as far as is reasonably practicable, properly takes account of the developments in transmission licensees' transmission businesses.
3. It should be noted that additional provisions apply where it is proposed to modify the CUSC Modification provisions, and generally reference should be made to the Transmission Licence for the full definition of the term.

### Scope of work

4. The Workgroup must consider the issues raised by the Modification Proposal and consider if the proposal identified better facilitates achievement of the Applicable CUSC Objectives.

5. In addition to the overriding requirement of paragraph 4, the Workgroup shall consider and report on the following specific issues:
  - a) Review the illustrative legal text
  - b) Consider the impact on end consumers
  - c) Consider the impact on competition
  - d) Consider how the equivalent of BSUoS is charged for in other EU member states
  - e) Consider what is meant by Generators in the context of delivering and off taking Trading Units and BM Units
  - f) Examine the impact of implementation on all relevant parties
  - g) Consider the treatment of pumped storage
  - h) Consider the impact on embedded benefits
  - i) The Workgroup is also requested by the Panel to consider if the mechanism for charging BSUoS to remaining parties continues to be beneficial and whether the CUSC Modifications Panel may wish to initiate further work outside the Workgroup on this subject.
6. The Workgroup is responsible for the formulation and evaluation of any Workgroup Alternative CUSC Modifications (WACMs) arising from Workgroup discussions which would, as compared with the Modification Proposal or the current version of the CUSC, better facilitate achieving the Applicable CUSC Objectives in relation to the issue or defect identified.
7. The Workgroup should become conversant with the definition of Workgroup Alternative CUSC Modification which appears in Section 11 (Interpretation and Definitions) of the CUSC. The definition entitles the Workgroup and/or an individual member of the Workgroup to put forward a WACM if the member(s) genuinely believes the WACM would better facilitate the achievement of the Applicable CUSC Objectives, as compared with the Modification Proposal or the current version of the CUSC. The extent of the support for the Modification Proposal or any WACM arising from the Workgroup's discussions should be clearly described in the final Workgroup Report to the CUSC Modifications Panel.
8. Workgroup members should be mindful of efficiency and propose the fewest number of WACMs possible.
9. All proposed WACMs should include the Proposer(s)'s details within the final Workgroup report, for the avoidance of doubt this includes WACMs which are proposed by the entire Workgroup or subset of members.
10. There is an obligation on the Workgroup to undertake a period of Consultation in accordance with CUSC 8.20. The Workgroup Consultation period shall be for a period of three weeks as determined by the Modifications Panel.
11. Following the Consultation period the Workgroup is required to consider all responses including any WG Consultation Alternative Requests. In undertaking an assessment of any WG Consultation Alternative Request, the

Workgroup should consider whether it better facilitates the Applicable CUSC Objectives than the current version of the CUSC.

As appropriate, the Workgroup will be required to undertake any further analysis and update the original Modification Proposal and/or WACMs. All responses including any WG Consultation Alternative Requests shall be included within the final report including a summary of the Workgroup's deliberations and conclusions. The report should make it clear where and why the Workgroup chairman has exercised his right under the CUSC to progress a WG Consultation Alternative Request or a WACM against the majority views of Workgroup members. It should also be explicitly stated where, under these circumstances, the Workgroup chairman is employed by the same organisation who submitted the WG Consultation Alternative Request.

12. The Workgroup is to submit its final report to the Modifications Panel Secretary on 19 April 2012 for circulation to Panel Members. The final report conclusions will be presented to the CUSC Modifications Panel meeting on 27 April 2012.

## Membership

13. It is recommended that the Workgroup has the following members:

Role	Name	Representing
<i>Chairman</i>	Patrick Hynes	Code Administrator
<i>National Grid Representative*</i>	Iain Pielage	National Grid
<i>Industry Representatives*</i>	Paul Mott	EDF Energy
	Garth Graham	SSE
	James Anderson	Scottish Power
	Esther Sutton	EON
	Cem Suleyman	Drax
	Michael Dodd	ESBI
	Helen Inwood	Npower
	Bob Brown	Conoco Philips
	Sarah Owen	Centrica
<i>Observer</i>	David Kemp	ELEXON
<i>Authority Representative</i>	Matthew Grant	
<i>Technical secretary</i>	Emma Clark	Code Administrator

NB: A Workgroup must comprise at least 5 members (who may be Panel Members). The roles identified with an asterisk in the table above contribute toward the required quorum, determined in accordance with paragraph 14 below.

14. The chairman of the Workgroup and the Modifications Panel Chairman must agree a number that will be quorum for each Workgroup meeting. The

agreed figure for CMP201 is that at least 5 Workgroup members must participate in a meeting for quorum to be met.

15. A vote is to take place by all eligible Workgroup members on the Modification Proposal and each WACM. The vote shall be decided by simple majority of those present at the meeting at which the vote takes place (whether in person or by teleconference). The Workgroup chairman shall not have a vote, casting or otherwise]. There may be up to three rounds of voting, as follows:
  - Vote 1: whether each proposal better facilitates the Applicable CUSC Objectives;
  - Vote 2: where one or more WACMs exist, whether each WACM better facilitates the Applicable CUSC Objectives than the original Modification Proposal;
  - Vote 3: which option is considered to BEST facilitate achievement of the Applicable CUSC Objectives. For the avoidance of doubt, this vote should include the existing CUSC baseline as an option.

The results from the vote and the reasons for such voting shall be recorded in the Workgroup report in as much detail as practicable.

16. It is expected that Workgroup members would only abstain from voting under limited circumstances, for example where a member feels that a proposal has been insufficiently developed. Where a member has such concerns, they should raise these with the Workgroup chairman at the earliest possible opportunity and certainly before the Workgroup vote takes place. Where abstention occurs, the reason should be recorded in the Workgroup report.
17. Workgroup members or their appointed alternate are required to attend a minimum of 50% of the Workgroup meetings to be eligible to participate in the Workgroup vote.
18. The Technical Secretary shall keep an Attendance Record for the Workgroup meetings and circulate the Attendance Record with the Action Notes after each meeting. This will be attached to the final Workgroup report.
19. The Workgroup membership can be amended from time to time by the CUSC Modifications Panel.

<b>CUSC Modification Proposal Form (for Charging Methodology proposals)</b>	<b>CMP201</b>
<b>Title of the CUSC Modification Proposal:</b> <i>(mandatory by proposer)</i> Removal of BSUoS charges from Generation	
<b>Submission Date</b> <i>(mandatory by Proposer)</i> 8 <sup>th</sup> December 2011	
<b>Description of the CUSC Modification Proposal:</b> <i>(mandatory by proposer)</i> <p>This proposal seeks to align GB market arrangements with those prevalent within other EU member states. This will deliver more effective competition and trade across the EU and so deliver benefits to all end consumers.</p> <p>It is proposed that Balancing Services Use of System (BSUoS) charges, which are currently charged to all liable CUSC parties on a non locational MWh basis, are removed from GB Generators. This will effectively align the GB ‘generation stack’ with those in other EU markets, thus facilitate equitable competition with generation in other EU markets which are not subject to such charges.</p> <p>There should be no adverse effects for GB end consumers, subject to implementation taking account of existing contractual commitments. Aligning the GB market arrangements with other member states better facilitates an efficient functioning internal market in electricity. To that end, GB consumers will benefit from more competitive arrangements delivered through a wider fully functioning competitive market in generation.</p> <p>Whilst the EU Third Package arrangements recognise that different types of market organisation will exist within the wider internal market in electricity, it also acknowledges the need to ensure a level playing field to deliver the full benefits of a competitive internal market in electricity. These objectives are broadly comparable with the objectives applicable to the Charging Methodologies within the CUSC.</p>	
<b>Description of Issue or Defect that the CUSC Modification Proposal seeks to Address:</b> <i>(mandatory by proposer)</i> <p>The Transmission Licence allows NGET to recover revenue in respect of the Balancing Services Activity, including the operation of the transmission system, through BSUoS charges. Liable CUSC parties pay BSUoS charges, based on their energy taken from, or supplied to the transmission system on a non locational MWh basis. Being non locational and applied equally to all, they are considered as ‘pass through’ and so contain little or no incentive on generation to despatch in an efficient manner. The charges are also calculated ex post and therefore the market price offered by GB Generators will contain an element to recover the cost and variability risk associated with their BSUoS charge.</p>	



Within Europe, it is commonly the case that the equivalent of BSUoS is charged almost exclusively to demand<sup>15</sup>. Consequently, GB Generators is disadvantaged when compared to equivalent generation in other member states.

Removing BSUoS from GB Generators will allow generation to offer market prices that are comparable and competitive with other generation across the EU, recognising that energy trade is facilitated mainly on a 'generation stack' price.

**Impact on the CUSC:** *(this should be given where possible)*

Revision to Section 14 – Charging Methodologies, Part 2 – The Statement of the Use of System Charging Methodology, Section 2 – The Statement of the Balancing Services Use of System Charging Methodology

Main Sections affected are 14.29 and 14.30

**Do you believe the CUSC Modification Proposal will have a material impact on Greenhouse Gas Emissions? Yes/No** *(assessed in accordance with Authority Guidance – see guidance notes for website link)*

**Impact on Core Industry Documentation. Please tick the relevant boxes and provide any supporting information:** *(this should be given where possible)*

BSC

Grid Code

STC

Other

*(please specify)*

Wider implications on BSC cash-flows may need to be explored.

**Urgency Recommended: Yes / No** *(optional by Proposer)*

**Justification for Urgency Recommendation** *(mandatory by Proposer if recommending progression as an Urgent Modification Proposal)*

**Self-Governance Recommended: Yes / No** *(mandatory by Proposer)*

**Justification for Self-Governance Recommendation** (mandatory by Proposer if recommending progression as Self-governance Modification Proposal)

**Should this CUSC Modification Proposal be considered exempt from any ongoing Significant Code Reviews?** (mandatory by Proposer in order to assist the Panel in deciding whether a Modification Proposal should undergo a SCR Suitability Assessment)

Yes. As this proposal seeks to make revisions to the BSUoS Methodology only, it has no interaction with the ongoing TNUoS SCR.

**Impact on Computer Systems and Processes used by CUSC Parties:** (this should be given where possible)

Minor Impact on National Grid Electricity Transmission's BSUoS charging system.

Mainly depending on the consideration of BSC cash flow implications, on BSC and User systems. Possibly also on how volumes are notified and treated. .

**Details of any Related Modifications to Other Industry Codes (including related CUSC Modification Proposals):** (where known)

**Justification for CUSC Modification Proposal with reference to Applicable CUSC Objectives:** (mandatory by proposer)

**Please tick the relevant boxes and provide justification for each of the Charging Methodologies affected.**

Use of System Charging Methodology

- (a) that compliance with the use of system charging methodology facilitates effective competition in the generation and supply of electricity and (so far as is consistent therewith) facilitates competition in the sale, distribution and purchase of electricity;
- (b) that compliance with the use of system charging methodology results in charges which reflect, as far as is reasonably practicable, the costs (excluding any payments between transmission licensees which are made under and in accordance with the STC) incurred by transmission licensees in their transmission businesses and which are compatible with standard condition C26 (Requirements of a connect and manage connection);
- (c) that, so far as is consistent with sub-paragraphs (a) and (b), the use of system charging methodology, as far as is reasonably practicable, properly takes account of the developments in transmission licensees' transmission businesses.

**Full justification:**

National Grid believes that this proposal better meets the relevant objective of facilitating competition.

It helps to create a level playing field between Generators in the EU internal market for electricity which in turn should facilitate further cross-border trading. GB consumers should therefore benefit from more competitive prices as a consequence.

In that an objective of EU legislation is to promote a single internal market in electricity and facilitate greater cross-border trading, National Grid believes that this proposal properly reflects its duties in the development of its transmission business.

<b>Details of Proposer:</b> (Organisation's Name)	National Grid Electricity Transmission Ltd.
Capacity in which the CUSC Modification Proposal is being proposed: (i.e. CUSC Party, BSC Party, "National Consumer Council" or Materially Affected Party)	CUSC Party
<b>Details of Proposer's Representative:</b> Name: Organisation: Telephone Number: Email Address:	Iain Pielage National Grid Electricity Transmission Ltd 01926 656360 <a href="mailto:Iain.Pielage@uk.ngrid.com">Iain.Pielage@uk.ngrid.com</a>
<b>Details of Representative's Alternate:</b> Name: Organisation: Telephone Number: Email Address:	Andy Wainwright National Grid Electricity Transmission Ltd 01926 655944 <a href="mailto:Andy.Wainwright@uk.ngrid.com">Andy.Wainwright@uk.ngrid.com</a>
<b>Attachments (Yes/No):</b> If Yes, Title and No. of pages of each Attachment:	

## Annex 3 - Workgroup Attendance Register

Name	Organisation	Role	Mtg 1	Mtg 2	Mtg 3	Mtg 4	Mtg 5	Mtg 6	Mtg 7
Patrick Hynes	National Grid	Chairman	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Emma Clark	National Grid	Technical Secretary	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Iain Pielage	National Grid	National Grid Proposer	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Heather Carter	National Grid	Observer	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
David Kemp	ELEXON	Observer	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Matthew Grant	Ofgem	Authority Rep	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No
Evriliki Kaliakatsou	Ofgem	Observer	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No
James Anderson	Scottish Power	Workgroup Member	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sarah Owen	Centrica	Workgroup Member	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Esther Sutton	E.ON UK	Workgroup Member	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cem Suleyman	Drax	Workgroup Member	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Rob Hill	Conoco Philips	Workgroup Member	Yes	Yes	Yes	Bob Brown	Yes	Yes	Yes
Paul Mott	EDF Energy	Workgroup Member	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Helen Inwood	NPower	Workgroup Member	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Jon Wisdom	Yes	Yes
Garth Graham	SSE	Workgroup Member	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Michael Dodd	ESBI	Workgroup Member	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No
Sheona MacKenzie	Ofgem	Authority Rep	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

## Annex 4 – Glossary of Terms

BM	Balancing Mechanism
BMU	Balancing Mechanism Unit
BSUoS	Balancing Services Use of System
ENTSO-E	European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity
NETS	National Electricity Transmission System
NGET	National Grid Electricity Transmission plc
NIV	Net Imbalance Volume
RCRC	Residual Cashflow Reallocation Cashflow
RIIO	Revenue, Incentives, Innovation and Outputs
SO	System Operator
TLM	Transmission Loss Multiplier
WACM	Workgroup Alternative CUSC Modification

## Annex 5 – CMP201 Original Timeline

16 December 2011	Panel to agree progression
10 January 2012	Workgroup meeting
2 February 2012	Second Workgroup meeting
9 February 2012	Issue draft Workgroup Consultation for Workgroup comment (5 days)
16 February 2012	Deadline for comments on draft Workgroup Consultation
29 February 2012	Publish Workgroup consultation (for 4 weeks)
28 March 2012	Deadline for responses to Workgroup consultation
W/C 16 April 2012	Post-consultation Workgroup meeting
10 May 2012	Second post-consultation Workgroup meeting
27 July 2012	Present Workgroup report to CUSC Modifications Panel
1 August 2012	Issue Code Administrator Consultation
30 August 2012	Deadline for responses
5 September 2012	Publish draft final report for industry review
20 September 2012	Publish draft final modification report with Panel Papers
28 September 2012	Panel Vote
10 October 2012	Send final report to Ofgem
14 November 2012	Indicative Authority decision date (based on 25 day KPI)

## Annex 6 – Workgroup Votes

<b>Name:</b>	Cem Suleyman
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### Vote 1: Whether each proposal better facilitates ACOs (against [CUSC baseline](#))

#### a) Original Proposal

(a)	(b)	(c)
Yes	Neutral	Yes
The Modification will eliminate all trade barriers related to the method of levying BSUoS. This will promote the efficient cross border trade of power. As a consequence the Modification will facilitate efficient competition in generation and supply for the benefit of consumers.	This ACO is not relevant to this Modification. Therefore the Modification will neither have a positive or negative effect against this ACO.	The Modification properly reflects National Grid's duty to develop its business by promoting a single internal electricity market. This will help facilitate efficient cross border trade and competition.

#### b) WACM1 (3 yr implementation)

(a)	(b)	(c)
Yes	Neutral	Yes
The Modification will eliminate all trade barriers related to the method of levying BSUoS. This will promote the efficient cross border trade of power. As a consequence the Modification will facilitate efficient competition in generation and supply for the benefit of consumers.	This ACO is not relevant to this Modification. Therefore the Modification will neither have a positive or negative effect against the ACO.	The Modification properly reflects National Grid's duty to develop its business by promoting a single internal electricity market. This will help facilitate efficient cross border trade and competition.

#### b) WACM2 (5 yr implementation)

(a)	(b)	(c)
Yes	Neutral	Yes
The Modification will eliminate all trade barriers related to the method of levying BSUoS. This will promote the efficient cross border trade of power. As a consequence the Modification will facilitate efficient	This ACO is not relevant to this Modification. Therefore the Modification will neither have a	The Modification properly reflects National Grid's duty to develop its business by promoting a single internal electricity market. This will help facilitate efficient cross

competition in generation and supply for the benefit of consumers.	positive or negative effect against the ACO.	border trade and competition.
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**Vote 2: Whether each WACM better facilitates the ACOs than the ORIGINAL**

**a) WACM1 (3 year)**

(a)	(b)	(c)
Yes	Neutral	Neutral
WACM1 better meets the ACO relative to the Original. This is because WACM1 provides the optimal lead time for market participants operating in generation and supply to react to the change to minimise any wind fall losses/gains. This lead time will ensure that competition is not distorted and that the benefits of CMP201 are realised in good time. This will ensure that consumers benefit fully from the Modification.	Neither the Original nor WACM1 is relevant to the achievement of this ACO.	Both the Original and WACM1 will equally reflect National Grid's duty to develop its business by promoting a single internal electricity market.

**b) WACM2 (5 year)**

(a)	(b)	(c)
No	Neutral	Neutral
WACM2 does not better meet the ACO relative to the Original. This is because the implementation time scale (at least 5 years lead time between an Authority decision and implementation) unnecessarily delays the achievement of the benefits of the Modification, whilst providing no additional benefit in terms of allowing market participant's sufficient time to react to the change to minimise perverse consequences.	Neither the Original nor WACM2 is relevant to the achievement of this ACO.	Both the Original and WACM2 will equally reflect National Grid's duty to develop its business by promoting a single internal electricity market.

**Vote 3: Which option BEST facilitates achievement of the ACOs? (inc. CUSC baseline)**

BEST option	Reason
WACM1	The Original, WACM1 and WACM2 all better facilitate the achievement of the ACOs relative to the CUSC baseline (as they are essentially the same modification with only the implementation timescales differing). However, WACM1 best facilitates the achievement of the ACOs compared with the other three options (including the CUSC baseline). This is because



	WACM1 provides the optimal notice period for market participants to react to the change to minimise any perverse outcomes which might distort competition. It also allows the benefits of the Modification to be achieved fully as soon as possible. Ultimately WACM1 maximises the benefits for consumers relative to the other options.
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<b>Name:</b>	<b>Iain Pielage</b>
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**Vote 1: Whether each proposal better facilitates ACOs (against CUSC baseline)**

**a) Original Proposal**

<b>(a)</b>	<b>(b)</b>	<b>(c)</b>
Yes	Neutral	Yes
The proposal better aligns the GB market with that prevalent in other EU Member Countries. It removes both the potential import and export barrier that currently arise on cross-border trades and any disparity that may arise as consequence of CMP202, if approved.	Not applicable to this objective.	The proposal acknowledges the influence that Europe and the 3 <sup>rd</sup> Package is having on GB market and is a proportionate response to those developments.

**b) WACM1 (3 yr implementation)**

<b>(a)</b>	<b>(b)</b>	<b>(c)</b>
Yes	Neutral	Yes
This alternative proposal achieves same objective as Original albeit delayed by a further year.	Not Applicable to this objective	This alternative proposal achieves same objective as Original albeit delayed by a further year.

**b) WACM2 (5 yr implementation)**

<b>(a)</b>	<b>(b)</b>	<b>(c)</b>
No	Neutral	No
Whilst the alternative will eventually achieve the same result as the original proposal, it effectively signals to the market that efficient competition should not occur for 5+ years.	Not Applicable to this objective	Similarly, whilst eventually achieving the same result as the original proposal, this alternative signals that the licensee should not take this development into account for 5+ years.

**Vote 2: Whether each WACM better facilitates the ACOs than the ORIGINAL**

**a) WACM1 (3 year)**

(a)	(b)	(c)
Neutral	Neutral	Neutral
Whilst meeting same end objective as Original, there has been little substantive evidence provided that would support the additional delay.	Not Applicable to this objective	As per (a)

**b) WACM2 (5 year)**

(a)	(b)	(c)
No	Neutral	No
Long implementation timescales effectively means that effective competition in this area would be placed “on hold” for 5+ years  Other proposals could subsequently be raised that un-wind or supersede this alternative: any competitive benefit would therefore be lost.	Not Applicable to this objective	The protracted timescales could hinder future developments as all new proposals would need to be assessed against both pre and post implementation positions

**Vote 3: Which option BEST facilitates achievement of the ACOs? (inc. CUSC baseline)**

BEST option	Reason
Original	On evidence available, the Original provides best balance between better facilitating competition in generation and addressing the contractual needs of Suppliers.

<b>Name:</b>	<b>James Anderson</b>
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**Vote 1: Whether each proposal better facilitates ACOs (against CUSC baseline)**

**a) Original Proposal**

(a)	(b)	(c)
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Yes	Neutral	Yes
<i>CMP201 better achieves Objective (a) as it better facilitates effective competition in the generation of electricity both within GB and across Europe through the removal of a barrier to trade.</i>	<i>Implementation of CMP201 will be neutral in facilitating achievement of Objective (b). As in the existing baseline, the cost allocation methodology will continue to accurately reflect charges into the appropriate time periods but will neither improve nor weaken cost reflectivity.</i>	<i>CMP201 will better reflect developments in the transmission licensees' businesses as it will take account of the increased interconnectivity between GB and continental Europe and promote development of cross-border trading in accordance with a single European market for electricity.</i>

**b) WACM1 (3 yr implementation)**

<b>(a)</b>	<b>(b)</b>	<b>(c)</b>
Yes	Neutral	Yes
<i>CMP201 better achieves Objective (a) as it better facilitates effective competition in the generation of electricity both within GB and across Europe through the removal of a barrier to trade.</i>	<i>Implementation of CMP201 will be neutral in facilitating achievement of Objective (b). As in the existing baseline, the cost allocation methodology will continue to accurately reflect charges into the appropriate time periods but will neither improve nor weaken cost reflectivity.</i>	<i>CMP201 will better reflect developments in the transmission licensees' businesses as it will take account of the increased interconnectivity between GB and continental Europe and promote development of cross-border trading in accordance with a single European market for electricity.</i>

**b) WACM2 (5 yr implementation)**

<b>(a)</b>	<b>(b)</b>	<b>(c)</b>
Yes	Neutral	Yes
<i>CMP201 better achieves Objective (a) as it better facilitates effective competition in the generation of electricity both within GB and across Europe through the removal of a barrier to trade.</i>	<i>Implementation of CMP201 will be neutral in facilitating achievement of Objective (b). As in the existing baseline, the cost allocation methodology will continue to accurately reflect charges into the appropriate time periods but will neither improve nor</i>	<i>CMP201 will better reflect developments in the transmission licensees' businesses as it will take account of the increased interconnectivity between GB and continental Europe and promote development of cross-border trading in accordance a single European</i>

	<i>weaken cost reflectivity.</i>	<i>market for electricity.</i>
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**Vote 2: Whether each WACM better facilitates the ACOs than the ORIGINAL**

**a) WACM1 (3 year)**

<b>(a)</b>	<b>(b)</b>	<b>(c)</b>
<i>No</i>	<i>Neutral</i>	<i>No</i>
<i>As CMP201 improves competition within GB and across Europe its implementation should not be unduly delayed. A 24 month implementation period should be adequate to allow Parties' existing contract positions to unwind and to allow for modification to parties' systems.</i>	<i>A delay in implementation from 24 to 36 months will neither improve nor reduce cost reflectivity.</i>	<i>As CMP201 will promote development of cross border trading to the benefit of GB consumers, delaying its implementation from 24 to 36 months will not better meet Applicable Objective (c).</i>

**b) WACM2 (5 year)**

<b>(a)</b>	<b>(b)</b>	<b>(c)</b>
<i>No</i>	<i>Neutral</i>	<i>No</i>
<i>As CMP201 improves competition within GB and across Europe its implementation should not be unduly delayed. A 24 month implementation period should be adequate to allow Parties' existing contract positions to unwind and to allow for modification to parties' systems.</i>	<i>A delay in implementation from 24 to 60 months will neither improve nor reduce cost reflectivity.</i>	<i>As CMP201 will promote development of cross border trading to the benefit of GB consumers, delaying its implementation from 24 to 60 months will not better meet Applicable Objective (c).</i>

**Vote 3: Which option BEST facilitates achievement of the ACOs? (inc. CUSC baseline)**

<b>BEST option</b>	<b>Reason</b>
CMP201 Original	<i>CMP201 better meets CUSC Applicable Objectives (a) and (C) for the reasons outlined above. Therefore, in order for its benefits to be delivered as soon as possible (commensurate with taking account of both Parties' contracted positions and the requirement to change their systems) implementation should not be unduly delayed. The two year implementation proposed in the Original proposal achieves this objective. Further, should CMP202, Removal of BSUoS charges from Interconnector Users, be approved with a short implementation timescale, generators within GB will be at a significant competitive disadvantage to interconnector users until CMP201 is implemented. This would further establish the requirement for an early implementation date.</i>

<b>Name:</b>	<b>Michael Dodd</b>
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**Vote 1: Whether each proposal better facilitates ACOs (against CUSC baseline)**

**a) Original Proposal**

<b>(a)</b>	<b>(b)</b>	<b>(c)</b>
Yes	Neutral	Yes
BSUoS on generators is an impediment to cross-border trading and places GB generation at a significant competitive disadvantage. The impact on supply competition is neutral as we believe the lead time to implementation (at least 2 years) is sufficient for suppliers of all sizes to hedge.	The proposal simply reallocates an arbitrarily allocated cost from generation to supply.	The modification facilitates the move to a single European market for electricity by promoting cross-border trade. Transmission charges have a key role within this and this modification is consistent with this ACO.

**b) WACM1 (3 yr implementation)**

<b>(a)</b>	<b>(b)</b>	<b>(c)</b>
Yes	Neutral	Yes
BSUoS on generators is an impediment to cross-border trading and places GB generation at a significant competitive disadvantage. The impact on supply competition is neutral as we believe the lead time to implementation (at least 2 years) is sufficient for suppliers of all sizes to hedge.	The proposal simply reallocates an arbitrarily allocated cost from generation to supply.	The modification facilitates the move to a single European market for electricity by promoting cross-border trade. Transmission charges have a key role within this and this modification is consistent with this ACO.

**b) WACM2 (5 yr implementation)**

<b>(a)</b>	<b>(b)</b>	<b>(c)</b>
Yes	Neutral	Yes
BSUoS on generators is an impediment to cross-border trading and places GB generation at a significant competitive disadvantage. The impact on supply	The proposal simply reallocates an arbitrarily allocated cost from generation to	The modification facilitates the move to a single European market for electricity by promoting cross-border trade.

competition is neutral as we believe the lead time to implementation (at least 2 years) is sufficient for suppliers of all sizes to hedge.	supply.	Transmission charges have a key role within this and this modification is consistent with this ACO.
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**Vote 2: Whether each WACM better facilitates the ACOs than the ORIGINAL**

**a) WACM1 (3 year)**

(a)	(b)	(c)
No	Neutral	No
The additional lead time means that the improvements to generation competition are not as immediate as those realised by the Original.		Whilst this alternative would remove generation BSUoS, the additional lead time is means it does not facilitate the ACO as well as the Original.

**b) WACM2 (5 year)**

(a)	(b)	(c)
No	Neutral	No
The additional lead time means that the improvements to competition are not as immediate as those realised by the Original		Whilst this alternative would remove generation BSUoS, the additional lead time is means it does not facilitate the ACO as well as the Original.

**Vote 3: Which option BEST facilitates achievement of the ACOs? (inc. CUSC baseline)**

BEST option	Reason
CMP201 Original	<i>This is the option that facilitates the removal of a significant barrier to cross-border trade quickest. It provides at least 2 years for suppliers to price the change into customers' contracts and we believe this is sufficient. A longer lead time would negate the benefits and delay the improvement in cross-border trading that will arise from the modification.</i>

Name:	Sarah Owen
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**Vote 1: Whether each proposal better facilitates ACOs (against CUSC baseline)**

**a) Original Proposal**

(a)	(b)	(c)
No	Neutral	No
<p><i>Increased risk on Suppliers in managing rising BSUoS costs. Impacts non-integrated suppliers more than fully integrated suppliers, therefore has a detrimental impact on supplier competition.</i></p> <p><i>Detrimental impact on GB end consumers.</i></p> <p><i>Creates disconnect between liable parties of BSUoS and RCRC.</i></p>		<p><i>There are no developments within Europe that facilitate the raising of this modification</i></p>

**b) WACM1 (3 yr implementation)**

(a)	(b)	(c)
No	Neutral	No
<p><i>Increased risk on Suppliers in managing rising BSUoS costs. Impacts non-integrated suppliers more than fully integrated suppliers, therefore has a detrimental impact on supplier competition.</i></p> <p><i>Detrimental impact on GB end consumers.</i></p> <p><i>Creates disconnect between liable parties of BSUoS and RCRC.</i></p>		<p><i>There are no developments within Europe that facilitate the raising of this modification</i></p>

**b) WACM2 (5 yr implementation)**

(a)	(b)	(c)
No	Neutral	No
<p><i>Increased risk on Suppliers in managing rising BSUoS costs. Impacts non-integrated suppliers more than fully integrated suppliers, therefore has a detrimental impact on supplier competition.</i></p> <p><i>Detrimental impact on GB end consumers.</i></p> <p><i>Creates disconnect between liable parties of BSUoS and RCRC.</i></p>		<p><i>There are no developments within Europe that facilitate the raising of this modification</i></p>

**Vote 2: Whether each WACM better facilitates the ACOs than the ORIGINAL**

**a) WACM1 (3 year)**

(a)	(b)	(c)
-----	-----	-----

<i>Neutral</i>	<i>Neutral</i>	<i>Neutral</i>

**b) WACM2 (5 year)**

<b>(a)</b>	<b>(b)</b>	<b>(c)</b>
<i>Neutral</i>	<i>Neutral</i>	<i>Neutral</i>

**Vote 3: Which option BEST facilitates achievement of the ACOs? (inc. CUSC baseline)**

<b>BEST option</b>	<b>Reason</b>
<i>CUSC Baseline</i>	<i>No impact on supplier competition, no impact to GB end consumers. No increased risk to suppliers</i>

<b>Name:</b>	<b>Helen Inwood</b>
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**Vote 1: Whether each proposal better facilitates ACOs (against CUSC baseline)**

**a) Original Proposal**

<b>(a)</b>	<b>(b)</b>	<b>(c)</b>
<i>No</i>	<i>Neutral</i>	<i>No</i>
<i>The transition period will result in suppliers paying more than they should due to the nature of commodity contracts. Need clarification on treatment of RCRC</i>		<i>CMP201 meets the European directive</i>

**b) WACM1 (3 yr implementation)**

<b>(a)</b>	<b>(b)</b>	<b>(c)</b>
<i>No</i>	<i>Neutral</i>	<i>Neutral</i>
<i>The transition period will result in suppliers paying more than they should due to the nature of commodity contracts. Need clarification on treatment of RCRC</i>		<i>CMP201 meets the European directive</i>

**b) WACM2 (5 yr implementation)**



<b>(a)</b>	<b>(b)</b>	<b>(c)</b>
Yes	Neutral	No
Transition period timescales are adequate to address original issue highlighted above  Need clarification on RCRC		CMP201 meets the European directive

**Vote 2: Whether each WACM better facilitates the ACOs than the ORIGINAL**

**a) WACM1 (3 year)**

<b>(a)</b>	<b>(b)</b>	<b>(c)</b>
Neutral	Neutral	Neutral

**b) WACM2 (5 year)**

<b>(a)</b>	<b>(b)</b>	<b>(c)</b>
Neutral	Neutral	Neutral

**Vote 3: Which option BEST facilitates achievement of the ACOs? (inc. CUSC baseline)**

BEST option	Reason
WACM2	We support this option because transition period timescales are adequate to address the issue of payment twice by suppliers.

<b>Name:</b>	<b>Esther Sutton</b>
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**Vote 1: Whether each proposal better facilitates ACOs (against CUSC baseline)**

**a) Original Proposal**

<b>(a)</b>	<b>(b)</b>	<b>(c)</b>
Neutral	Neutral	Yes
CMP201 seems likely to have a detrimental impact on Objective (a) through impacting Suppliers who	However, the analysis has also suggested that it is unlikely that	No impact.

<p><i>have already contracted beyond 3 years, and it should not be assumed that these numbers are insignificant. It should also be born in mind that contracts of any duration can be signed many months before they begin, e.g. a 2-year contract may be agreed with a customer 2 years and 9 months before the contract start date. It is not only contract durations but the negotiation lead-time that should be considered in assessing the BSUoS risk to Suppliers. The analysis also suggests that the overall cost to consumers appears higher than the benefits to generation.</i></p>	<p><i>parties would have to increase their security cover as a result of CMP201. Rather, generators would be required to hold less and may also require a lower level of credit cover from Suppliers.</i></p>	
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**b) WACM1 (3 yr implementation)**

<b>(a)</b>	<b>(b)</b>	<b>(c)</b>
Yes	Neutral	Yes
<p><i>There is a stronger case for WACM1 than the original proposal; like the original, from the 3 year implementation CMP201 WACM1 would make GB generation more competitive with European generation. It would also have less potential for negative impacts on Suppliers by delaying the</i></p>	-	<p><i>As per the original proposal, adjusting the GB market arrangements to better align with those across the continent would progress GB arrangements to take due account of European development of a pan-European liberalised market.</i></p>

**b) WACM2 (5 yr implementation)**

<b>(a)</b>	<b>(b)</b>	<b>(c)</b>
Yes	Neutral	Yes
<p><i>Again CMP201 WACM2 would also make GB generation more competitive with European generation once implemented. It would also avoid negative impacts on Supplier competition that might arise through an earlier implementation.</i></p>	-	<p><i>Whether CMP201 was implemented to the original, WACM1 or WACM2 timescales, this should still better align GB balancing charges with European arrangements. Delaying implementation might also enable relevant changes to be raised in the interim</i></p>

		<i>should there be unexpected developments in the European market, rather than making a significant change to GB arrangements that could potentially be negated by subsequent changes in evolution of the European market.</i>
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**Vote 2: Whether each WACM better facilitates the ACOs than the ORIGINAL**

**a) WACM1 (3 year)**

<b>(a)</b>	<b>(b)</b>	<b>(c)</b>
Yes	Neutral	Yes
<i>A minimum 3-year notice as per the original would have an adverse effect on Suppliers who may have contracted beyond these timescales and may not be able to amend agreements on BSUoS. Transitional risk would be minimised by WACM1 and this would also allow more time for development of market arrangements in other European states.</i>	-	<i>As per vote 1, whether CMP201 was implemented to the original, WACM1 or WACM2 timescales, this would still better align GB balancing charges with other European States. A year's delay as WACM1 would provide seems unlikely to be of detriment to overall harmonisation. The single market for energy may well still be developing (and amongst the many challenges to achieve this, those other states not currently charging 100% to supply would also have to change their arrangements). Delaying might be beneficial should European progress take an unexpected turn reducing the benefit of CMP201, in that there would be more time to address</i>

		<i>that, potentially with new modifications, to better align with Europe before instigating a major change in GB.</i>
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**b) WACM2 (5 year)**

<b>(a)</b>	<b>(b)</b>	<b>(c)</b>
<i>Yes</i>	<i>Neutral</i>	<i>Neutral</i>
<i>5-6 years lead time should effectively negate the transitional risk to Suppliers.</i>	<i>-</i>	<i>As per WACM1, delaying this change further would not be a significant barrier to cross-border trade (while we note that the analysis suggested that under CMP201 flows from GB to France would increase by 30%, it also noted that interconnector flows can be against market price for 32% of the time). It may seem desirable to adjust the GB arrangements sooner (but not too soon), but the market might not be fully coupled even within WACM2 timescales. Without this the full benefits of CMP201 would not be realised anyway. However 5-6 years could potentially increase uncertainty and delay harmonisation.</i>

**Vote 3: Which option BEST facilitates achievement of the ACOs? (inc. CUSC baseline)**

<b>BEST option</b>	<b>Reason</b>
<i>WACM1</i>	<i>The move towards harmonisation across the European market supports CMP201 over the baseline.  However a minimum of 2 years per CMP201 original is not enough to avoid negative impacts on Suppliers.  3-4 years as per WACM1 is desirable to reduce the transitional risk to all</i>

	<p>concerned and help facilitate market coupling.</p> <p>5-6 years per WACM2 would be better than the baseline or CMP201 Original but perhaps an excessive lead time given the challenging timescales sought for European harmonisation.</p>
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<b>Name:</b>	<b>Paul Mott</b>
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**Vote 1: Whether each proposal better facilitates ACOs (against CUSC baseline)**

**a) Original Proposal**

<b>(a)</b>	<b>(b)</b>	<b>(c)</b>
Yes	Neutral	Yes
<p><i>I believe that CMP201 would, if passed, better facilitate System Charging Method objective (a). This is because if passed, it would help to create a level playing field between Generators in the EU which in turn should facilitate further cross-border trading of electricity and benefit GB consumers from more competitive wholesale prices. However, the transition to implementation (the lead time from an Ofgem decision) in the original is only just sufficient, at a minimum of 2 full years and a maximum of 3.</i></p>	<p><i>It is not clear how CMP201 (original) better or worse facilitates (b), “that compliance with the use of system charging methodology results in charges which reflect, as far as is reasonably practicable, the costs”. I consider it to be neutral against this objective. CMP201 if passed would neither improve nor weaken cost reflectivity.</i></p>	<p><i>I believe that CMP201 would, if passed, better facilitate System Charging Method objective (c). This is because if passed, the change would better reflect the duties associated with National Grid’s business by promoting a single internal market in electricity. This in turn would promote efficient cross border trade (in line with the intent of the Third Package), all in the context of the growth over time in the extent of interconnection capacity between GB and Europe, and the improvements in cross-border trading that should arise, if they are sensibly implemented here, from CACM as per the European Target Model.</i></p>

**b) WACM1 (3 yr implementation)**

<b>(a)</b>	<b>(b)</b>	<b>(c)</b>
Yes	Neutral	Yes
<p><i>I believe that CMP201 (WACM1) would, if passed, better facilitate System Charging Method objective (a). This is because if passed, it would help to create a level playing field between Generators in the EU which in turn should facilitate further cross-border trading of electricity and benefit GB consumers from more competitive wholesale prices. The transition to implementation (the lead time from an Ofgem decision) in WACM1 is very sufficient, unlike the Original, at a minimum of 3 full years and a maximum of 4. This more than exceeds trading horizons and should be fair and workable for all parties.</i></p>	<p><i>It is not clear how CMP201 (WACM1) better or worse facilitates (b), “that compliance with the use of system charging methodology results in charges which reflect, as far as is reasonably practicable, the costs”. I consider it to be neutral against this objective. CMP201 (WACM1) if passed would neither improve nor weaken cost reflectivity.</i></p>	<p><i>I believe that CMP201 (WACM1) would, if passed, better facilitate System Charging Method objective (c). This is because if passed, the change would better reflect the duties associated with National Grid’s business by promoting a single internal market in electricity. This in turn would promote efficient cross border trade (in line with the intent of the Third Package), all in the context of the growth over time in the extent of interconnection capacity between GB and Europe, and the improvements in cross-border trading that should arise, if they are sensibly implemented here, from CACM as per the European Target Model.</i></p>

**b) WACM2 (5 yr implementation)**

<b>(a)</b>	<b>(b)</b>	<b>(c)</b>
Yes	Neutral	Yes
<p><i>I believe that CMP201 (WACM2) would, if passed, better facilitate System Charging Method objective (a). This is because if passed, it would help to create a level playing field between Generators in the EU which in turn should facilitate further cross-border trading of electricity and benefit GB consumers from more competitive wholesale prices. The transition to implementation</i></p>	<p><i>It is not clear how CMP201 (WACM2) better or worse facilitates (b), “that compliance with the use of system charging methodology results in charges which reflect, as far as is reasonably</i></p>	<p><i>I believe that CMP201 (WACM2) would, if passed, better facilitate System Charging Method objective (c). This is because if passed, the change would better reflect the duties associated with National Grid’s business by promoting a single internal market in electricity. This in turn would</i></p>

<p><i>(the lead time from an Ofgem decision) in WACM2 is unnecessarily long, at a minimum of 5 full years and a maximum of 6. This exceeds trading horizons by quite some margin, and it seems sub-optimal to have a change that is forthcoming, yet not yet in force, over quite such a long horizon without good reason. It would increase the net complexity of the commercial landscape which participants must commercially be fully aware of, prior to the eventual full implementation of CMP201 (WACM 2) , for several years.</i></p>	<p><i>practicable, the costs". I consider it to be neutral against this objective. CMP201 (WACM2) if passed would neither improve nor weaken cost reflectivity.</i></p>	<p><i>promote efficient cross border trade (in line with the intent of the Third Package), all in the context of the growth over time in the extent of interconnection capacity between GB and Europe, and the improvements in cross-border trading that should arise, if they are sensibly implemented here, from CACM as per the European Target Model.</i></p>
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**Vote 2: Whether each WACM better facilitates the ACOs than the ORIGINAL**

**a) WACM1 (3 year)**

<b>(a)</b>	<b>(b)</b>	<b>(c)</b>
Yes (slightly)	Neutral	Yes (slightly)
<p><i>The transition to implementation (the lead time from an Ofgem decision) in WACM1 is very sufficient, unlike the Original, at a minimum of 3 full years and a maximum of 4. This more than exceeds trading horizons and should be fair and workable for all parties.</i></p>		<p><i>The transition to implementation (the lead time from an Ofgem decision) in WACM1 is very sufficient, unlike the Original, at a minimum of 3 full years and a maximum of 4. This more than exceeds trading horizons and should be fair and workable for all parties.</i></p>

**b) WACM2 (5 year)**

<b>(a)</b>	<b>(b)</b>	<b>(c)</b>
No (slightly)	Neutral	No (slightly)
<p><i>The transition to implementation (the lead time from an Ofgem decision) in WACM2 is unnecessarily long, at a minimum of 5 full years and a maximum of 6. This exceeds trading horizons by long way, and it seems sub-optimal to have a change that is forthcoming, yet not yet in force, over quite such a long horizon without good reason. It would increase</i></p>		<p><i>The transition to implementation (the lead time from an Ofgem decision) in WACM2 is unnecessarily long, at a minimum of 5 full years and a maximum of 6. This exceeds trading horizons by a long way, and it</i></p>

<p><i>the net complexity of the commercial landscape which participants must commercially be fully aware of, prior to the eventual full implementation of CMP201 (WACM 2), for several years.</i></p>		<p><i>seems sub-optimal to have a change that is forthcoming, yet not yet in force, over quite such a long horizon without good reason. It would increase the net complexity of the commercial landscape which participants must commercially be fully aware of, prior to the eventual full implementation of CMP201 (WACM 2), for several years.</i></p>
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**Vote 3: Which option BEST facilitates achievement of the ACOs? (inc. CUSC baseline)**

<b>BEST option</b>	<b>Reason</b>
WACM1	<p><i>The transition to implementation (the lead time from an Ofgem decision) in WACM1 is very sufficient, unlike the Original, at a minimum of 3 full years and a maximum of 4. This more than exceeds trading horizons and should be fair and workable for all parties. WACM 2 is unduly long in the transition, and would increase the net complexity of the commercial landscape which participants must commercially be fully aware of, prior to the eventual full implementation of CMP201 (WACM 2), for several years. The transition to implementation (the lead time from an Ofgem decision) in the original is acceptable, as it does exceed trading horizons - but might be said by some parties to be only just sufficient, at a minimum of 2 full years and a maximum of 3. We believe WACM1 to represent a fair solution to the timescale / transition issue.</i></p>

<b>Name:</b>	<b>Rob Hill</b>
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**Vote 1: Whether each proposal better facilitates ACOs (against CUSC baseline)**

**a) Original Proposal**

<b>(a)</b>	<b>(b)</b>	<b>(c)</b>
No	Neutral	Yes



<i>The original modification proposal improves cross border competition in generation but would distort competition for GB supply as existing customer and wholesale contracts unwind.</i>	<i>The proposal has no impact on cost reflectivity of the system charging methodology.</i>	<i>The proposal would improve cross border trading and market coupling. If the EU Third package is considered “developments in the transmission licensees’ transmission businesses’ then the modification proposal properly takes account of this development.</i>
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**b) WACM1 (3 yr implementation)**

<b>(a)</b>	<b>(b)</b>	<b>(c)</b>
No	Neutral	Yes
<i>Whilst still distorting competition in supply, the longer implementation timescales in the WACM1 reduces this when compared to the original proposal as it is likely that most commercial arrangements will be able to take account of the proposed changes.</i>	<i>The proposal has no impact on cost reflectivity of the system charging methodology.</i>	<i>The proposal would improve cross border trading and market coupling. If the EU Third package is considered “developments in the transmission licensees’ transmission businesses’ then the modification proposal properly takes account of this development.</i>

**b) WACM2 (5 yr implementation)**

<b>(a)</b>	<b>(b)</b>	<b>(c)</b>
<i>WACM2 has the greatest likelihood of minimal competitive distortion as it is likely that all commercial arrangements will be able to take account of the proposed changes given the long implementation timescales</i>	<i>The proposal has no impact on cost reflectivity of the system charging methodology</i>	<i>The proposal would improve cross border trading and market coupling. If the EU Third package is considered “developments in the transmission licensees’ transmission businesses’ then the modification proposal properly takes account of this development.</i>
<i>WACM2 has the greatest likelihood of minimal competitive distortion as it is likely that all commercial arrangements will be able to take account of the proposed changes given the long implementation</i>	<i>The proposal has no impact on cost reflectivity of the system charging methodology</i>	<i>The proposal would improve cross border trading and market coupling. If the EU Third package is considered “developments in the transmission licensees’</i>

<i>timescales</i>		<i>transmission businesses' then the modification proposal properly takes account of this development.</i>
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**Vote 2: Whether each WACM better facilitates the ACOs than the ORIGINAL**

**a) WACM1 (3 year)**

<b>(a)</b>	<b>(b)</b>	<b>(c)</b>
Yes	Neutral	Neutral
<i>Less distortion in supply competition.</i>		

**b) WACM2 (5 year)**

<b>(a)</b>	<b>(b)</b>	<b>(c)</b>
Yes	Neutral	Neutral
<i>Less distortion in supply competition.</i>		

**Vote 3: Which option BEST facilitates achievement of the ACOs? (inc. CUSC baseline)**

<b>BEST option</b>	<b>Reason</b>
<i>WACM2</i>	<i>The longer implementation timescales allow all parties to ensure that commercial agreements are in place to accommodate these changes</i>

<b>Name:</b>	<b>Garth Graham</b>
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**Vote 1: Whether each proposal better facilitates ACOs (against CUSC baseline)**

**a) Original Proposal**

<b>(a)</b>	<b>(b)</b>	<b>(c)</b>
Yes	Neutral	Yes
<i>I believe that CMP201 (Original) would, if passed, better facilitate System Charging Method objective (a). This is because if passed, it would help to create a level playing</i>	<i>It is not clear how CMP201 (Original) better or worse facilitates (b), "that compliance with the</i>	<i>I believe that CMP201 (Original) would, if passed, better facilitate System Charging Method objective (c). This is</i>

<p><i>field between Generators in the EU which in turn should facilitate further cross-border trading of electricity and benefit GB consumers from more competitive wholesale prices. This would facilitate competition in the sale, distribution and purchase of electricity and thus better facilitate the Applicable Objectives. However, the transition to implementation (the lead time from an Ofgem decision) in the CMP201 (Original) is only just sufficient, at a minimum of 2 full years and a maximum of 3.</i></p>	<p><i>use of system charging methodology results in charges which reflect, as far as is reasonably practicable, the costs". I consider it to be neutral against this objective. CMP201 (Original) would, if passed, neither improve nor weaken cost reflectivity.</i></p>	<p><i>because if passed, the change would better reflect the duties associated with National Grid's business by promoting a single internal market in electricity. This in turn would promote efficient cross border trade (in line with the intent of the Third Package), all in the context of the growth over time in the extent of interconnection capacity between GB and other EU Member States, and the improvements in cross-border trading that should, in principle, arise from the appropriate implemented of the European Target Model via, for example, the CACM Network Code.</i></p>
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**b) WACM1 (3 yr implementation)**

<b>(a)</b>	<b>(b)</b>	<b>(c)</b>
<p><i>Yes</i></p>	<p><i>Neutral</i></p>	<p><i>Yes</i></p>
<p><i>I believe that CMP201 (WACM1) would, if passed, better facilitate System Charging Method objective (a). This is because if passed, it would help to create a level playing field between Generators in the EU which in turn should facilitate further cross-border trading of electricity and benefit GB consumers from more competitive wholesale prices. This would facilitate competition in the sale, distribution and purchase of electricity and thus better facilitate the Applicable Objectives. The transition to implementation (the lead time from an Ofgem decision) in WACM1 is certainly sufficient (whereas the Original is just sufficient) at a minimum of 3 full years and a maximum</i></p>	<p><i>It is not clear how CMP201 (WACM1) better or worse facilitates (b), "that compliance with the use of system charging methodology results in charges which reflect, as far as is reasonably practicable, the costs". I consider it to be neutral against this objective. CMP201 (WACM1) if passed would neither</i></p>	<p><i>I believe that CMP201 (WACM1) would, if passed, better facilitate System Charging Method objective (c). This is because if passed, the change would better reflect the duties associated with National Grid's business by promoting a single internal market in electricity. This in turn would promote efficient cross border trade (in line with the intent of the Third Package), all in the context of the growth</i></p>

<p><i>of 4 for a transition / implementation period. This more than exceeds trading horizons and should be fair and workable for all parties.</i></p> <p><i>A longer transition period than that in WACM1 would unduly (and unfairly) delay the application of this change to the CUSC which would distort competition in the sale, distribution and purchase of electricity and thus not better facilitate the Applicable Objectives.</i></p>	<p><i>improve nor weaken cost reflectivity.</i></p>	<p><i>over time in the extent of interconnection capacity between GB and other EU Member States, and the improvements in cross-border trading that should, in principle, arise from the appropriate implemented of the European Target Model via, for example, the CACM Network Code.</i></p>
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**b) WACM2 (5 yr implementation)**

<b>(a)</b>	<b>(b)</b>	<b>(c)</b>
<p><i>No</i></p>	<p><i>Neutral</i></p>	<p><i>No</i></p>
<p><i>The transition to implementation (the lead time from an Ofgem decision) in WACM2 is to great as it more than more exceeds the trading horizons. This longer transition period would unduly (and unfairly) delay the application of this change to the CUSC which would distort competition in the sale, distribution and purchase of electricity and thus not better facilitate the Applicable Objectives.</i></p>		<p><i>The transition to implementation (the lead time from an Ofgem decision) in WACM2 is inappropriate. This longer transition period would unduly (and unfairly) delay the application of this change to the CUSC which; if done in a timely manner, as per the Original and WACM1 (but not WACM2); would properly take account of the developments in transmission licensees' transmission businesses.</i></p>

**Vote 2: Whether each WACM better facilitates the ACOs than the ORIGINAL**

**a) WACM1 (3 year)**

<b>(a)</b>	<b>(b)</b>	<b>(c)</b>
<p><i>Yes (slightly)</i></p>	<p><i>Neutral</i></p>	<p><i>Yes (slightly)</i></p>
<p><i>The transition to implementation (the lead time from an Ofgem decision) in WACM1 is sufficient, unlike the Original, at a minimum of 3 full years and a maximum of 4. This more than exceeds trading horizons and should be fair and workable for all parties.</i></p>		<p><i>The transition to implementation (the lead time from an Ofgem decision) in WACM1 is sufficient, unlike the Original, at a minimum of 3 full years</i></p>

		<i>and a maximum of 4. This more than exceeds trading horizons and should be fair and workable for all parties.</i>
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**b) WACM2 (5 year)**

<b>(a)</b>	<b>(b)</b>	<b>(c)</b>
<i>No</i>	<i>Neutral</i>	<i>No</i>
<i>The transition to implementation (the lead time from an Ofgem decision) in WACM2 is too great as it more than more exceeds the trading horizons. This longer transition period would unduly (and unfairly) delay the application of this change to the CUSC which would distort competition in the sale, distribution and purchase of electricity and thus not better facilitate the Applicable Objectives.</i>		<i>The transition to implementation (the lead time from an Ofgem decision) in WACM2 is inappropriate. This longer transition period would unduly (and unfairly) delay the application of this change to the CUSC which; if done in a timely manner, as per the Original and WACM1 (but not WACM2); would properly take account of the developments in transmission licensees' transmission businesses.</i>

**Vote 3: Which option BEST facilitates achievement of the ACOs? (inc. CUSC baseline)**

<b>BEST option</b>	<b>Reason</b>
WACM	<p><i>It is clear from the Workgroup deliberations that there is broad acceptance that the proposed change (that is removing BSUoS charges from Generators and applying them solely to Suppliers) has merit – in terms of better facilitating competition in the sale, distribution and purchase of electricity - the main issue of disagreement centres on the period of transition to implementation.</i></p> <p><i>The transition to implementation period (the lead time from an Ofgem decision) in WACM1 is certainly sufficient (whereas the Original is just sufficient) at a minimum of 3 full years and a maximum of 4 for a transition / implementation period. This more than exceeds trading horizons and should be fair and workable for all parties.</i></p> <p><i>It should ensure that the proposed change comes into effect as soon as reasonably practical such that the clear benefits of the change; in terms of better facilitating competition in the sale, distribution and purchase of electricity; are realised. Delaying implementation would negate the</i></p>

	<i>benefits of the proposed change being realised over the period of the lengthened implementation period. This would be detrimental to competition in the sale, distribution and purchase of electricity.</i>
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## Annex 7 – CMP201- Removal of BSUoS from Generators: Supplier Issues Paper

This information paper was provided to the Workgroup by two Members in order to outline the CMP201 competition issues for Suppliers. The Workgroup discussed the paper (but did not unanimously agree, or disagree, with its contents).

### Interaction of BSUoS and RCRC

A7.1. Ofgem has explained the theoretical importance of the current relationships between BSUoS and RCRC, as part of the recent Electricity Cash-Out Issues Papers<sup>16</sup>.

'In theory a participant who is perfectly balanced should receive a rebate through RCRC equivalent to what it pays for energy balancing via BSUoS. Due to the separation of RCRC and BSUoS, as well as the fact that BSUoS is not broken down into energy and system balancing costs, it is not readily apparent whether or not this is occurring. We are concerned that if it is not, there may be a less than efficient allocation of costs.'

A7.2. We have completed some simplistic modelling of the effect of this BSUoS proposal on a *perfectly balanced party*. The results of this are summarised below.

£/MWh (-ve :credit to party)	Current			
Balanced Party	BSUoS <sup>17</sup>	RCRC	Imbalance	Total
Supplier	£0.12	-£0.12	£0.00	£0.00
Generator	£0.12	-£0.12	£0.00	£0.00
	Under CMP201			
Balanced Party	BSUoS	RCRC	Imbalance	Total
Supplier	£0.24	-£0.12	£0.00	£0.12
Generator	£0.00	-£0.12	£0.00	-£0.12

A7.3. This scenario is one in which parties are overall 'short' and Grid are buying energy. Clearly, different assumptions of NIV and System Prices will give different answers, but the theoretical misallocation of energy balancing costs will be the level of RCRC.

A7.4. It is clear that parties no longer, both in theory or in practice, will receive the correct level of energy balancing costs and so can no longer be receiving the efficient allocation of costs.

<sup>16</sup> Electricity Cash-out issues Ref: 143/11

<http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/Markets/WhlMkts/CompandEff/CashoutRev/Documents1/Electricity%20cash-out%20issues%20paper.pdf>

<sup>17</sup> This represents the theoretical sum of energy balancing costs which, by definition is the equal and opposite of RCRC

## **Effect on Supplier risk**

A7.5. Regardless of whether the change is cost-neutral, it will increase the effective risk on Suppliers and so, in turn, consumers.

A7.6. It is generally accepted that due to its inherent volatility and the ex-post nature of pricing that BSUoS places a considerable risk on Suppliers. This risk is currently mitigated, to a degree, by the natural hedge that exists between BSUoS and RCRC (as described by Ofgem above).

A7.7. Thus, this change will increase the risk borne by Suppliers in 2 main ways:

- Doubling the level of the charge
- Breaking the relationship between BSUoS and RCRC

### *Doubling the level of the charge*

A7.8. It is self-evident that doubling the level of an unpredictable charge will increase the risk unless actions are taken to address the root causes (the inherent volatility and the ex-post pricing).

A7.9. It may be claimed that this additional risk is already captured in the forward curve. However Generators clearly do not bear the same BSUoS risk as Suppliers. BSUoS costs' rising implies that National Grid is spending more money on Balancing Services. This money is spent almost exclusively with Generators. Hence the generation community, as a whole, is naturally and necessarily protected, to a degree, against BSUoS.

A7.10. Against this, it may be argued that whilst true of the generation community as a whole, it is not true of each individual Generator and so the link to forward curve is not clear. However, it is logical that marginal plant are the most likely to be affected by increases (and decreases) in unforeseen spending in Balancing Services, as they are more likely to be 'called' by Grid, and so are at less risk to BSUoS variations than the 'average' generator. Hence it is likely that minimal BSUoS risk is priced into the curve (as the marginal Generator is particularly well hedged against BSUoS risk), and certainly less than a Supplier will be exposed directly to.



Breaking the relationship between BSUoS and RCRC

A7.11. The table below illustrates the volatility of BSUoS since the start of 2008- both 'gross' and 'net' of RCRC. (Effectively, 'gross' is all balancing costs and 'net' theoretically is system balancing costs). As can be seen, the range for 'net' BSUoS is lower both for daily average prices and rolling yearly averages.

	Daily BSUoS Price (Gross)	Daily BSUoS Price (Net)	Rolling Year BSUoS Price (Gross)	Rolling Year BSUoS Price (Net)
Max	£5.09	£3.79	£1.55	£1.36
Min	-£0.75	-£0.28	£1.10	£0.99
Range	£5.84	£4.07	£0.45	£0.37

**Next Steps**

A7.12. As can be seen, this modification has consequences for the efficient allocation of energy balancing costs, and also creates additional risk.

A7.13. If this modification is to progress any further the issue of allocation of energy allocation will need to be addressed, and the scope should be widened to include measures to manage volatility and predictability. This could include moving towards fixing BSUoS prices in advance for a period of 6 or 12 months, as is currently the case for Gas System Operator costs.

[This information paper was provided to the Workgroup by Elexon in order to outline the CMP201 issues with respect to the (BSC) definitions of BMUs etc. The Workgroup discussed the paper (but did not agree, or disagree, with its contents).]

### What is a Trading Unit?

A8.1 A Trading Unit is a collection of one or more BM Units established in accordance with BSC Section K4. Forming a Trading Unit with other BM Units (which may have different Lead Parties) can enable a BM Unit to receive benefits in certain areas such as:

- Transmission Loss Multipliers (TLMs);
- Production/Consumption Status;
- Certain BSC costs;
- Residual Cashflow Reallocation Cashflow (RCRC); and
- Balancing Services Use of System (BSUoS) charges.

A8.2 A description of the different types of Trading Unit can be found in BSC Section K4 and BSC Procedure (BSCP) 31. In each Settlement Period, the BSC deems a Trading Unit to be either a ‘delivering’ Trading Unit or an ‘oftaking’ Trading Unit as follows:

- If the sum of all the BM Unit Metered Volumes (QM<sub>ij</sub>) in the Trading Unit is greater than zero for that Settlement Period, the Trading Unit is a ‘delivering’ Trading Unit.
- If the sum of all the BM Unit Metered Volumes in the Trading Unit is less than or equal to zero for that Settlement Period, the Trading Unit is an ‘oftaking’ Trading Unit.

A8.3 *For example, a generation site consists of three BM Units: two generation units and a Station Demand unit. In a particular Settlement Period, they produce the following Metered Volumes:*

BM Unit	Metered Volume
T_GEN-1	100MWh
T_GEN-2	80MWh
T_DEM-1	-40MWh

A8.4 *In this case, the net Metered Volume across all the BM Units in this Trading Unit is 140MWh. As this is greater than zero, the Trading Unit is a delivering Trading Unit in this Settlement Period.*

### What is the difference between Production/Consumption status and delivering/oftaking status?

A8.5 There commonly tends to be confusion about the difference between Production/Consumption (P/C) status and delivering/oftaking status. P/C Status is usually determined at the Trading Unit level, based on the Generation Capacity and Demand Capacity values submitted by its BM Units for the current BSC Season. These values are the BM Units’ estimates of their maximum generation/demand for that BSC Season. Delivering/oftaking

status is also determined at the Trading Unit level, but is based on the actual Metered Volumes of its BM Units in a given Settlement Period. Certain BM Units can choose to fix their P/C Status independently of their Trading Unit (currently Exempt Export BM Units, plus Interconnector BM Units if P277 is approved). Others have their P/C Status fixed automatically by BSC Systems (currently Interconnector BM Units, plus Supplier BM Units will always have a fixed P/C Status of Consumption when P269 is implemented on 23 February 2012).

- A8.6 The important thing to note is that delivering/offtaking status is completely independent of a BM Unit's P/C Status. It is therefore possible for a Production BM Unit to be part of an offtaking Trading Unit, or for a Consumption BM Unit to be part of a delivering Trading Unit. In addition, both of these are independent of the BM Unit's individual Metered Volume in a given Settlement Period.
- A8.7 For example, P269 will fix the P/C Status of all Supplier BM Units as Consumption in every Settlement Period. However, it will still be possible for an individual Supplier BM Unit to export ( $QM_{ij} > 0$ ) in a given Settlement Period even though its Base Trading Unit is offtaking in that Settlement Period. Similarly, it will still be possible for a Base Trading Unit to export in a given Settlement Period, even though all of its Supplier BM Units have a Consumption P/C Status and some of these BM Units may be importing ( $QM_{ij} \leq 0$ ) in that Settlement Period.

### What are the current arrangements with BSUoS?

A8.8 In any given Settlement Period, a BM Unit's BSUoS charge is based on their proportion of BM Unit Metered Volume ( $QM_{ij}$ ) relative to the total BM Unit Metered Volume in that Settlement Period, and is calculated as follows:

- For a BM Unit in a delivering Trading Unit:

$$BSUoS_{TOT,ij} = \{BSUoS_{TOT,j} * QM_{ij} * TLM_{ij}\} / \{|\sum^+(QM_{ij} * TLM_{ij})| + |\sum^-(QM_{ij} * TLM_{ij})|\}$$

- For a BM Unit in an offtaking Trading Unit:

$$BSUoS_{TOT,ij} = \{-1 * BSUoS_{TOT,j} * QM_{ij} * TLM_{ij}\} / \{|\sum^+(QM_{ij} * TLM_{ij})| + |\sum^-(QM_{ij} * TLM_{ij})|\}$$

A8.9 For more information, please see CUSC Section 14.30.

A8.10 Each BM Unit is charged BSUoS based on its Metered Volume for the relevant Settlement Period as a ratio of the total Metered Volume over all BM Units in that Settlement Period. However, it should be noted that BM Units are charged on a 'net Trading Unit basis', as explained in CUSC Section 14.30.3.

A8.11 In essence, this means if a BM Unit is operating in the opposite direction of the Trading Unit to which it belongs (i.e. importing when the Trading Unit is delivering, or exporting when the Trading Unit is offtaking) then it is paid BSUoS. This is because, in this situation, the relevant equation will give a negative result, which results in a payment to the BM Unit.

A8.12 This can be summarised as follows:

Current Arrangements		Trading Unit is...	
		Delivering (net TUQM <sub>ij</sub> > 0)	Offtaking (net TUQM <sub>ij</sub> ≤ 0)
BM Unit is...	Exporting (QM <sub>ij</sub> > 0)	Charged BSUoS	Paid BSUoS
	Importing (QM <sub>ij</sub> ≤ 0)	Paid BSUoS	Charged BSUoS

A8.13 Let us consider the earlier example. In this scenario, the Trading Unit is a delivering Trading Unit. T\_GEN-1 and T\_GEN-2 are both exporting (positive Metered Volumes), and so they are charged BSUoS accordingly.

A8.14 However, T\_DEM-1 is importing, and so it is paid BSUoS accordingly. In this case, the Lead Party of these three BM Units will have the payment they receive from T\_DEM-1 netted off from their charges against the generation units, giving them a reduced BSUoS charge overall.

### How can we define a ‘generator’ under CMP201?

A8.15 CMP201 proposes to remove BSUoS charges from ‘generation’, in order to better align with arrangements in other EU Member States. In essence, anyone who is currently charged BSUoS for exporting onto the Transmission System will no longer pay BSUoS, while anyone who is charged BSUoS for importing off the Transmission System will continue to pay (albeit at a higher tariff).

A8.16 However, it is not the intention of CMP201 to change any benefits that may occur through being part of a Trading Unit, such as a BM Unit being paid BSUoS for flowing in the opposite direction to its Trading Unit. A definition of ‘generation’ is needed that would retain these benefits for any BM Units that will not be exempt from BSUoS under CMP201.

A8.17 Two possible definitions for a ‘generator’ were suggested in the first CMP201 Workgroup meeting:

- 1) A BM Unit that is exporting (BM Unit’s QM<sub>ij</sub>>0); or
- 2) A BM Unit that is in a delivering Trading Unit (net TU QM<sub>ij</sub>>0 even if BM Unit’s QM<sub>ij</sub>≤0).

A8.18 Both of these are Settlement Period-based determinations – i.e. they can change from half-hour to half-hour.

#### 1) A BM Unit that is exporting

A8.19 Under this definition, a BM Unit would be charged BSUoS if it was importing in a Settlement Period, but would not be charged if it was exporting. However, there is a question as to whether the Trading Unit status should still be considered. This gives two sub-scenarios:

- a) The Trading Unit status is not considered; or
- b) The Trading Unit status is considered.

1a) The Trading Unit status is not considered

A8.20 Here, an importing BM Unit would be charged BSUoS based only on its own Metered Volume in the Settlement Period, and it would not matter whether its Trading Unit was delivering or offtaking in that Settlement Period. This would mean that BM Units would not be paid BSUoS if they were flowing in the opposite direction to their Trading Unit, as they currently would, as the Trading Unit would not be considered.

A8.21 This can be summarised as follows:

<b>Scenario 1a</b> <b>BMU that is exporting</b> <b>(TU is not considered)</b>		<b>Trading Unit is...</b>	
		<b>Delivering</b> (net TU $QM_{ij} > 0$ )	<b>Offtaking</b> (net TU $QM_{ij} \leq 0$ )
<b>BM Unit s...</b>	<b>Exporting</b> ( $QM_{ij} > 0$ )	No BSUoS	No BSUoS
	<b>Importing</b> ( $QM_{ij} \leq 0$ )	Charged BSUoS	Charged BSUoS

A8.22 Let us consider the earlier example. In this scenario, the Trading Unit is a delivering Trading Unit.  $T\_GEN-1$  and  $T\_GEN-2$  are both exporting BM Units (positive Metered Volumes), and so they would not be charged BSUoS.

A8.23 However,  $T\_DEM-1$  is importing. In this case, it would be charged BSUoS. This is different to the current arrangements, where  $T\_DEM-1$  would be paid BSUoS.

1b) The Trading Unit status is considered

A8.24 Here, an importing BM Unit would be subject to BSUoS in the same way as currently, and any importing BM Units in delivering Trading Units would benefit from a negative BSUoS charge (i.e. they would be paid BSUoS).

A8.25 This can be summarised as follows:

<b>Scenario 1b</b> <b>BMU that is exporting</b> <b>(TU is considered)</b>		<b>Trading Unit is...</b>	
		<b>Delivering</b> (net TU $QM_{ij} > 0$ )	<b>Offtaking</b> (net TU $QM_{ij} \leq 0$ )
<b>BM Unit is...</b>	<b>Exporting</b> ( $QM_{ij} > 0$ )	No BSUoS	No BSUoS
	<b>Importing</b> ( $QM_{ij} \leq 0$ )	Paid BSUoS	Charged BSUoS

A8.26 Let us consider the earlier example. In this scenario, the Trading Unit is a delivering Trading Unit.  $T\_GEN-1$  and  $T\_GEN-2$  are both exporting BM Units (positive Metered Volumes), and so they would not be charged BSUoS.

A8.27  $T\_DEM-1$  is importing, but as the Trading Unit is delivering, it would be paid BSUoS as it would under the current arrangements.

A8.28 It should be noted that counting any BM Unit that is exporting as 'generation' would mean that Supplier BM Units, which are traditionally considered as demand, would fall under the generation bracket should they export in any given Settlement Period (for example, due to large amounts of SVA embedded generation). In either of the above scenarios, should a Supplier BM Unit export in any Settlement Period, it would be considered

generation and would not be subject to BSUoS for that Settlement Period, regardless of what its Base Trading Unit was doing.

## 2) A BM Unit that is in a delivering Trading Unit

A8.29 Under this definition, a BM Unit would be charged BSUoS if it was part of a Trading Unit that was offtaking in the Settlement Period, but would not be charged if the Trading Unit was delivering. This definition would be similar to the current arrangements, except that delivering Trading Units would not pay BSUoS. This would imply that any BM Unit that is exporting while in an offtaking Trading Unit will still be paid BSUoS, rather than charged.

A8.30 This can be summarised as follows:

Scenario 2 BMU that is in delivering TU		Trading Unit is...	
		Delivering (net TU $QM_{ij} > 0$ )	Offtaking (net TU $QM_{ij} \leq 0$ )
BM Unit is...	Exporting ( $QM_{ij} > 0$ )	No BSUoS	Paid BSUoS
	Importing ( $QM_{ij} \leq 0$ )	No BSUoS	Charged BSUoS

A8.31 Let us consider the earlier example. In this scenario, the Trading Unit is a delivering Trading Unit.  $T\_GEN-1$  and  $T\_GEN-2$  are both exporting BM Units (positive Metered Volumes), and  $T\_DEM-1$  is importing. However, as they are all part of a delivering Trading Unit, none of them are charged BSUoS.

A8.32 Returning to the Supplier BM Unit that had large amounts of SVA embedded generation, then under this scenario it would be charged BSUoS as currently – as long as the Base Trading Unit it belonged to was offtaking in each Settlement Period. This means it would still be paid BSUoS, as currently, if it was itself exporting. In the event that the Base Trading Unit was a delivering Trading Unit in any Settlement Period, all of the BM Units in that Base Trading Unit (whether importing or exporting) would not be charged BSUoS in that Settlement Period.

## How should we define a ‘generator’ under CMP201?

A8.33 The table below summarises what would happen in each scenario under the current arrangements and under each of the possible definitions described above:

Scenario (Def'n of 'generator')	Exporting BM Unit in a...		Importing BM Unit in a...	
	Delivering TU	Offtaking TU	Delivering TU	Offtaking TU
Current Arrangements	Charged BSUoS	Paid BSUoS	Paid BSUoS	Charged BSUoS
1a BMU that is exporting (TU is not considered)	No BSUoS	No BSUoS	Charged BSUoS	Charged BSUoS
1b BMU that is exporting (TU is considered)	No BSUoS	No BSUoS	Paid BSUoS	Charged BSUoS
2 BMU that is in delivering TU	No BSUoS	Paid BSUoS	No BSUoS	Charged BSUoS

A8.34 Under all scenarios, exporting BM Units in delivering Trading Units, which are charged BSUoS currently would no longer pay BSUoS. Importing BM Units in offtaking Trading Units, which are also charged BSUoS currently, would continue to be charged BSUoS. However, the BM Units that are currently paid BSUoS would be treated differently in each scenario, which would affect the BSUoS calculations.

- **Scenario 1a:** It would be relatively simple to calculate and allocate BSUoS under this scenario as the algebra would simply split BSUoS based on each BM Unit's Metered Volume. As all the BM Units liable for BSUoS would have a negative Metered Volume in the relevant Settlement Period, the calculation should be fairly straightforward. However, this scenario does not retain the BSUoS benefits that are currently enjoyed by BM Units flowing in the opposite direction to their Trading Unit. As such, this does not meet the criterion that these benefits should be retained.
- **Scenario 1b:** This scenario does retain the BSUoS benefits that apply under the current arrangements. However, this method of allocating BSUoS would be more complicated as the Trading Unit status would need to be factored in. Additionally, if BSUoS is being charged based on whether an individual BM Unit is importing or exporting, then it is questionable as to whether considering its Trading Unit status is actually relevant and how practical this would be.
- **Scenario 2:** This scenario retains the BSUoS benefits, and would also be relatively simple as the calculations would be similar to those used currently. The main difference would be that the equation for delivering Trading Units would equal zero. As such, ELEXON suggests that this would be the best scenario to use for CMP201.

A8.35 Scenario 2 is normally used as the definition of 'generation' under the BSC. Also, many of the benefits which arise from being in a Trading Unit with other BM Units depend on whether the Trading Unit is delivering or offtaking in a given Settlement Period. For example, the allocation of TLMS to BM Units is based on their Trading Unit's delivering or offtaking status rather than whether the BM Unit is exporting or importing. Using this definition would therefore retain consistency in this regard. In addition, the algebra for the BSUoS calculations is likely to be easier under Scenario 2 than under Scenario 1b. These reasons would favour defining 'generation' at the Trading Unit level.

**Belgium: Elia**

I. What charges do generators pay to the TSO, other than connection charges? Network tariffs

II. Compensation for generators:

Service	Do generators provide this service to the TSO?	If they are compensated, how?	Who does the TSO recover the costs from?
Black Start	✓	Fixed payment for the provision of the service	100% Demand
Internal Congestion Management	✓	Payments/charges based on prices submitted by the generator	
Primary Reserve	✓	Fixed monthly payment	100% Generation
Secondary Reserve	✓	Fixed payment for the provision of the service Payment for activated volumes	
Tertiary Reserve	✓	Fixed payment for the provision of the service Payment for activated volumes	
Voltage Control/Reactive Power	✓	Fixed payment for the provision of the service Payment for activated volumes	100% Demand



## France: RTE

I. What charges do generators pay to the TSO, other than connection charges? G-comp: €0.19/MWH. There is no specific cost allocation between producers and load – the split is considered to be 3:97

II. Compensation for generators:

Service	Do generators provide this service to the TSO?	If they are compensated, how?	Who does the TSO recover the costs from?
Black Start	✓	Compulsory Service – No compensation	
Internal Congestion Management	✓	Pay-as-bid payment of energy through balancing mechanism auction	100% Demand
Primary Reserve	✓	Fixed payment for the provision of the service	
Secondary Reserve	✓	Fixed payment for the provision of the service Payment for activated volumes	
Tertiary Reserve	✓	Pay-as-bid payment of energy through balancing mechanism auction	
Voltage Control/Reactive Power	✓	Fixed payment for the provision of the service Payment based on operating time of the unit	

## Germany: Amprion

I. What charges do generators pay to the TSO, other than connection charges? None

II. Compensation for generators:

Service	Do generators provide this service to the TSO?	If they are compensated, how?	Who does the TSO recover the costs from?
Black Start	✓	Compensation is provided	
Internal Congestion Management	✓	Contractual arrangements: Payment for fuel cost increases Receipt for fuel cost savings	100% Demand
Primary Reserve	✓	Tendering process	Contracted power recovered from demand
Secondary Reserve	✓		Balancing energy recovered from balancing responsible parties
Tertiary Reserve	✓		
Voltage Control/Reactive Power	✓	Contractual agreements: Payment for the reactive energy in proportion to PX prices	100% Demand

## Netherlands: TenneT

I. What charges do generators pay to the TSO, other than connection charges? None

II. Compensation for generators:

Service	Do generators provide this service to the TSO?	If they are compensated, how?	Who does the TSO recover the costs from?
Black Start	✓	The compensation is based on prices agreed in contracts with the relevant generators after a call for tender	100% Demand
Internal Congestion Management	✓	Payments based on prices submitted by the generator	Currently 100% Demand, but there is a proposal to let Generators in the congestion area pay 100% of the costs for internal congestion management. Renewable generators might be exempted from the obligation.
Primary Reserve	✓	All generators above 5 MW are currently obliged to provide the service and are not compensated for it. There are discussions on abolishing the obligation and contracting primary reserve from generators after a call for tender	100% Demand

Secondary Reserve	✓	<p>Compensation for balancing energy is based on a settlement price for balancing</p> <p>Compensation for the capacity is based on a call for tender</p>	<p>The costs for balancing energy are recovered from balancing responsible parties according to their balancing position</p> <p>The cost for the capacity is paid 100% by Demand</p>
Tertiary Reserve	✓	<p>Compensation for the balancing energy is based on the settlement price for balancing</p> <p>Compensation for the capacity is based on a call for tender</p>	<p>The costs are recovered from balancing responsible parties according to their balancing position</p> <p>The cost for the capacity is paid 100% by Demand</p>
Voltage Control/Reactive Power	✓	<p>The compensation is based on prices agreed in contracts with the relevant generators after a call for tender. The compensation often consists of a fixed and variable component.</p>	<p>100% Demand</p>

**Additional Comments:**

There is an incentive scheme in place, based on which the costs recovered through tariffs charged to load customers are not fully pass-through. The incentive is based on a budget and a sliding scale with cap and floor. For outperformance or underperformance of not more than 20% of the budget, TenneT keeps or pays 25% of this outperformance or underperformance. Anything above or below 20% of the budget is settled through the tariffs.

## Spain: Red Electrica de Espana

I. What charges do generators pay to the TSO, other than connection charges? All generators pay an access tariff (0,5 €/MWh)

II. Compensation for generators:

Service	Do generators provide this service to the TSO?	If they are compensated, how?	Who does the TSO recover the costs from?
Black Start	✓	No Compensation - compulsory	
Internal Congestion Management	✓	Through market mechanisms – pay as bid	100% Demand
Primary Reserve	✓	No Compensation - compulsory	
Secondary Reserve	✓	Through market mechanisms Payment for provision of service according to marginal price Payment for activated volumes according to marginal price	Capability: 100% Demand Activated Volumes: Gen & Dem according to deviations in programmes
Tertiary Reserve	✓	Through market mechanisms according to marginal price	Gen & Dem according to deviations in programmes

Voltage Control/Reactive Power	✓	<p>“Special Regime”* generators: 4% of 8.29 c€/kWh if they maintain <math>\cos\phi</math> within a specific range.</p> <p><i>*Those which receive feed-in tariff or market premium, cogeneration and RES</i></p>	
<p>Additional Comments: All these services are provided into the market and the associated costs are included in the final energy market price. They are not purchased by the TSO so it has not to recover any cost. TSO’s role is managing and settling this market, but not purchasing.</p>			

## Great Britain: National Grid

I. What charges, if any, do generators pay to the TSO, other than connection charges? None

II. Compensation for generators:

Service	Do generators provide this service to the TSO?	If they are compensated, how?	Who does the TSO recover the costs from?
Black Start	✓	Monthly payment for provision of the service	50% Demand 50% Generation
Internal Congestion Management	✓	Payment/Charge based on prices submitted by the generator	
Primary Reserve	✓	Payment for provision of the service Payment for activated volumes	
Secondary Reserve	✓	Procured through contracts	
Tertiary Reserve	✓	Payment for provision of the service	
Voltage Control/Reactive Power	✓	Procured through contracts	

## **Ireland: Eirgrid**

I. What charges, if any, do generators pay to the TSO, other than connection charges?

### **Short Notice Declarations (SNDs)**

A charge for an SND may be incurred by a User if it does not give the required notice to the System Operator of certain types of reductions in MW availability (MDMW). The charge reflects the period of notice given, the size of reduction and the Reason Code.

### **Trips**

A User incurs a Trip Charge when the output from a unit rapidly and unexpectedly reduces. The size of the charge will reflect the speed and the size of the reduction in output. Incidents are categorised as below:

- Direct Trip: A reduction rate of 15MW/s
- Fast Wind Down A reduction rate of 3MW/s
- Slow Wind Down: A reduction rate of 1MW/s

### **Generator Performance Incentives (GPIs)**

The Grid Codes specify minimum standards of capability and performance that Users must meet. Generators will incur a charge if the minimum Grid Code requirements are not met for the following:

- Operating Reserve
- Reactive Power
- Minimum Generation
- Minimum On Time
- Maximum Starts
- Governor Droop
- Loading / Deloading
- Late/Early Synchronisation



II. Compensation for generators:

Service	Do generators provide this service to the TSO?	If they are compensated, how?	Who does the TSO recover the costs from?
Black Start	✓	Monthly payment for provision of the service	100% Demand
Internal Congestion Management	✓	Constraint payments keep generators financially neutral for the difference between the market schedule and the actual dispatch.	Single Electricity Market Operator Imperfections Charge: funded by Energy Imbalances and Make Whole Payments
Primary Reserve	✓	Monthly payment for each MW of capability	100% Demand
Secondary Reserve	✓		
Tertiary Reserve	✓		
Voltage Control/Reactive Power	✓	Capability payment	

### Introduction

A10.1. CMP201 proposes to remove BSUoS liability from Generators, reallocating the charge 100% on Suppliers. It was noted by the Workgroup that Supplier's may be required to hold additional credit cover as a consequence of this reallocation. This note provides an assessment of the potential impact on Suppliers.

### Current Credit Arrangements:

A10.2. CUSC Parties are required to maintain security cover for both TNUoS and BSUoS in accordance with the requirements set out in the CUSC (Section 3).

A10.3. National Grid extends unsecured credit to CUSC Parties in accordance with the "Best Practice Guideline for Gas and Electricity Network Operator Credit Cover", depending on a party's Approved Credit Rating. Where this is insufficient or does not have an Approved Credit Rating, the CUSC Party is required to provide additional security cover, typically in the form of:

- Parent Company Guarantee
- Letter of Credit
- Monies lodged in Escrow account
- Other Insurance, Bond or Security arrangements agreed with National Grid

A10.4. In addition, National Grid also extends credit based on their payment history. This is calculated at 0.4% per 12 month period of the Maximum Credit Allowance (the Maximum Credit Allowance is 2% of RAV). This is incremented equally each month up to a maximum of 2% after 60 months. This credit is conditional on timely settlement of National Grid's charges. Where a party misses the due date, the credit extended by National Grid is reduced by 50%.

A10.5. With the current RAV of £7.9bn, this equates to credit cover being extended at approximately £53k per month up to a maximum of approximately £3m for each party. A new entrant would need to provide approved credit cover, such as a letter of credit, until such times as their payment history is sufficient to cover their forecast liabilities.

A10.6. For Suppliers, the BSUoS element of the security cover required is determined from a forecast of a party's likely BSUoS liabilities over a 32-day period.

A10.7. Whilst not codified, National Grid's practice is to review the level of security cover extended for BSUoS to on a regular (quarterly) basis. In doing so, it looks at the last 3 months' liabilities and the equivalent period

in the previous year. A party is then informed if any change in the level of credit cover is required; a party thereafter has typically a month to establish that new level of cover. Given the likely timescales of CMP201, if implement, a Supplier should have sufficient time in advance of any notice to discuss with National Grid and establish new credit arrangements, if needed.

- A10.8. It should also be noted that some Suppliers, by associating themselves in a trading unit with embedded generation, avoid the need for credit cover as the generation embedded benefit offsets the demand liabilities associated with the supply business.
- A10.9. To assess the impact of the CMP201 proposal, the total credit cover, from payment history and other credit arrangements, for each Supplier was examined and any TNUoS credit requirement deducted thus leaving an indicative amount of credit available to cover BSUoS liabilities. This was compared with their current BSUoS liability requirement and the level of BSUoS credit cover (as a ratio of the two) derived: A BSUoS cover ratio less than two would indicate that that CUSC Party would need to increase their cover prior to the introduction of CMP201, if approved.

Findings:

- A10.10. From the data available, only four CUSC Parties that are required to hold security cover had a BSUoS cover ratio less than two. Of those four, one may acquire sufficient additional cover through the payment history mechanism in a few months. All the parties identified are related to companies of significant size, two of which provide Parent Company Guarantees.
- A10.11. Figure A10.1 below shows the distribution of Suppliers required to hold security cover and the level of cover extended through the payment history mechanism. As noted above, there are also a number of Suppliers who, through their relationship with embedded generation, do not require credit cover for BSUoS. These Suppliers are not included within this analysis.




Figure A10.1: Distribution of Supplier Credit cover

A10.12. It should be noted that the majority of Suppliers identified rely on the security cover extended by National Grid. It should also be noted that, whilst this note focuses on the impact on credit arrangements between National Grid and Suppliers, Generators would be required to hold less security cover as a consequence of the CMP201 proposal. Similarly, Generators may also require a reduced level of credit cover from a Supplier as a consequence of potentially lower wholesale prices arising from the transfer of BSUoS liabilities.

## Annex 11 – Changes to interconnector flows with no Generator BSUoS

- A11.1. The analysis aims to quantify the impacts of GB generation BSUoS on trade with Europe. As GB generation currently pay a proportion of BSUoS, the removal of this as proposed will mean that the GB wholesale price is reduced.
- A11.2. This analysis calculates the percentage of time that the GB Generators would export or sell their energy domestically based on spot prices and day-ahead prices. Under CMP201, the GB price is reduced by the BSUoS charge in that period however there is still a charge for the price of capacity (C). For the purpose of this analysis, the capacity price is assumed to be static.
- A11.3. This analysis is based on historic prices adjusted by BSUoS. Further modelling by NGET calculates that the GB wholesale price will react to this; i.e. if imports into GB increase, the GB wholesale price will fall. The opposite effect on wholesale prices will occur if exports from GB increase. Therefore this conclusion represents the overall trend rather than a forecast of the absolute flows. Other factors, such as market liquidity and trading arrangements will also have an impact on the overall level of trade.

### Spot Prices

- A11.4. A GB generators decision
- If  $GB-BSUoS > FR-C$ , the GB generator will sell their power domestically
  - If  $GB-BSUoS < FR-C$ , the GB generator will export their power to France
- A11.5. A FR generators decision
- If  $FR > GB-BSUoS-C$ , the FR generator will sell their power domestically
  - If  $FR < GB-BSUoS-C$ , the FR generator will export their power to GB

The results are included in the table below:

	GB Generator	FR Generator
Total Hours Selling Domestically	4921 (56%)	3839 (44%)
Total Hours Exporting via the interconnector	3839 (44%)	4921 (56%)

### Day-ahead Prices

- A11.6. A GB generators decision
- If  $GB_{BL}-BSUoS_{BL} > FR_{BL}-C_{BL}$  or  $GB_{PK}-BSUoS_{PK} > FR_{PK}-C_{PK}$ , GB generator will sell energy domestically
  - If  $GB_{BL}-BSUoS_{BL} < FR_{BL}-C_{BL}$  or  $GB_{PK}-BSUoS_{PK} < FR_{PK}-C_{PK}$ , GB generator will export their power to France
- A11.7. A FR generators decision
- If  $FR_{BL} > GB_{BL}-BSUoS_{BL}-C_{BL}$  or  $FR_{PK} > GB_{PK}-BSUoS_{PK}-C_{PK}$ , FR generator will sell energy domestically

- If  $FR_{BL} < GB_{BL} - BSUoS_{BL} - C_{BL}$  or  $FR_{PK} < GB_{PK} - BSUoS_{PK} - C_{PK}$ , FR generator will export their power to GB

A11.8. The results are included in the table below:

	Based on Baseload Prices		Based on Peak Prices	
	Total Days Selling Domestically	Total Days Exporting via the interconnector	Total Days Selling Domestically	Total Days Exporting via the interconnector
GB Generator	124 (50%)	126 (50%)	98 (39%)	152 (61%)
FR Generator	126 (50%)	124 (50%)	152 (61%)	98 (39%)

### Comparison of Results

A11.9. Below are a comparison of the results with the status quo and the post implementation of CMP 202.

A11.10. The status quo assumes that there is a BSUoS charge included in the price of GB generation, a BSUoS charge for access to the interconnector and a charge for the interconnector capacity.

A11.11. Post CMP 202 assumes that CMP 202 has been implemented so there is no BSUoS charge for access to the interconnector. However, there is still a BSUoS charge included in the price of GB generation and a charge for the interconnector capacity.

A11.12. Under CMP 201, the assumption is that CMP 202 is already implemented. It also assumes that BSUoS has been removed from the price of GB generation, so there is only the price of capacity included.

### Spot Market

	Status Quo		Post CMP 202		Under CMP 201	
	Export	Sell Domestically	Export	Sell Domestically	Export	Sell Domestically
GB	35%	65%	39%	61%	44%	56%
FR	54%	46%	59%	41%	56%	44%
Total Export	89%		98%		100%	

### Day-Ahead Market: Baseload

	Status Quo		Post CMP 202		Under CMP 201	
	Export	Sell Domestically	Export	Sell Domestically	Export	Sell Domestically
GB	31%	69%	42%	58%	50%	50%
FR	36%	34%	45%	55%	50%	50%
Total Export	67%		87%		100%	

### Day-Ahead Market: Peak

	Status Quo		Post CMP 202		Under CMP 201	
	Export	Sell Domestically	Export	Sell Domestically	Export	Sell Domestically
GB	32%	68%	44%	56%	61%	39%
FR	37%	63%	45%	55%	39%	61%
Total Export	69%		89%		100%	

A11.13. Overall, the results indicate that the removal of BSUoS from GB generation and interconnectors better facilitates competition between a GB and French generator. Exports from GB increase in all scenarios under the implementation of CMP 201 and 202 compared with the current situation. Under the current arrangements and the implementation of CMP 202 alone, there is a period of time where no trade between the two countries would occur because the price differential between the countries was not great enough to cover the expected cost of BSUoS and the price of capacity. As BSUoS is calculated ex-post, the price differential needs to be great enough to provide the trader with certainty that the trade will be profitable once the cost of BSUoS and the price of capacity have been taken account of. Under the proposed changes of CMP 201, a trade would occur 100% of the time as the BSUoS charge no longer creates a barrier.

### Implementation

A11.14. Under the implementation of CMP 202 and 201, there is no barrier to trade for the (GB and none GB) generators as they can access each others market with no additional charges. However, under the implementation of CMP 202 alone, the GB price is still inflated by the BSUoS charge. This means that the GB price is greater than the FR price, for more time than what it would be under the implementation of CMP 202 & 201. The greater price coupled with the ability for the FR generator to greater access the GB market, means that the FR generator can take advantage of the higher price. This results in GB importing more and effectively losing the ability to compete with the cheaper FR generators.

A comparison of results is included in the table below.

### Spot Prices

	Under CMP 202 alone (% of time)	Under CMP 201 & CMP 202 (% of time)
GB Import	61%	56%

### Day-ahead Prices

	Based on Baseload Prices		Based on Peak Prices	
	Under CMP 202 alone (% of time)	Under CMP 201 & CMP 202 (% of time)	Under CMP 202 alone (% of time)	Under CMP 201 & CMP 202 (% of time)
GB Import	57%	50%	48%	39%

A11.15. Based on these results, GB generators are going to be disadvantaged 5% of the time based on spot prices and 7-9% of the time based on day-ahead prices if CMP 202 is implemented alone.



### **Cashout and BSUoS.**

A12.1. This Workgroup paper presents an overview of the possible interaction of BSUoS and the cashout regime for discussion by the Workgroup. In summary, revenues from imbalance payments accrue in Residual Cashflow Reallocation Cashflow (RCRC)<sup>18</sup>, whereas the net cost associated with rebalancing the system are recovered as part of BSUoS. BSUoS also recovers the cost of maintaining security of the system and internal SO costs (e.g. control centre costs).

### ***Background***

A12.2. The diagrams below describe the revenue flows associated with balancing actions.

BSC revenue flows:

A12.3. When a party is out of balance they pay or are paid at the System Buy Price (SBP) or System Sell Price (SSP). To balance the system the SO uses the Balancing Mechanism, buying or selling energy (taking offers and bids respectively).

A12.4. Parties that drive the market out of balance are subject to the main price. However if their imbalance is assisting to maintain balance they receive a market price (the reverse price). The marginal nature of the main price is intended to encourage parties to contract. SBP and SSP are derived from a methodology in the BSC, one will be the main price and the other the reverse price depending on the 'length' of the system<sup>19</sup>.

A12.5. If the system is long (too much power / demand low or over contracted) the SO takes bids and the SSP is set on these bids, SBP is set by a market price. If the system is short (not enough power / demand high or under contracted) the SO takes offers and these set the SBP, with the SSP set by the market price.


A12.6. Therefore there are two effects that determine the size of the 'beer fund', firstly the volume of parties who are out of balance and the pricing (SBP/ SSP). The monies that accrue (positive or negative) are paid by or to all BSC lead parties on a half-hourly MWh.

SO revenue flows:

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<sup>18</sup> Residual Cashflow Reallocation Cashflow (RCRC) commonly called the 'beer fund'

<sup>19</sup> [http://www.elexon.co.uk/ELEXON%20Documents/imbalance\\_pricing\\_guidance\\_note.pdf](http://www.elexon.co.uk/ELEXON%20Documents/imbalance_pricing_guidance_note.pdf)



A12.7. The net cost of the SO actions in the Balancing Mechanism (CSOBM) is paid to or by the SO to / from the BSC. The SO also pays contract services outside the Balancing Mechanism; e.g. options for forward contracts, warming contracts, reserve contracts. These contract costs, along with other SO costs, such as SO internal costs (control centre) and any incentive payments (positive or negative) are summed up with CSOBM and recovered in the form of BSUoS. BSUoS and is recovered from all BSC lead parties (currently) on a half hourly (MWh) basis.

A12.8. This is best explained through a number of examples<sup>20</sup>: i) Balancing the system (energy); ii) impact of dual balancing, iii) Securing the system (transmission constraints).

***i) Energy balancing***

A12.9. In this example we have one supplier that has under-contracted leaving the system short by 1000MW (it could equally be a generator not running). If this were the only issue on the system, the SO would buy power in the Balancing Mechanism, say for £80/MWh.

A12.10. Theoretically, under a perfect marginal imbalance pricing methodology, this would set the out of balancing cost for being under-contracted at £80MWh (SBP).

A12.11. The supplier would then pay £80k into the BSC as an imbalance cost. As this is the only imbalance RCRC =£80k. In this hour the demand is 40GWh, so total metered power supplied and delivered is 80GWh. RCRC is therefore a £1MWh (£80k/80GWh) payment to BSC lead parties.

A12.12. In practice it the actions to balance the system will be a mixture of contract and Balancing Mechanism costs, and these action will be for both energy and system balancing. BSUoS would also include SO internal and

<sup>20</sup> Ignoring losses and assuming BSAD is zero, all actions are unflagged and priced, BPA and SPA are zero. For simplicity the a period has been assumed to be 1h.

incentive costs. However for this example we are conveniently assuming these are all zero. Therefore BSUoS would be net cost of the Balancing Mechanism (CSOBM= £80/MWh \*1000MW = £80k, paid by the SO), so BSUoS would be £80k/80GW = £1/MW. So in this extremely simplified example, RCRC and BSUoS are equal and opposite. Therefore a third party supplier or generator would not be exposed to a cost.

### **ii) Dual imbalance pricing**

A12.13. We now consider this impact of the same supplier being short whilst a generator is spilling. A generator spills 200MW and the market price is say £50/MW (setting the reverse price).

A12.14. Now the system operator only has to take 800MW corrective action at £80/MW. SBP is still set at £80/MWh, and SSP is set at £50/MWh (from pre-gate closure market).

A12.15. Within the BSC the supplier would still pay £80k, but the spilling generator would also get paid £10k (200MW\*£50/MWh). Therefore RCRC becomes £70k, or a payment of £0.875/MWh (£70k/80GWh) to all parties.

A12.16. The net cost of SO actions is £64k (800MW at £80/MWh); this is paid as CSOBM by the SO to the BSC (and passed on as an offer payment).

A12.17. Assuming all else is zero, BSUoS would be £64k/80GWh = £0.8/MWh. So as a result of dual imbalance pricing, in this example, which is more representative of the real system than first example BSUoS and RCRC does not net off.

A12.18. [If main = reverse = £80/MWh; RCRC would be £64k which is the same as CSOBM]

### **iii) Solving constraints**

A12.19. In this example the SO need to solve a constraint on a balanced system (everyone is in perfect balance).

A12.20. Because everyone is balanced there are no imbalance payments and so RCRC is zero.


A12.21. The SO is required to take off 1000MW behind an export constraint at a bid price of £25/MW and replace it on the other side of the constraint with an offer at £80/MWh. The net cost of the constraint is £55/MWh\*1000MW= £55k.

A12.22. Assuming a demand of 40GW as previously, BSUoS would be (£55k / (40GWh+40GWh)) £0.6875MWh.


A12.23. So for the example of a constraint BSUoS and RCRC are not related. However in practice the System Operator with simultaneously solve constraints and energy imbalance so there could be some form of interaction.

Analysis of interaction.

A12.24. In order to understand the extent of interaction National Grid presented information highlighting the correlation of BSUoS charge (payment to National Grid shown as positive) and the RCRC payment (payment to market participants shown as positive). The graph below shows the corrections between these two revenue streams:




A12.25. Whilst this shows some correlation it is distorted by other revenue flows through BSUoS. Using the revenue stream CSOBM (from BSC to SO and included in BSUoS) rather than BSUoS itself shows an interaction:




A12.26. Again the overall interaction is clear, although it is not as strong as between BSUoS and RCRC. This is likely due to element the inclusion in BSUoS of energy balancing actions that are missing in CSOBM due to SO forward trading.

A12.27. Another way of viewing this data is by picking an individual week. The graph below shows the first week in October 2010. In this particular week the R Squared value for the correlation between BSUoS and RCRC is 0.766.




A12.28. Applying an offset to BSUoS clearly shows the correlation:

BSUoS and RCRC 1 to 7 Oct adjusted by offset (1.4346)




A12.29. Going back to the original scatter plot and picking a point off the main trend line we are able to see that the correlation is much more consistent on a weekly basis:

BSUoS and RCRC half hourly plot




A12.30. Using this point we can plot the week commencing 20 December 2010:

20 to 26 December 2010



A12.31. Here we can see that the correlation within this week between BSUoS and RCRC is much better. The final graph below shows this as an offset to BSUoS, again showing a clear correlation:

20 to 26 Dec 2010 BSUoS Offset



## Summary

A12.32. BSUoS is made up of a number of elements, one part of this is related to energy imbalance and thus nets to RCRC. Due to the nature of imbalance pricing the energy element in BSUoS is not exactly the same as RCRC. The direct relationship will be 'skewed' by the total volumes of imbalance in both directions and the difference between the main and reverse prices. As the SO optimises actions in the Balancing Mechanism some actions will be taken to solve energy and system constraints simultaneously.

A12.33. Suppliers and Generators will consider the combined effect of BSUoS and RCRC in deciding operational strategies as they are both avoidable MWh charges.




### Modelling the Impact of CMP202: Removing BSUoS from Interconnectors.

#### Introduction

- A13.1. CMP201 proposes to remove the current 50% BSUoS liability from Generators, reallocating the charge 100% on Suppliers. Given that BSUoS is effectively a “pass-through” charge to CUSC Parties, the proposer postulates that the effect of CMP201 should be to reduce the GB wholesale price by the BSUoS ‘cost’ covering that charge and any risk premium (due to the ex-post nature of BSUoS).
- A13.2. This note outlines the modelling approach taken by National Grid to examine the impact of the proposal on Interconnector flows.

#### The Model Principles

- A13.3. The basic model consists of three interconnected nodes representing the GB, French & Netherland electricity markets. The interconnector flow limits were set as follows:



- A13.4. Each node has a generation price-stack, used to determine the market prices for a given demand level, and a corresponding set of demand data representative on the annual load profile for each country.
- A13.5. The model has been built using Excel and the “Solver” analysis package to determine optimal market positions given the constraints on the Interconnectors. When run, solver optimises the amount of generation in each market such that it meets each countries demand and flows on the interconnectors are within their defined limits. The model outputs the MW run at each price point in the generation stack for each country, and a wholesale market (shadow) price of production (cost of providing the next MW).

<sup>21</sup> Further data from RTE Elia and Tennet websites indicate that this limit could be increased.

- A13.6. The model was run twice, once with an unadjusted price stack representative of the current position with BSUoS inherent within the offered prices, and once with the GB generation price reduced to reflect the effect of removing BSUoS from generation.
- A13.7. To replicate cost transfer of the BSUoS implicit within the generator price, the volume of GB generation priced at average BSUoS charge was added back into the overall GB market cost.
- A13.8. Comparing the results from each run provides an indication of the change in interconnected flows, the impact on production and consumption in each market, and overall change in benefit/cost. It should however be noted that the impact demonstrated will be that associated solely with the reduction in GB generation prices as a consequence of removing BSUoS and assumes all other factors remain unchanged. In reality the markets may respond differently. Fuel prices, plant availability, underlying demand variations will vary across the entire EU market and not just the simple three interconnected markets modelled. The generation background is also changing with new more efficient plant and renewable generation entering the market. Consequently, the model results should be considered as providing more of an indication as to the impact rather than precise numbers.
- A13.9. Data used for the model covered Financial year 2010 / 11 with an average BSUoS price of £1.11 used when reducing the GB wholesale prices. Demand and Price data for France & Netherland was appropriately “shifted” to account for GB / Continent time differences.
- A13.10. Further analysis was also performed assuming different levels of BSUoS based on the 2010/11 data. This was achieved by “subtracting” the assumed £1.11/MWh BSUoS charge within the modelled fuel price the “adding back” different amounts up to £1.75/MWh when doing the pre (with BSUoS in fuel price) and post (without BSUoS in fuel price) proposal comparisons.
- A13.11. The assumptions within the model are that the Interconnectors are available all the time, capacities are the same in both direction and that there is no cost to using the Interconnector (either in the form of losses or capacity prices).

### **Demand Profiles**

- A13.12. Demand data for each half hour was obtained for GB and for France (from the RTE website). Exact equivalent data was not available for Netherlands and so a profile was derived by scaling the French demand figures by the ratio of Dutch energy consumption (from TenneT website) and French energy consumption.

A13.13. Sample data was then taken for each of three seasons; Winter, Spring + Autumn and Summer, to provide a representation of the annual loads. In total, 504 demand values were derived for each country split 25%, 50%, 25% between each season time.

### Generation Prices

A13.14. For the model to determine a wholesale price for given demand levels, and hence interconnector flows, spot price data was used to derive a price curve as follows:

1. A load duration curve was produced for each country from the demand data. Essentially, 17,520 periods of demand data ranked in ascending order.
2. An equivalent price duration curve was produced for each country by ranking the 8,760 hourly spot prices (average of two GB period prices) in ascending order.
3. Fourteen points were then chosen on the load duration curve, ensuring they covered significant points on the curve such as low / high demand.
4. The equivalent price points were then taken from the price duration curves.



A13.15. For example, and referring to graphs / tables below:

The first point of GB load curve (at 1%) corresponds to GB demand of 21,709MW and a price point of £26.3/MWh on the price curve.

The next point (at 5%), corresponds to an *additional* 3,482MW of GB generation at a corresponding GB price of £29.89/MWh.

The above approach was repeated for all points for all markets. The exercise was also repeated using 2011/12 data for the comparative runs on that financial year.

## Duration curves and Prices for 2010/11



Demand Load Duration points			
Point	GB	FR	NL
1%	21709	31037	6838
5%	25191	37894	8349
10%	26337	40100	8835
20%	29514	43632	9613
30%	32436	47083	10373
40%	34479	50333	11089
50%	36721	52836	11640
60%	38994	55332	12190
70%	40341	59576	13125
80%	42670	64738	14263
90%	46846	70983	15639
95%	49498	75364	16604
99%	53219	83867	18477
99.9%	56149	88440	19485

Corresponding Price Points		
GB £/MWh	Fr £/MWh	NI £/MWh
26.315	8.572	10.17
29.89	17.174	21.2
32.19	24.933	26.95
35.265	31.822	32.51
37.82	35.969	36.08
39.995	38.804	38.52
42.11	41.428	40.85
44.4	44.23	43.26
47.29	47.754	46.61
50.87	52.377	50.99
57.94	57.172	55.77
67.63	61.48	59.02
96.91	79.444	67.8
407.44	212.27	219.6

Min	21709	31037	6838
Max	57079	91718	20207

21.74	0.729	0.73
407.44	212.27	219.6

## Calculation of Producer Surpluses

A13.16. In addition to the direct impact on the market costs, producer surpluses were also calculated. An explanation of how this was derived is provided below.

A13.17. In a single market, as demand increases, then more expensive plant is required to meet that demand (the generation price volume curve).

A13.18. At any given demand level, the producer surplus is determined from the difference between the wholesale price and a generator's costs (fuel price).




Figure A14.1: Basis of Producer Surpluses

A13.19. If BSUoS is removed from generation, then there should be a corresponding decrease in a Generator's costs and the wholesale price would, with all other factors being equal, drop by the cost of Generation BSUoS (G-BSUoS). Producer surpluses would remain unchanged; however the G-BSUoS element would transfer to, and be paid by Suppliers, returning the effective cost to its original position.




Figure A14.2: Local Impact of Removing G-BSUoS

A13.20. However with a lower GB wholesale price, interconnector exports from GB are likely to increase. This increase would result in a higher GB "gross demand" with an increase in the GB wholesale price. GB producer surpluses would increase accordingly. There would also be additional revenues corresponding to the export volume and the price differential between the exporting (from) and importing (to) markets.




Figure A14.3: Wider Impact when considering Interconnections.

### Analysis Results based on 2010/11 Prices

A13.21. To assess the impact of the CMP201 proposal for differing levels of BSUoS, the analysis model was effectively run twice to determine costs for both pre and post proposal scenarios. The base case for the analysis used 2010/11 demand and spot prices with an average 2010/11 BSUoS charge of £1.11/MWh inherent within GB spot prices. It is assumed that Interconnector flows are not subject to BSUoS charges.

A13.22. Total GB demand modelled came out as 320TWh indicating that the demand curves adequately represented the full year. This was met by a combination of GB generation and net imports / exports. The table below shows the impact of varying BSUoS levels on the GB demand weighted wholesale price and gross demand met by GB generation.

BSUoS Level £/MWh	Gross Dmd GWh	Mkt Price £/MWh
0.00 (BSUoS removed)	316.4	49.30
1.11 (2010/11) Base	312.6	49.84
1.25	312.5	49.91
1.50	312.2	50.04
1.75	311.6	50.16

A13.23. As anticipated, the impact of removing BSUoS from the generation fuel price lead to decrease in the local (GB) wholesale price but not by the full value of G-BSUoS. Removing -BSUoS from GB generation led to a net reduction in relatively cheap imports from France to GB (raising the GB wholesale price), and thus an increase in GB gross demand. Conversely applying BSUoS to GB generation led to increased imports to GB / reduced exports from GB and lower GB production. In all cases, removing BSUoS from generation prices increased the level of GB exports by approximately 30%.

A13.24. This represents the increased convergence of EU wholesale markets, with GB generation becoming more competitive with the removal of BSUoS from the GB wholesale price (as is common practice in continental markets).

A13.25. The model produced a GB wholesale cost of meeting demand *without* BSUoS being inherent to the Generator’s fuel price. This totalled £15,793m.

A13.26. Under the CMP201 proposal, the amount of BSUoS a GB Generator (G-BSUoS) would have paid (the product of their MWh generation and the appropriate BSUoS charge) is transferred to demand. This amount therefore needs added to the “without BSUoS” market scenario cost to provide the comparable pre-proposal GB Market Total Cost. These values are shown below.

BSUoS Level £/MWh	G-BSUoS £m	GB Market Total Cost £m
1.11	351	16,144
1.25	395	16,189
1.50	475	16,268
1.75	554	16,347

8.1 The table below provides a comparison between pre and post CMP201 proposal results (BSUoS inherent in GB Generator price versus no BSUoS in GB Generator price) for differing levels of BSUoS. As has been previously described, the producer surplus and consumer cost calculations are not directly comparable. The producer surplus is a proxy for profit i.e. the price a commodity is sold at minus cost. The consumer cost is a measure of the total cost of providing electricity. It is not a measure of consumer surplus in the Marshallian sense i.e. the difference between what a consumer is willing to pay for a commodity and what he or she actually pays. Adding together the two calculations does not provide an overall GB market benefit/cost value.

A13.27.

BSUoS	Total GB Market Cost £m		Difference Pre - Post		GB Producer Surpluses £m		Difference Post - Pre	
	Pre	Post	£m	%	Pre	Post	£m	%
1.11	15,967	16,144	-177	1.1	5,936	6,117	181	3.0
1.25	15,990	16,189	-199	1.2	5,914	6,117	203	3.4
1.50	16,031	16,268	-237	1.5	5,875	6,117	242	4.2
1.75	16,071	16,347	-276	1.7	5,836	6,117	281	4.8

A13.28. As can be expected, as BSUoS rises, the total market cost (i.e. total cost of GB production) increases by between 1.1% and 1.7%. Pre-proposal GB producer (Generator) surpluses however decline as consequence of greater imports into GB reducing their output.

A13.29. Whilst the CMP201 proposal appears to show a negative impact on GB consumer costs, there is a small benefit to EU consumers as a whole when the other modelled markets are considered.

A13.30. The table below show the model results across all the markets modelled (GB, Fr & NI).

BSUoS	Total EU Market Cost £m		Difference Pre - Post		EU Producer Surpluses £m		Difference Post - Pre	
	Pre	Post	£m	%	Pre	Post	£m	%
1.11	44,728	44,721	7	0.01	23,483	23,473	-10	0.01
1.25	44,774	44,765	9	0.01	23,485	23,473	-12	0.01
1.50	44,856	44,844	12	0.01	23,489	23,474	-15	0.01
1.75	44,935	44,923	12	0.01	23,491	23,471	-17	0.01

A13.31. The model results showed a small benefit to EU consumers of between £7m and £12m. If Producer Surpluses are considered, then there is a revenue transfer to GB generation from generation in the other markets. Overall, there appears to be a small reduction in producer surpluses of about -£2m to -£5m. This is a natural consequence of market convergence, i.e. comparable price structures, and the greater access that arises as GB generation competes on equitable terms within the wider EU market. Considering the magnitude of the market costs and Producer Surpluses (£45bn & £24bn) and other model assumptions, this can be considered insignificant within the accuracy of the model. Also, please note the methodological inconsistencies associated with deriving overall cost/benefit values based on differing economic concepts i.e. costs and surpluses as discussed in paragraph 4.36

A13.32. The main conclusion revealed by the analysis is that on a wider European market basis, total consumer costs reduce while producer surpluses fall following the implementation of CMP201. This finding is not surprising as by facilitating efficient competition there are two important effects. The first effect can be described as a productive efficiency effect i.e. the market employs a more efficient allocation of resources. This reduces total consumer costs. The second effect can be characterised as the competing away of producer rents due to the increase in competitive activity. This results in reducing total producer surplus.

A13.33. It should be noted that the figures from the model analysis represent a “fully coupled” market where electricity would always flow from high to low market prices during each half hour. In reality much of the trading across the Interconnectors occurs day ahead. Previous analysis has shown that the interconnectors can flow against market price for up to 32% of the time. Whilst it is difficult to quantify, the impact of CMP201 may not be as great as modelled due to this sub-optimal trading.

A13.34. The results show that BSUoS when applied to GB generation appears to distort the GB market in favour of continental imports into GB. Whilst this “benefits” GB consumers in the short term, it prevents efficient competition between generation in both the local (GB) market and the wider (EU) market: costs across the EU as a whole increase as a consequence.

A13.35. There may also be a consequential impact on supply security if the GB market becomes less attractive for new generator investment. Whilst the



relative impact on consumers of increasing BSUoS is 0.6% for a range of BSUoS at £1.11MWh and £1.75MWh, GB production reduces by 1.8% over the same range. This position may become worse as the level of interconnection increases and further continental imports are attracted by the effect that BSUoS has on the GB wholesale price.

A13.36. For completeness the costs and surpluses for the French and Netherland markets are provided below. Note however that these markets are also interconnected with other EU markets; any individual market effect will here will probably be diluted by trading within this wider pan European market.

BSUoS	Total Fr Market Cost £m		Difference Post - Pre		Fr Producer Surpluses £m		Difference Post - Pre	
	Pre	Post	£m	%	Pre	Post	£m	%
1.11	23,563	23,413	150	0.6	14,491	14,336	-154	-1.1
1.25	23,583		170	0.7	14,510		-174	-1.2
1.50	23,616		203	0.9	14,545		-209	-1.4
1.75	23,649		236	1.0	14,579		-243	-1.7

BSUoS	Total NI Market Cost £m		Difference Post - Pre		NI Producer Surpluses £m		Difference Post - Pre	
	Pre	Post	£m	%	Pre	Post	£m	%
1.11	5,197	5,163	34	0.7	3,056	3,021	-35	-1.1
1.25	5,201		38	0.7	3,061		-40	-1.3
1.50	5,201		45	0.9	3,069		-48	-1.6
1.75	5,215		52	1.0	3,076		-55	-1.8

### Analysis Results based on 2011/12 Prices

A13.37. A repeat of the base case analysis was performed using 2011/12 prices. GB national demand was 318.2TWh. Again two model runs were compared; one with BSUoS in the Generator's fuel price and one with the fuel price reduced by £1.53MWh; the average BSUoS for that year.

A13.38. The results were similar to the 2010/11 analysis. Reducing GB Generation prices by the average BSUoS charge for that year resulted in a small increase in exports from GB to continental markets (~1%) and a similar reduction on imports (~15%). Again though there was a drop in the GB market price, the additional GB exports and reduced imports limited the drop. This is shown in the table below.

BSUoS Level £/MWh	Gross Dmd GWh	Mkt Price £/MWh
0.00 within price	313.0	52.63
1.53 (2011/12) Base	309.7	52.68

A13.39. Comparing market costs from the pre and post CMP201 proposal scenarios also show similar results to 2010/11 results with a market cost

increase of ~1.2%. Again, GB producer benefit from the proposal by ~£12m whilst the overall benefit across all markets; i.e. the sum of all market costs and producer surpluses; was £29m.

	Total GB Market Cost £m		Difference Post - Pre		GB Producer Surpluses £m		Difference Post - Pre	
	Pre	Post	£m	%	Pre	Post	£m	%
BSUoS	16,300	16,478	-178	1.2	7,183	7,369	12	2.8

### Impact of Competition

A13.40. Two effects were considered, one short term and one long.

A13.41. Following the “send back” letter the Workgroup concluded that there was no short term effect from competition. It was originally thought that some generation would use the additional surpluses to attempt to increase market share by reducing their prices. However, the price curves used to perform the model analysis were built from actual market spot prices. Those prices should therefore be reflective of costs and risks facing a generator and other factors that will remain unchanged. To that extent the price curve already represented a competitive marginal cost for additional generation. The additional surpluses would therefore not be used to reduce the market price below the marginal cost of generation. The surpluses do however represent a revenue transfer as a consequence of greater competition with continental generation arising from better access to the wider EU market.

A13.42. In the longer term, new generation may invest in the GB market encouraged by the increase in available surpluses. This would displace more expensive marginal plant and again reduce the cost to GB consumers. A number of additional scenarios were run using the 2011/12 model data to investigate these effects.

A13.43. The “long term” effect of new generation entering the market was modelled by introducing an additional 500MW and 1000MW of generation, first assuming a base-load generation price, then repeated assuming a more mid-merit plant price. The table below shows the effect on the overall market cost of introducing this additional plant.

	Market Cost £m	Producer Surplus £m
<i>Pre-proposal (Base-case)</i>	16,300	7,183
Post Proposal / Pre-investment	16,478	7,369
+500MW “base-load” investment	16,359	7,374
+1000MW “base-load” investment	16,207	7,341
+500MW “mid-merit” investment	16,394	7,325
+1000MW “mid-merit” investment	16,279	7,246

- A13.44. The model results indicated that introducing of between 500MW and 1000MW of either base or mid-merit generation brought the total market cost down to a level comparable with, or lower than that of the pre-proposal (base-case) scenario.
- A13.45. As per previous observations regarding the model, it is the observable effect that is significant rather than the absolute numbers. Whilst the model cannot predict the timescales over which new investment will occur, it does show that given the principle that greater surpluses attracting greater investment, then in the long term the investment of those surpluses in new generation will feed back to GB consumers in the form of lower prices or mitigate the effects of other potential increases such as fuel costs.
- A13.46. Following the “send back” letter by the Authority, the Workgroup considered if it were possible to provide any guidance over possible timescales.
- A13.47. As shown above, it is relatively straightforward to model the impact of new and more efficient generation entering a market and displacing older less efficient plant. However, it is exceptionally difficult to evaluate the timescales over which such investment would occur.
- A13.48. Broadly, one could consider three different types of investment with those up to three distinct decision phases:
- a. Entirely New Investments. For this case, feasibility work would be required to identify a suitable location and establish the initial business case. This may take approximately 1-2 years. Following the feasibility phase, it may take between 2 to 3 years to obtain to develop build plans and obtain the requisite consents. Thereafter, and after the final a final decision to proceed, construction and commissioning would take between 2 and 4 years depending on the type and size of the project. Overall project timescale is therefore between 5 and 9 years assuming a continuous decision process.
  - b. Replacement Investment: Under this scenario, old plant is replaced with new plant. The feasibility / business case phase is likely to be

shorter, maybe 1 year as site related issues are less. Build planning and consents could also be potentially shorter, maybe 1 to 2 years, given factors such as the existing use of the site. Again, once the decision to build has been made, then construction may take between 2 and 4 years giving an overall project timescale of 4 to 8 years.

- c. Refurbishment: Here, investments are incremental improvements that aimed at reducing a plant's operating cost and extending its useful life. It is likely that comparatively little time, maybe is required in developing the business case and obtaining any additional planning permission; incremental improvement to plant may therefore be achieved over 2 to 3 years.

A13.49. The above timeframes are ballpark estimates and overall project start to completion assumes no significant decision delay between phases. A proportion of projects will however, progress as far as obtaining all the appropriate consents and then await favourable economic conditions prior to construction and so, can be developed in relatively short timescales.

A13.50. A view may be formed from National Grid's recently published [2012 Electricity Ten Year Statement](#) (ETYS). The following table has been extracted from Chapter 2 "Gone Green" background and Appendix F – Generation data of the ETYS.

Year	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
<b>Generation (MW)</b>	84930	82684	85157	82827	84863	88068
<b>Demand (MW)</b>	57700	57707	57673	57591	57417	57483
<b>Under Construction (MW)</b>	1209	1860	2065	2065	2236	2236
<b>Consented (MW)</b>	403	1625	6205	10194	12989	13664
<b>Awaiting Consents (MW)</b>	284	1066	2020	2845	4731	6103
<b>Other / Scoping (MW)</b>	0	165	842	3075	7269	19145

A13.51. The ETYS shows demand as relatively flat / marginally declining. The level of generation in 2015 is comparable with that in 2013, though down on 2012, similar capacity to that year being achieved in 2016 and exceeded the following year. The data also shows that that in the run-up to 2015, there is between 1000MW and 2000MW of plant under construction. Typically, plant will take between 2 to 4 years to construct, depending to type and size. Some of this new generation could reasonably be expected to be fully commissioned in comparable timescales the implementation of this proposal.

A13.52. Notable, however, is the level of consented generation i.e. plant that is in a position to proceed with its build, subject to the owner's final investment decision. The forecasts of consented plant levels increase significantly in 2013 and beyond. From analysis performed as part of CMP192, about 40% of plant with consents progress to construction. If the additional generation surpluses indicated by the model materialise, then it would be

reasonable to assume that a greater proportion of consented plant will proceed to build: plant planned for later years may also be advanced. Likewise, plans for plant currently being scoped are also more likely to progress the stage of seeking consents. If one assumes the current level of 40% of consented plant progressing to construction and a 2 to 4 year build timeframe, then roughly between 600MW and 800MW (based on 2012/13) of this consented plant could become available from 2015/16 onwards, which is broadly in line with the “go-live” dates outlined in this proposal. If a higher proportion is assumed, encouraged by potentially greater return, then this would obviously be higher increasing security of supply within GB and furthering competitive pressures on prices.

- A13.53. In the context of this proposal, and assuming the greater producer surpluses, some operators may also decide to extend the life of their plant through refurbishment. Under such a scenario, the level of plant expected to close over the future years may also be lower than forecast.
- A13.54. The Workgroup noted the views expressed that investment is not driven solely by demand. Other factors such as government policies, the market arrangements either side of interconnections and the investor’s risk appetite and expected returns, will also influence any decision when and where new projects will proceed. In addition, wider statutory requirements such as planning consents and permissions will also play a factor in delivery timescales, as will the manufacturer supply chain timescales for the new plant. The timescales for preparatory scoping, planning and obtaining consents can be significantly greater than construction timescales. It was also noted, particularly as a result of the current investment uncertainty and reduced demand across Europe many projects may have been delayed and so could be brought forward in relatively short timescales.
- A13.55. To derive any meaningful timescales from a model would necessitate modelling of the plant economics and macro economic factors affecting not only the GB, but also much of the EU single market.
- A13.56. Plant specific information or assumptions would be needed about the relative running cost of the various generation types in each market along with consideration of other technical factors such as age or remaining economic life.
- A13.57. In addition, various scenarios of likely economic growth, fuel prices, plant mix, emerging technologies etc. across the EU market would need to be considered. Similarly, views would also be needed on the rate at which new interconnector links will be delivered as this will also influence where and when investment in new generation will occur. Many investment decisions are also made on a global basis requiring further assumptions on those global financial arrangements.
- A13.58. Whilst moves to develop an agreed model and its associated background data is currently being considered by ENTSO-E as part of its Ten Year

Network Development Plan, the process is still in the early stages and the outcome is likely to produce only 4 scenarios providing a high level indication of how a European wide electricity network and electricity market may develop; that plan is also focussed on transmission infrastructure investment rather than a basis for generation investment. At best, this work may provide EU wide agreed base cases against which further more detailed analysis may be possible, however such a position is not available yet nor is the outcome of this work well defined.

A13.59. Ultimately, different companies will have different strategies. Each will have their own, and commercially sensitive, assessment criteria for determining new investments in new plant (or interconnectors) and the decommissioning (or mothballing) of old plant. Any analysis by the Workgroup would therefore be highly subjective and easily contested.

A13.60. The Workgroup believes that given the huge level of subjectivity in any possible modelling, relying on it for any decision would potentially lead to contention over whether it unduly influenced that decision, detracting from the fundamental principles that in an open market, greater surpluses will attract greater investment and that removing market distortions should lead to the correct investment decision.

A13.61. It was observed that the rationale for raising CMP201 was to address a cross-border competition issue and thus further the objectives of the EU Third package. Recital 60 of the Directive 2009/72/EC concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity in that it states:  
 “undistorted market prices would provide an incentive for cross-border interconnections and for the investment in new power generation while leading in the long term to price convergence”.

A13.62. In so stating, it is clear from the Directive that the European Commission believes that removing market differences will benefit consumers albeit without a specifying a timeframe over which this will be achieved.

**Potential Impact of Coal & Gas Prices**

A13.63. Historic Gas and Coal prices were also examined to determine if there was any likely impact from merit order changes between these two types of plant. The prices were converted from their market units (\$/tonne for coal and p/therm for gas) to a common unit of £/MWh equivalent using the appropriate monetary exchange rate and a coal conversion 23456MJ / tonne. Accounting for the relative thermal efficiency of coal plant (34%) and CCGTs (50%), the price differential over 2010 and 2011 was examined to determine the relative position in the merit order for the two year. This is shown in the table below;

Year	% Time Coal > Gas	% Time Coal < Gas
2010 / 11	3%	97%
2011 / 12	8%	91%

A13.64. Between the two year, on average, coal and gas prices favoured running coal plant 5% more in 2011/12 than in 2010 / 11. Assuming this was reflected in the generation run in those years then comparing the two scenarios for 2010 / 11 with a BSUoS level of £1.50MWh and 2011/12 where average BSUoS was £1.53MWh, should provide an indication of the impact of a merit order change.

Year	BSUoS	Total GB Market Cost £m		Difference Post - Pre		GB Producer Surpluses £m		Difference Post - Pre	
		Pre	Post	£m	%	Pre	Post	£m	%
2011/12	1.53	16,300	16,478	-178	1.1	7,183	7,369	186	2.6
2010/11	1.50	16,031	16,268	-237	1.5	5,836	6,117	281	4.8

A13.65. It should be noted that other factors such as the underlying demand difference and possibly new wind generation may also influence the results. However, demand variation for each country was less than 1% between the years (for GB 320 TWh vs 318TWh) and the amount of new wind generation added in each country relatively small. Both GB and France added approximately 1GW of additional capacity in 2011 compared to the 5GW already installed; the Netherlands added 100MW to their existing 2GW<sup>22</sup>. The impact this would have had on the remaining plant and interconnector transfers would therefore be negligible.

A13.66. Within the accuracy of the model, its underlying data and assuming other minimal effects, the merit order impact on GB consumer is small. The overall EU benefit however is significantly higher which *may* correspond to higher volumes of coal generation available in GB compared to Netherlands and France.

A13.67. In particular the Netherlands predominantly meets demand from Gas fired plant; on 2009 data this was 60% for gas and 23% for coal. Consequently increases in gas prices will affect then more than GB where the volumes of coal and gas generation are more equally balanced (44% gas, 28% Coal). With coal appearing relatively cheaper in 2011/12, the EU benefit may therefore increase from relatively cheaper GB exports derived from coal replacing potentially more expensive continental gas plant.

A13.68. A scenario was also run, based on the 2010/11 data to assess the impact of potential fuel price rises. The scenario assumed a 5% increase in fossil fuel prices was assumed, that nuclear / renewable prices would remain unchanged and that this plant would run in preference to fossil. Examining the relative levels of each plant type in each country, the fuel prices at the demand levels at which we would expect the fossil plant to run were incremented accordingly.

A13.69. Wholesale prices here were comparable, £48.29/MWh with BSUoS in the fuel price and £47.29/MWh without. Overall the impact on consumer cost

<sup>22</sup> Source: Wikipedia: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wind\\_power\\_in\\_the\\_European\\_Union](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wind_power_in_the_European_Union)

was less (£158m) due to additional imports from cheap nuclear plant in France. The producer surpluses were also comparable at approximately £6,193m (with BSUoS in the fuel price) and £6,358m (without BSUoS in the fuel price).



## Annex 14 – Draft Legal Text

The following extracts of the text in blue is the proposed additional text for CMP201. All other relevant changes were implemented under CMP202.

Note that given the date at which this proposal may become effective is in advance of the Authorities decision, the appropriate implementation date will be substituted into the legal text at that time.

See paragraphs 4.112 to 4.113 for an indication of applicable dates.

- 14.29.4 All CUSC Parties acting as Generators and Suppliers (for the avoidance of doubt excluding all BMUs associated with Interconnectors), and from <implementation date> BMU's associated with offtaking Trading Units, are liable for Balancing Services Use of System charges based on their energy taken from or supplied to the National Grid system in each half-hour Settlement Period. (For the avoidance of doubt, Embedded Exemptible Generation will be treated as negative demand).

The following text was implemented as part of CMP202, but is included here for clarity. Note that the equation relating to delivering Trading Units is only required prior to the proposal's go-live implementation date.

- 14.30.2 A customer's charge is based on their proportion of BM Unit Metered Volume for each Settlement Period relative to the total BM Unit Metered Volume for each Settlement Period, adjusted for transmission losses by the application of the relevant Transmission Losses Multiplier.

For all liable importing and exporting BM Units in delivering Trading Units in a Settlement Period:

$$BSUoS_{TOT_{ij}} = \frac{BSUoS_{TOT_j} * QM_{ij} * TLM_{ij}}{\left\{ \sum^+ (QMBSUoS_{ij} * TLM_{ij}) \right\} + \left\{ \sum^- (QMBSUoS_{ij} * TLM_{ij}) \right\}}$$

For all liable importing and exporting BM Units in offtaking Trading Units in a Settlement Period:

$$BSUoS_{TOT_{ij}} = \frac{-1 * BSUoS_{TOT_j} * QM_{ij} * TLM_{ij}}{\left\{ \sum^+ (QMBSUoS_{ij} * TLM_{ij}) \right\} + \left\{ \sum^- (QMBSUoS_{ij} * TLM_{ij}) \right\}}$$

Where:

BSUoS<sub>TOT<sub>j</sub></sub> Total BSUoS Charge applicable for Settlement Period  
 j  
 QM<sub>ij</sub> BM Unit Metered Volume \*\*

QMBSUoS <sub>ij</sub>	BSUoS Liable BM Unit Metered Volume
TLM <sub>ij</sub>	Transmission Loss Multiplier **
$\sum^+$ -	refers to the sum over all BM Units that are in delivering Trading Units in Settlement Period 'j'
$\sum^-$ -	refers to the sum over all BM Units that are in offtaking Trading Units in Settlement Period 'j'

'delivering' and 'offtaking' in relation to Trading Units have the meaning set out in the Balancing and Settlement Code (excluding all Interconnector BMUs and Trading Units).

14.30.3 For the avoidance of doubt, BM Units that are registered in Trading Units will be charged on a net Trading Unit basis i.e. if a BM Unit is exporting to the system and is within a Trading Unit that is offtaking from the system then the BM Unit in essence would be paid the BSUoS charge. Conversely, if a BM Unit is importing from the system in a delivering Trading Unit then the BM Unit in essence would pay the BSUoS charge.



## Annex 15 – Record of pre “send back” views

A15.1. This section is provided for record only and summarises the views by the Workgroup, National Grid and the CUSC Panel in the initial voting prior to the send back decision by Ofgem.

### Workgroup Conclusion

A15.2. The Workgroup believes that the Terms of Reference have been fulfilled and CMP201 has been fully considered.

A15.3. For reference the Applicable CUSC Objectives for the Use of System Charging Methodology are:

(a) that compliance with the use of system charging methodology facilitates effective competition in the generation and supply of electricity and (so far as is consistent therewith) facilitates competition in the sale, distribution and purchase of electricity;

(b) that compliance with the use of system charging methodology results in charges which reflect, as far as is reasonably practicable, the costs (excluding any payments between transmission licensees which are made under and in accordance with the STC) incurred by transmission licensees in their transmission businesses and which are compatible with standard condition C26 (Requirements of a connect and manage connection);

(c) that, so far as is consistent with sub-paragraphs (a) and (b), the use of system charging methodology, as far as is reasonably practicable, properly takes account of the developments in transmission licensees' transmission businesses.

A15.4. The Workgroup voted (via email) by majority that CMP201 does better facilitate Applicable Objective (a) and (c) and were Neutral on (b). The majority of the Workgroup expressed a preference for the CMP201 WACM 1. The table below summarises the votes: Full details of the vote can be found in Annex 6.

Vote 1: Whether each Proposal better facilitates the Applicable CUSC Objectives

Name	Original			WACM1			WACM2		
	(a)	(b)	(c)	(a)	(b)	(c)	(a)	(b)	(c)
Cem Suleyman	Yes	Neutral	Yes	Yes	Neutral	Yes	Yes	Neutral	Yes
Iain Pielage	Yes	Neutral	Yes	Yes	Neutral	Yes	No	Neutral	No
James Anderson	Yes	Neutral	Yes	Yes	Neutral	Yes	Yes	Neutral	Yes
Michael Dodd	Yes	Neutral	Yes	Yes	Neutral	Yes	Yes	Neutral	No
Sarah Owen	No	Neutral	No	No	Neutral	No	No	Neutral	No
Helen	No	Neutral	No	No	Neutral	Neutral	Yes	Neutral	No

Inwood									
Esther Sutton	Neutral	Neutral	Yes	Yes	Neutral	Yes	Yes	Neutral	Yes
Paul Mott	Yes	Neutral	Yes	Yes	Neutral	Yes	Yes	Neutral	Yes
Rob Hill	No	Neutral	Yes	No	Neutral	Yes	Yes	Neutral	Yes
Garth Graham	Yes	Neutral	Yes	Yes	Neutral	Yes	No	Neutral	No

Vote 2: Whether each WACM better facilitates the Applicable CUSC Objectives than the Original.

Name	WACM1			WACM2		
	(a)	(b)	(c)	(a)	(b)	(c)
Cem Suleyman	Yes	Neutral	Yes	No	Neutral	No
Iain Pielage	Neutral	Neutral	Neutral	No	Neutral	No
James Anderson	No	Neutral	No	No	Neutral	No
Michael Dodd	No	Neutral	No	No	Neutral	No
Sarah Owen	Neutral	Neutral	Neutral	Neutral	Neutral	Neutral
Helen Inwood	Neutral	Neutral	Neutral	Yes	Neutral	Neutral
Esther Sutton	Yes	Neutral	Yes	Yes	Neutral	Yes
Paul Mott	Yes	Neutral	Yes	No	Neutral	No
Rob Hill	Yes	Neutral	Yes	Yes	Neutral	Yes
Garth Graham	Yes	Neutral	Yes	No	Neutral	No

Vote 3: Which option BEST facilitates achievement of the Applicable CUSC Objectives? (inc. the CUSC baseline; i.e. 'status quo')

Name	Best Option
Cem Suleyman	WACM 1
Iain Pielage	Original
James Anderson	Original
Michael Dodd	Original
Sarah Owen	Baseline
Helen Inwood	WACM 2
Esther Sutton	WACM 1
Paul Mott	WACM 1
Rob Hill	WACM 2
Garth Graham	WACM 1

### National Grid Opinion

A15.5. National Grid considers that CMP201 would better facilitate Applicable Use of System Charging Methodology (CUSC) Objective (a) in that it helps to create a level playing field between Generators in the EU internal market for electricity which in turn should facilitate further cross-border

trading of electricity and benefit GB consumers in terms of the consequence of more competitive electricity prices and Applicable Use of System Charging Methodology (CUSC) Objective (c) in that it properly reflects its duties in the development of National Grid's business by promoting a single internal market in electricity and facilitating greater cross-border trading of electricity. National Grid believes that in respect of Objective (b), that the CMP201 proposal is neutral. The BSUoS cost methodology will continue to reflect costs and therefore the charges in the appropriate time periods. Given that under the current regime these are regarded as a pass through, and therefore a revenue recovery issue, the CMP201 proposal will neither improve nor weaken cost reflectivity. The base analysis performed as part of this Modification indicates that overall GB cost and overall EU market cost reduces. We also note that the effect in the analysis represents between 0.4% and 0.04% of overall costs within the model. Therefore the view above is based on the qualitative assessment of the benefits of converging markets and not the additional quantitative impact assessment over which concerns have been raised.

### CUSC Modification Panel Recommendation

- A15.6. At the meeting of the CUSC Modifications Panel on 28 September 2012, the Panel voted by majority that the CMP201 Original and both WACMs better meets the Applicable CUSC Objectives and so should be implemented. A majority of the Panel expressed a preference for the Original.
- A15.7. The tables below show a breakdown of Panel members voting on whether each proposal better facilitates the Applicable CUSC Objectives and the rationale for such votes. The table also includes a column on the views in relation to the analysis provided in Annex 13 and 14. A number of the members of the Panel noted the uncertainties surrounding the assumptions in the impact analysis but no member of the Panel considered that further quantitative analysis models would be useful.

#### Original

<b>Panel Member</b>	<b>Better facilitates ACO (a)</b>	<b>Better facilitates ACO (b)?</b>	<b>Better facilitates ACO (c)?</b>	<b>Overall (Y/N)</b> (Plus views in relation to the analysis provided in Annex 13 and 14).
Bob Brown	No. Noted concerns regarding credit requirements flagged by some Supplier responses and also had concerns whether Generators would pass on the full reductions in their costs. Noted that section 4.13 of the report appears to acknowledge concerns regarding adverse impact on competition. Regards	Neutral	Neutral	No. (Analysis does not impact decision.)

	<p>consumer costs as an indication of the success of competition. The report states that costs to GB consumers will increase so BB considers that this supports the view that competition will not be improved. Noted that the Proposer had acknowledged, when introducing CMP201 to the Panel in December 2011, that it was not required to be raised as part of the Third Package. Noted that Charging Methodology ACOs are different from CUSC ACOs in that they do not require the Panel to take into account relevant legally binding decisions of the Commission. Not convinced, on the evidence presented in the Report, that EU customers should be regarded as more important than GB customers when reaching a view against Charging Methodology ACOs.</p>			
Garth Graham	<p>Yes. Noted that the removal of BSUoS charges on interconnector users meant that two identical generators one in GB and one in France (or Holland) could be competing in the GB market; however the GB generator would pay BSUoS whilst the other generator would not. This would result in a distortion in competition which CMP201 seeks to address. Therefore CMP201 better facilitates competition, in particular, in generation. Noted that the requirements of the EU Third Package was a valid matter to take into consideration as it was law applicable to GB. In terms of the impact on Suppliers noted that evidence had not been forthcoming (although parties may provide it to Ofgem) as to contract volumes over time.</p>	Neutral.	Yes.	Yes. (Analysis does not impact decision.)
Simon Lord	<p>Yes. [For the reasons given by GG above]</p>	Neutral.	Yes.	Yes. (Analysis does not impact decision.)

Michael Dodd	Yes. [For the reasons given by GG above]	Neutral.	Yes.	Yes. (Considers outcome of analysis is likely to be closer to £16m, and that the range is as a consequence of the assumptions. Competitive pressure in the market should result in Generators passing through BSUoS savings.)
James Anderson	Yes. There is a drive to implement due to the Third Package, the reduction in prices will be passed through, considered that there is no particular issue for non vertically-integrated participants. There is no quantitative evidence that contracts extend beyond 2 years and 2 years is sufficient time for participants to resolve any credit issues.	Neutral.	Yes.	Yes. (Analysis does not impact decision.)
Paul Jones	No. Some benefit for GB generation by improving competition. However, original could undermine competition in the retail market as some fixed price customer contracts extend to three years and would be affected by a two year implementation.	Neutral.	Neutral.	No. (Decision not based on analysis.)
Paul Mott	Yes. Drive to implement due to the Third Package, so that GB power stations compete on level basis with continentals (same cost base)	Neutral.	Yes.	Yes. (Decision not based on analysis.)
Duncan Carter	No. There is no requirement under EU legislation to adopt CMP201. This is gold plating of EU legislation, with material impact on GB consumers, at worst equalling £276m per annum (A13.27). This indicates diminished competition in the GB market. There is only qualitative analysis to support the claim that GB consumers may see reduced bills at an unspecified point in the future, which could be decades	Neutral.	Neutral.	No. (Materiality is key but no benefit in doing any further analysis as all modelling has limitations. Basic economic theory states that a reduction in (GB electricity) supply will inevitably increase prices (of electricity in GB). Analysis clearly shows that GB consumers will be materially worse off post

	<p>away. Effective subsidy of continental electricity consumers by GB consumers could be politically unsustainable, which may result in increased investor uncertainty and increase investment capital costs, reducing competition. Likely to reduce competition in GB supply market. Increasing electricity exports to the continent is also likely to reduce the GB's security of supply, and undermine competition.</p>			<p>implementation – up to £276m. There is no timescale for when GB consumers will (or indeed if) obtain any material benefit from liberalisation of the EU energy market. Thus the disbenefit to GB consumers is quantified, while there is only weaker qualitative evidence for the benefits. There is insufficient transparency in the GB market arrangements to demonstrate that BSuOS savings for Generators are passed onto Suppliers and ultimately consumers.)</p>
Patrick Hynes	<p>Yes. The status quo position acts as a barrier to generation investment in GB compared to similar arrangements prevalent in continental Europe.</p>	Neutral	Yes	<p>Yes. (Noting the worse case scenario within the analysis of £178m on GB consumers, but also the overall benefit to GB and whole European market. The principle of the proposal is robust in that converging markets is beneficial and that it also promotes the establishment of an efficient functioning IEM.)</p>

### WACM 1

Panel Member	Better facilitates ACO (a)	Better facilitates ACO (b)?	Better facilitates ACO (c)?	Overall (Y/N)
Bob Brown	No.	Neutral.	Neutral.	No.
Garth Graham	No. The Original is better as it introduces the change without unreasonable delay. Given that there is a minimum two year implementation period plus the notice parties	Neutral.	No.	No.



	have had to factor in this change the change should be implemented as soon as reasonably practical.			
Simon Lord	Yes.	Neutral.	Yes.	Yes.
Michael Dodd	Yes.	Neutral.	Yes.	Yes.
James Anderson	Yes.	Neutral.	Yes.	Yes.
Paul Jones	Yes. Three year implementation would prevent undermining competition in retail.	Neutral.	Neutral.	Yes.
Paul Mott	Yes.	Neutral.	Yes.	Yes.
Duncan Carter	No.	Neutral.	Neutral.	No.
Patrick Hynes	Yes.	Neutral.	Yes.	Yes.

## **WACM 2**

<b>Panel Member</b>	<b>Better facilitates ACO (a)</b>	<b>Better facilitates ACO (b)?</b>	<b>Better facilitates ACO (c)?</b>	<b>Overall (Y/N)</b>
Bob Brown	No. 5 years creates uncertainty and delays any benefit to an unacceptable degree.	Neutral.	Neutral.	No.
Garth Graham	No. The Original is better as it introduces the change without unreasonable delay. Given that there is a minimum two year implementation period plus the notice parties have had to factor in this change the change should be implemented as soon as reasonably practical.	Neutral.	No.	No.
Simon Lord	Yes.	Neutral.	Yes.	Yes.
Michael Dodd	Yes.	Neutral.	Yes.	Yes.

James Anderson	Yes	Neutral	Yes	Yes
Paul Jones	Yes, marginally, although 5 year implementation would significantly erode the value of benefit available.	Neutral.	Neutral.	Yes. Marginally better than baseline
Paul Mott	Yes.	Neutral.	Yes.	Yes.
Duncan Carter	No.	Neutral.	Neutral.	No.
Patrick Hynes	No.	Neutral.	No.	No.

**BEST**

Bob Brown	Baseline
Garth Graham	Original
Simon Lord	Original
Michael Dodd	Original
James Anderson	Original
Paul Jones	WACM1
Paul Mott	Original
Duncan Carter	Baseline
Patrick Hynes	Original